Afghanistan

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

I think that I, or anybody whether Ismailia Muslim or not, don�t have to necessarily agree upon everything that Hazar Imam says in worldly matters�Even Hazar Imam has said that in one of his interviews before. Though, it is absolutely necessary for an Ismaili Muslim to must agree upon everything said by Him in religious and spiritual matters�or else it�s a simple matter of abandonment of Ismaili Faith�

Most of Ismaili people don�t think like that due to several social and religious reasons�and I don�t mean to judge anybody, but personally I think, having that simple matter of discretion clouded�undermines the real meaning and interpretation of Imamat and it�s purpose. Particularly if someone is imposing their personal discretion on others just on the simple basis of being His spiritual Murid�.for me it�s just impractical and illogical to live with for anybody.

Hazar Imam is definitely one of the leading thinkers and intellectuals of the world today and I greatly admire and value his suggestions and ideas on all matters. I could be wrong on my assessment on Afghanistan or any other worldly matter but I have a right to have that choice based on my own knowledge and intellect. So does everyone else.

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

"The Community always follows very closely the personal way of thinking
of the Imam. It's one of the particularities of Ismailis.

That�s just the attitude of the Ismailia community that has been developed but I don�t think He is implicitly implying that the community must do so�

Yeah, that�s the interview where He had explained His role as an Imam�and personal capabilities and shortfalls as a human being. They are different �personalities� and I think mixing them to make one is not such a great idea. As an Imam (divine authority), He is infallible and as a human being in worldly matters He is prone to mistakes and errors just like any other human being.

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

Though, it�s not about Afghanistan but I just wanted to point out what He thinks and said about drinking alcohol in that interview. I think that�s exactly the attitude every Muslim should have regarding alcohol� thinking rationally with your own intellect for good, rather than just take it from scriptures and believe in it intellectually blinded.

As for as Afghanistan�what matters is how people will play on the ground�which can go either worse way or good�status quo is not optimistic and I just personally don�t see any hope because fundamentals are not in place or are misplaced�.

A society can not be sustaining or progressing for long or built upon scratch without regional corporations�currently the whole area is just divided and controlled by foreigners by force which came from far and are duplicitous from within�you can find latest political and military reports about the area and see how screwed things are�

Anyways�that was just my two cents.

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

of course developing and third world emerged all right in last 50 years with less or more progress area wise, but you know, 50 years is a really long time in terms of how things matters in today�s world�I mean generally speaking, look at the events of this decade only�no one would have already imagined and predicted, for sure, of what had happened in 2001 and the aftermaths, the events in financial markets in U.S. and the world within last two years and so�you know, there is so much uncertainty in every aspect of human life nowadays that , I think, next 50 years would probably be like last 500 years or more in terms of changes that can occur ahead�what I sense from what I see is that politically, technologically, economically and socially�things are just hanging and moving in random orders�and will just depend on how we act or react with events down the road.

With Afghanistan, even NATO and other institutions lately are admitting defeat in sense of progress and showing no clear vision of what they are doing there or would be doing from here. I think the whole approach was wrong from the very beginning�and now it seems like they are just sucked into it with no strategy of further maneuvers or exit on hand�maybe it was just meant to be that way and they knew it. I hope but don�t see wherewithal for serious progress in that area. I think, within days after they leave, the board will be upside down. Also progress is relative and subjective matter for some people�

I don�t know where you got the message from that in His views He is infallible even in worldly matters�I think He was clear on that in that interview. And, God forbid, I really don�t think it will make him any lesser Imam or divine Authority.

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

This discussion is getting a little bit off of the topic but more interesting to understand a lot of things.

Yes, His guidance encompasses all matters and is absolute truth but that is if it is directed to His murids in sort of like direct instructions or Farmans�

My understanding is that as a human being with flesh and bones and other humanly attributes He is just as much capable as humanly possible in worldly matters as His Highness The Aga Khan and his statements or actions will be reflecting that fact�or else it would be that people who believe in him as divine authority in religious and spiritual matters would have to interpret His every action and word as God�s words, does not matter where and whom He is addressing, which I think will contradict to what He said about Himself as a human being in that interview�

Though, as I said, He is also one of the top geniuses in a lot of matters of humanity and I find a lot of wisdom in His words on anything He talks about, aside from being the manifested God According to Ismaili faith but I personally am not comfortable mixing His role of an Imam and The Aga khan. I find that it might be leading to violation of the basic Islamic principle of Unity of God or Tauheed�

Another interesting point is that I think, we shouldn�t just idealize whatever Ismailies do, either as an individual or community in every aspect, as the principle of the Ismaili faith�.just like Islam and Muslims are two different things and not everything what Muslims do reflects the true Islam�

The fact that Hazar Imam has taken the role as a leader of Ismaili community for it�s material and worldly uplift as well as religious or spiritual well being is kind of arbitrary due to the demands of the time and environment that we are living in and it�s great and appreciated a lot by everyone but, I think, that is not as something of a absolute nature for all Ismailies.

There are several examples where Hazar Imam�s business ventures or other social matters did not succeed as He wanted to or would have wanted to�so how is that explained?

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

October 2, 2009
Op-Ed Contributors
Putting the �I� in Aid
By PETER BERGEN and SAMEER LALWANI
Washington

THE top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, is right to warn that efforts to rebuild that country depend on winning the �struggle to gain the support of the people.� And few issues do more to stoke the resentment of ordinary Afghans than the tens of billions of dollars of foreign aid from which they have seen little or no benefit. They see legions of Westerners sitting in the backs of S.U.V.�s clogging the streets of Kabul and ask themselves what exactly those foreigners have done to improve their daily lives.

Eight years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. And by some estimates 40 percent of international aid leaves the Afghan economy as quickly as it comes in � going to pay Western security contractors, maintain back offices in the West and pay Western-style salaries, benefits and vacations � while as little as 20 percent of that aid reaches its intended recipients. Compounding this problem, the salaries of imported civilian workers are orders of magnitude higher than those of their Afghan peers. Some employees of the United States Agency for International Development, for instance, earn more than 300 times the monthly pay of an Afghan teacher.

Yes, when it comes to large-scale projects like building roads and hospitals, Western contractors have to take the lead because Afghan companies are years away from having enough experience. But there is a way for the Afghan government to recoup some of the billions of dollars of aid flowing to those contractors and being recycled back to the West: tax it.

Foreign contractors and corporations working in Afghanistan do not pay income taxes there; and if they do pay taxes at all, it is to their home governments. America and its European allies could easily give up claims on taxes from their citizens working in Afghanistan and instead condition contracts so that the workers and the companies that employ them pay Afghan taxes. The loss in tax revenue suffered by Western countries would be trivial compared to the good will this would engender among Afghans. Right now the government�s tax revenues total a paltry $300 million. Taxing foreign technical assistance alone � an estimated $1.6 billion annually � could double this revenue.

And this would require little sacrifice from the 70,000 or so foreigners working in Afghanistan. Afghan taxes are quite low, with the highest bracket set at 20 percent, while technical advisers from Western development agencies can earn $9,000 to $22,000 per month and private contractors can earn even more. With Western unemployment rates high, it is unlikely that having to pay a relatively paltry amount of tax to Afghanistan would deter contractors or corporations from taking on lucrative work there.

The money isn�t the only issue: because it is dependent on foreign aid for about 90 percent of its budget, Afghanistan is fiscally and politically unaccountable to its people. The government needs to build a taxation bureaucracy or it will never develop many of the abilities critical to governance, like budgeting and allocating resources. Since the taxable Afghan population is now tiny � most citizens are either desperately poor or operate within the large black market economy � the quickest path to developing a working revenue system is by taxing the foreign workers and companies.

New tax revenues from foreign contractors should be used, above all, to pay down a substantial portion of the cost of building up the Afghan National Army, which is $1 billion to $2 billion annually. Foreign contractors have a vested interest in helping the army develop, as it will eventually provide the security that will allow them to continue enjoying their lucrative contracts after Western forces eventually withdraw.

While they face risks, contractors in Afghanistan are also faring quite well financially. It�s time they returned some of that wealth to the Afghan people.

Peter Bergen is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation. Sameer Lalwani is a research fellow there.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/opinion/02bergen.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted=print

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

Yes, that�s absolutely right�but, I think, that is said and to be taken in the religious and spiritual context of His role as an Iman� and as He had said in that interview:

��One has to make a very careful distinction here between worldly and religious matters. An Ismaili may ask My advice on a worldly problem, then not accept it��

Hence, that choice is personal and discretionary and I think, having that choice is a not a sign of wavering faith in Him as the Imam of the time.

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

October 4, 2009
Op-Ed Contributors
10 Steps to Victory in Afghanistan

Reform or Go Home

COUNTERINSURGENCY is only as good as the government it supports. NATO could do everything right � it isn�t � but will still fail unless Afghans trust their government. Without essential reform, merely making the government more efficient or extending its reach will just make things worse.

Only a legitimately elected Afghan president can enact reforms, so at the very least we need to see a genuine run-off election or an emergency national council, called a loya jirga, before winter. Once a legitimate president emerges, we need to see immediate action from him on a publicly announced reform program, developed in consultation with Afghan society and enforced by international monitors. Reforms should include firing human rights abusers and drug traffickers, establishing an independent authority to investigate citizen complaints and requiring officials to live in the districts they are responsible for (fewer than half do).

Other steps might include a census and district-level elections (promised since 2001, but never held), fair and effective taxation to replace kickbacks and extortion, increased pay to diligent local officials, the transfer of more budgetary authority to the provinces and the creation of local courts for dispute resolution.

If we see no genuine progress on such steps toward government responsibility, the United States should �Afghanize,� draw down troops and prepare to mitigate the inevitable humanitarian disaster that will come when the Kabul government falls to the Taliban � which, in the absence of reform, it eventually and deservedly will.

� DAVID KILCULLEN, a former adviser to Gen. David Petraeus and the author of �The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One�

�

End Suicide Attacks

TO win in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies must prevent the rise of a new generation of anti-American terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists.

The metric for measuring this threat is not the amount of territory controlled by the Taliban or Al Qaeda, but the number of people willing to be recruited as suicide terrorists. These individuals are motivated not by the existence of a terrorist sanctuary, but by deep anger at the presence of foreign forces on land they prize.

This is why the number of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, overwhelmingly against military targets, has skyrocketed as United States and NATO forces have increasingly occupied the country from 2006 on. There were nine attacks in 2005, 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first six months of this year.

It is imperative to decrease the number of suicide attacks. Given the ethnic divisions of the country, our best tactic is to use political and economic means to empower local Pashtuns to feel that they have greater autonomy from both Taliban and Western domination, and less need to respond violently.

A similar strategy toward Sunni groups in Anbar Province reduced anti-American suicide terrorism in Iraq and is our best way forward in Afghanistan.

� ROBERT A. PAPE, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and the author of �Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism�

�

If You Can�t Beat Them, Let Them Join

WITHIN a year, we must persuade large numbers of insurgents to lay down their arms or switch to the government�s side. Afghanistan�s doughty warriors have a tradition of changing alliances, but success will require both military operations focused on the insurgent leadership and, even more important, incentives for fighters at the local level.

Mid-level insurgents and their followers should be offered a chance to join a revised version of the Afghan Public Protection Force. These local self-defense forces should be expanded and tied to legitimate local governing structures � both official and tribal. The majority of development funds should be funneled to leaders to strengthen local governance and development and pay the militias� salaries.

Local self-defense forces in Colombia, Peru, South Vietnam and, most recently, Iraq, have proved very successful. The creation of a viable force like this is the single most important benchmark for the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan.

� LINDA ROBINSON, the author of �Tell Me How This Ends: Gen. David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq�

�

Pump Up the Police

FOR all the disputes over strategy, virtually everyone agrees that we need to strengthen the Afghan security forces, make them true partners and put them in the lead. Afghans want lasting security, and they want it to have an Afghan face.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, wisely wants to double the size of the Afghan Army and increase the police forces to 160,000 men. This requires not just money, but also a commitment to send more trainers, embedded advisers and partner units. At the moment, international forces in Afghanistan say they still lack about 30 percent of the trainers and mentors needed to train even the current police force.

Creating effective security forces will also require more aid to create a functioning local justice system with courts, lawyers and jails. This will take at least a decade, so for the short term we should assist efforts to revive Afghanistan�s traditional justice systems.

� ANTHONY CORDESMAN, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

�

Kick Out Corruption

TO defeat the insurgency, the Afghan government and its main partner, the United States, need to win the confidence of the public. Accountability must replace the widespread immunity enjoyed by officials who abuse their power.

Despite all the problems with our recent election, the incoming government will have a chance to start fresh, and a proper vetting of all new officials is the place to begin. This means establishing strict accountability mechanisms for high officials in the districts and provinces as well as in the ministries and directorates in Kabul. Simply shuffling abusive and incompetent officials among offices � as has been the norm over the past eight years � keeps the public from getting the governmental services it needs.

While the corruption in Kabul is well known, the alliances that American and other foreign forces have made at the local level with abusive officials and influential figures have emboldened those Afghans and alarmed the Afghan public. These alliances must be examined and stopped. The next government should make a statement by quickly clearing out some of the most blatantly corrupt officials.

� NADER NADERY, a commissioner on the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

�

Learn to Tax From the Taliban

SKEPTICS of state-building proposals question whether the Kabul government � now almost fully dependent on foreign aid � will ever be able to support the military and police forces being trained. Yet there has been comparatively little investment by the international community in helping Kabul collect taxes, even though insurgents and corrupt officials have proved it can be done.

In addition to collecting taxes from the illegal opium trade, Taliban forces extort money from trucks carrying legal cargo through their territories and demand �protection fees� from local businesses, even hitting up construction projects financed by NATO.

Government officials also take illegal kickbacks � one governor in the eastern part of the country is reported to earn as much as $10 million a month extorting trucking firms. But this money doesn�t end up in state coffers � it just lines the governor�s deep pockets.

The �civilian surge� should include tax experts who could help federal and provincial officials develop mechanisms for collecting revenue � and make sure that money ends up where it belongs.

� GRETCHEN PETERS, the author of �Seeds of Terror�

�

Polls Have the Power

BY and large, my generation of military professionals trained for and thought about what we might call �Type A� war � modern war, featuring the clash of mechanized forces fielded by industrial states. Happily, we never had to fight the Soviets on the northern German plain, though Operation Desert Storm showed we might have been pretty good at it, had the balloon gone up.

In Afghanistan we�re fighting a �Type B� war that is in some of its essentials �postmodern.� Like postmodernism itself, the concept has a variety of meanings and may not represent a coherent set of ideas. But one thing is clear: the Type B enemy likely has little to lose � no territory to protect, few important targets at risk, perhaps even no life worth living. Thus the Type A objective of fatally weakening an opponent by destroying assets important to his success � in theory, a measurable process � is replaced in Type B war by the much more complicated, essentially unquantifiable task of defeating him.

In time, democracies tire of war, as well they should. Thus, the single most important factor a Type B enemy counts on is time. The outcome in Afghanistan may be determined already, simply because we�ve been there for eight years. The strategic center of gravity is American public opinion, which will tell us when we�ve run out of time. If you want to know how we are doing in Afghanistan, read the polls in America.

� MERRILL McPEAK, the chief of staff of the Air Force from 1990 to 1994

�

Take a Risk

WHILE in Afghanistan last summer as part of Gen. Stanley McChrystal�s initial assessment team, I found many American and other international units more focused on protecting themselves than protecting the Afghan population. Traveling through the allegedly secure city of Mazar-i-Sharif with a German unit, for example, was like touring Afghanistan by submarine. What little I saw of the city was through a small slit of bulletproof glass in an armored personnel carrier. (While I was a light-infantry officer in both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, I had never before traveled in an armored personnel carrier.) The Germans offered their assessment of security in the region, but since they lack regular face-to-face contact with the people living there, why should I trust their analysis? Can they speak with authority on the degree to which an insurgent campaign of intimidation is having an effect when they themselves keep the Afghans at such a distance?

It�s not just the Germans, though. Some American and other allied commanders also insist on protective measures that hamper troops from interacting with the population and gathering information on what is driving the conflict at the local level.

After eight years of war with little to show for American and allied efforts, many Americans have tired of the campaign in Afghanistan and are wary of putting our soldiers in greater danger. But if we are to be successful in Afghanistan, it is a risk we must take.

� ANDREW McDONALD EXUM, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security

�

Don�t Believe That We Can Afford to Lose

AMERICA cannot achieve even the minimal objective of preventing Al Qaeda from re-establishing safe havens in Afghanistan without a substantial increase in forces over the coming year. The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan�s south is growing. The Afghan and international forces there now cannot reverse that growth. They may not even be able to stem it. That is the assessment of the top American commander there, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

President Obama said in August, �If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans.� Some of his advisers now say the opposite: Taliban control will not lead to terrorist havens. Why not? Osama bin Laden first built camps in the territory of a Taliban leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, in the mid-1980s. Relations between Al Qaeda and the Taliban remain close. Even if they do not invite Al Qaeda in, could they, unlike Pakistan, keep Al Qaeda out? The president was right: the triumph of the Taliban will benefit Al Qaeda.

Rejecting General McChrystal�s request for more forces leaves two options. The United States withdraws and lets Afghanistan again collapse into chaos, or it keeps its military forces and civilians in harm�s way while denying them the resources they need to succeed. Neither is acceptable.

� FREDERICK KAGAN, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and KIMBERLY KAGAN, the president of the Institute for the Study of War

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Pakistani Patronage

THE government of Pakistan, through its intelligence agency, has long been a patron of the Afghan Taliban, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently warned that the collaboration continues. Pakistan sees the relationship as a way of hedging its bets in Afghanistan, an asset in its confrontation with India.

It is difficult to define a clear benchmark for ending that aid because the Pakistanis refuse to acknowledge that any relationship exists. But let us consider it to have ended or gone into remission if, a year from now, six consecutive months have gone by with no credible reporting of the sort that underlay the general�s observation.

The significance of this benchmark is threefold. First, Pakistani patronage is an impediment to subduing the Taliban. Second, it is an excellent gauge of how well or poorly NATO�s campaign in Afghanistan is going. Continued Pakistani dealing with the Taliban would reflect Islamabad�s judgment that it is going poorly enough that bets still must be hedged. Third, an end to the relationship would eliminate one of the biggest paradoxes in the rationale for the counterinsurgency: the Pakistani government that our efforts in Afghanistan are supposedly helping to save is assisting the forces from which we are trying to save it.

� PAUL R. PILLAR, a former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia at the C.I.A. and a professor in Georgetown University�s Security Studies Program

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/opinion/04afghanistan.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted=print

Biryani · Joined: 18 Jun 2009 Posts: 232 Location: London

An ex colleague of mine at work has her husband deployed in Afghanistan. I asked her about why her husband is in Afghanistan�after struggling to justify her answer with unsound reasons, she gave up and told me that she personally has no clue and they are just following what their government is telling them to do and they have no other choice right now� she said that she can�t even watch TV out of fear of getting the bad news.

What actually bothers me is not the deaths and destruction of Afghans or Americans; they both deserve each other. It is rather dying of these young Canadians in vain for nothing. They have no business combating half way across the world. Canada is sucked into this mess and losing it�s prestige as the traditional peace keeping blue berets. Just few years ago, typical Canadians traveling abroad were greeted with smiles and handshakes but that has been changed now with people�s resentment and anger shared along Americans. I hope Canada�s war in Afghanistan is Canada�s last war.

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

October 7, 2009
Returned Artifacts Displayed in Kabul
By SABRINA TAVERNISE

KABUL, Afghanistan � On most days, the news from Afghanistan involves something exploding. Which is why Tuesday was such a surprise: instead of bombings, it brought the unveiling of stolen treasures, some as old as the Bronze Age.

The National Museum was celebrating the return of about 2,000 artifacts that had been smuggled into Britain over the years of war in Afghanistan. British authorities confiscated the smuggled items and, after several years spent figuring out where the artifacts had come from, sent them back to Afghanistan in February.

The pieces were on public display for the first time on Tuesday. Visitors peered into glass cases holding delicate blue bowls from the 12th century, a bird-shaped oil burner, and an assortment of tools described as cutter, shaver, bayonet and chopper.

�These news stories don�t always make the front pages, but they should,� Mark Sedwill, the British ambassador to Afghanistan, said of the artifacts� return.

Afghanistan founded the museum in the 1920s, shortly after the country gained full control over its affairs from Britain. Situated at the crossroads of four great civilizations � Chinese, Central Asian, Indian and Persian � Afghanistan is a treasure trove for archaeologists.

�This whole area is so rich,� said Nancy Hatch Dupree, director of the Afghanistan Center at Kabul University, who has been involved with Afghan antiquities since the 1960s. �Part of the reason is its geopolitical location.�

By the time the Soviet Union invaded in 1979, the museum owned about 100,000 items. But when the pro-Moscow government collapsed in the early 1990s and civil war convulsed the country, artifacts began to disappear.

The neighborhood around the museum became too dangerous for government workers to visit. Archaeologists concerned about the museum�s fate negotiated with a rebel leader for the chance to reinforce it against intruders, but the steel doors they had installed proved ineffective. Thieves pulled them out of the mud walls, stole from the storeroom, and put the doors back.

Most of the artifacts in the Islamic room were burned when a rocket shell punched through the roof. �They were just little lumps of metal,� Mrs. Dupree recalled of the damaged items.

The plunder was devastating. Omara Khan Masoudi, the museum director, estimates that about 70 percent of the museum�s artifacts were stolen from 1992 to 1995, in the brutal years of civil war before the Taliban took over the country. The Taliban were not friends of the country�s archaeological heritage, either; they blew up ancient statues of Buddha in the name of Islam.

But some of the most important pieces the museum had were locked away in a secret location by museum administrators in the last years of the Communist government. The museum closed in 1991 and reopened again in 2004 after 13 years of war.

The items from Britain are not the first to be returned. About 13,000 artifacts have come back to Afghanistan from Norway, Denmark, Switzerland and the United States since the Taliban fell in 2001, according to Mr. Masoudi.

Some in the crowd on Tuesday were asking whether it was wise to display valuables.

Mrs. Dupree was sure that it was. �Afghanistan has to give a face to the world that they are more than just the Taliban and NATO,� she said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/world/asia/07afghan.html?_r=1&th&emc=th

kmaherali · Joined: 27 Mar 2003 Posts: 9913

There is a related multimedia linked at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/asia/13jurm.html

November 13, 2009
Afghan Enclave Seen as Model to Rebuild, and Rebuff Taliban
By SABRINA TAVERNISE

JURM, Afghanistan � Small grants given directly to villagers have brought about modest but important changes in this corner of Afghanistan, offering a model in a country where official corruption and a Taliban insurgency have frustrated many large-scale development efforts.

Since arriving in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States and its Western allies have spent billions of dollars on development projects, but to less effect and popular support than many had hoped for.

Much of that money was funneled through the central government, which has been increasingly criticized as incompetent and corrupt. Even more has gone to private contractors hired by the United States who siphon off almost half of every dollar to pay the salaries of expatriate workers and other overhead costs.

Not so here in Jurm, a valley in the windswept mountainous province of Badakhshan, in the northeast. People here have taken charge for themselves � using village councils and direct grants as part of an initiative called the National Solidarity Program, introduced by an Afghan ministry in 2003.

Before then, this valley had no electricity or clean water, its main crop was poppy and nearly one in 10 women died in childbirth, one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world.

Today, many people have water taps, fields grow wheat and it is no longer considered shameful for a woman to go to a doctor.

If there are lessons to be drawn from the still tentative successes here, they are that small projects often work best, that the consent and participation of local people are essential and that even baby steps take years.

The issues are not academic. Bringing development to Afghans is an important part of a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at drawing people away from the Taliban and building popular support for the Western-backed government by showing that it can make a difference in people�s lives.

�We ignored the people in districts and villages,� said Jelani Popal, who runs a state agency that appoints governors. �This caused a lot of indifference. �Why should I side with the government if it doesn�t even exist in my life?� �

Jurm was tormented by warlords in the 1990s, and though it never fell to the Taliban, the presence of the central government, even today, is barely felt. The idea to change that was simple: people elected the most trusted villagers, and the government in Kabul, helped by foreign donors, gave them direct grants � money to build things like water systems and girls� schools for themselves.

Local residents contend that the councils work because they take development down to its most basic level, with villagers directing the spending to improve their own lives, cutting out middle men, local and foreign, as well as much of the overhead costs and corruption.

�You don�t steal from yourself,� was how Ataullah, a farmer in Jurm who uses one name, described it.

The grants were small, often less than $100,000. The plan�s overall effectiveness is still being assessed by academics and American and Afghan officials, but the idea has already been replicated in thousands of villages across the country.

Anecdotal accounts point to some success. There have even been savings. When villages in the Jurm Valley wanted running water, for instance, they did much of the work themselves, with help from an engineer. A private contractor with links to a local politician had asked triple the price. (The villagers declined.)

Even such modest steps have not come easily. Jurm presented many obstacles, and it took a development group with determined local employees to jump-start the work here.

One basic problem was literacy, said Ghulam Dekan, a local worker with the Aga Khan Development Network, the nonprofit group that supports the councils here.

Unlike the situation in Iraq, which has a literacy rate of more than 70 percent, fewer than a third of Afghans can read, making the work of the councils painfully slow. Villagers were suspicious of projects, believing that the people in the groups that introduced them were Christian missionaries.

�They didn�t understand the importance of a road,� Mr. Dekan said.

Most projects, no matter how simple, took five years. Years of war had smashed Afghan society into rancorous bits, making it difficult to resist efforts by warlords to muscle in on projects.

�They said, �For God�s sake, we can�t do this, we don�t have the capability,� � Mr. Dekan said. �We taught them to have confidence.�

Muhamed Azghari, an Aga Khan employee, spent more than a year trying to persuade a mullah to allow a girls� school. His tactic: sitting lower than the man, a sign of deference, and praising his leadership. He paid for the man to visit other villages to see what other councils had accomplished.

�Ten times we fought, two times we laughed,� Mr. Dekan said, using the Afghan equivalent of �two steps forward, one step back.�

When it came to women, villagers were adamant.

But forcing conditions would have violated a basic principle of the approach: never start a project that is not backed by all members of the community, or it will fail.

�People have to be mentally ready,� said Akhtar Iqbal, Aga Khan�s director in Badakhshan. If they are not, the school or clinic will languish unused, a frequent problem with large-scale development efforts.

Five years later, the village of Fargamanch has women�s literacy classes and a girls� high school. Over all, girls� enrollment in Badakhshan is up by 65 percent since 2004, according to the Ministry of Education. The number of trained midwives has quadrupled.

Health has also improved. Now, 3,270 families have taps for clean drinking water near their homes, reducing waterborne diseases.

The councils are also a check on corruption. When 200 bags of wheat mysteriously disappeared from the local government this year, council members demanded they be returned. (They were.)

When a minister�s aide cashed a check meant for a transformer, Mr. Ataullah spent a week tracking down a copy. (The aide was fired.)

�The government doesn�t like us anymore,� Mr. Azghari said, laughing. �They want the old system back.�

While Badakhshan�s changes are fragile, the forces of modernization are growing. Televisions have begun to broadcast the outside world into villages. Phone networks cover more than 80 percent of the province, triple what the figure was in 2001.

Perhaps most important, Afghans are tired of war, and seeing the benefits of a decade of peace might be enough to encourage new kinds of decisions.

Ghulam Mohaiuddin, a farmer, seethes when he remembers the past.

�The jihad was useless,� he said, sitting cross-legged in his mud-walled house.

Suddenly, a loud blast went off, startling his guests. He laughed. It was the sound of canal construction, not a bomb.

�Now we�ve put down our weapons and started building,� he said, smiling.

Sangar Rahimi contributed reporting.

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