August 21, 2008
Op-Ed Contributors
All the Oil We Need
By EUGENE GHOLZ and DARYL G. PRESS
WHILE oil prices have declined somewhat of late, the volatility of the market and the political and religious unrest in major oil-producing countries has Americans worrying more than ever about energy security. But they have little to fear — contrary to common understanding, there are robust stockpiles of oil around the globe that could see us through any foreseeable calamities on the world market.
True, trouble for the world’s energy supplies could come from many directions. Hurricanes and other natural disasters could suddenly disrupt oil production or transportation. Iran loudly and regularly proclaims that it can block oil exports from the Persian Gulf. The anti-American rhetoric of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela raises fears of an export cutoff there. And ongoing civil unrest wreaks havoc with Nigeria’s output.
Even worse, this uncertainty comes in the context of worrisome reports that oil producers have little spare capacity, meaning that they could not quickly ramp up production to compensate for a disruption.
But such fears rest on a misunderstanding. The world actually has enormous spare oil capacity. It has simply moved. In the past, major oil producers like Saudi Arabia controlled it. But for years the world’s major consumers have bought extra oil to fill their emergency petroleum reserves.
Moreover, whereas the world’s reserve supply once sat in relatively inaccessible pools, much of it now sits in easily accessible salt caverns and storage tanks. And consumers control the spigots. During a supply disruption, Americans would no longer have to rely on the good will of foreign governments.
The United States alone has just more than 700 million barrels of crude oil in its Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Government stockpiles in Europe add nearly another 200 million barrels of crude and more than 200 million barrels of refined products. In Asia, American allies hold another 400 million barrels. And China is creating a reserve that should reach more than 100 million barrels by 2010.
Those figures only count the government-controlled stocks. Private inventories fluctuate with market conditions, but American commercial inventories alone include well over a billion barrels. Adding up commercial and government stockpiles, the major consuming countries around the world control more than four billion barrels.
Some policy makers and analysts worry that these emergency stocks are too small. For example, they sometimes compare the American strategic reserve to total American consumption, so the reserves appear dangerously inadequate. The United States consumes about 20 million barrels of oil every day, so the Strategic Petroleum Reserve could only supply the country for 35 days. (Furthermore, the United States could not draw oil out of the reserve at anything approaching a rate of 20 million barrels per day.) This is why President Bush in his 2007 State of the Union address called for doubling the strategic reserve.
But this vulnerability is a mirage. The size of plausible disruptions, not total consumption, determines the adequacy of global reserves. The worst oil disruptions in history deprived global markets of five million to six million barrels per day. Specifically, the collapse of the Iranian oil industry during the revolution in 1978 cut production by nearly five million barrels a day, and the sanctions on Iraq after its conquest of Kuwait in 1990 eliminated 5.3 million barrels of supply. If a future disruption were as bad as history’s worst, American and allied governments’ crude oil stocks alone could replace every lost barrel for eight months.
Current fears about energy security focus on Iran. For example, Tehran could sharply cut its oil exports to drive up global prices. Of course, this would be the economic equivalent of suicide terrorism: oil exports provide more than 80 percent of Iranian government revenues, and a major cutback would wreck Iran’s economy.
It would also be futile because the industrialized world could easily replace Iranian oil. Iran only exports 2.5 million barrels each day. A coordinated release of reserve crude by the United States and its European and Asian allies could replace missing Iranian barrels for a year and a half. Iran is vulnerable; the West is not.
Of course, we are told, Iran might be able to take Saudi, Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil off the market, too, by attacking oil tankers as they pass through the Strait of Hormuz, along Iran’s coast. It’s conceivable, but not likely.
Significantly impeding oil traffic would require a sustained military campaign. Dozens of tankers carry more than 15 million barrels of crude through the strait every day. The water is so deep that the navigable channel for supertankers is 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. There is simply too much traffic across too much space for the waterway to be easily blocked.
Countries have attacked oil infrastructure before, and the results were underwhelming. During the Iran-Iraq war, Baghdad and Tehran struck each other’s oil terminals and tankers repeatedly, but they proved to be very resilient targets. Rugged structures and quick maintenance meant that Iran’s Kharg Island terminal kept pumping despite repeated bombings. Tankers, which dwarf aircraft carriers, have thick hulls designed to prevent oil spills and, when attacked, proved to have few sensitive parts where a “lucky” hit could cause serious damage. They managed to keep the oil flowing through Persian Gulf waters throughout the Iran-Iraq war.
Today, Iran has more advanced anti-ship weapons, and it could surely harass commercial tanker traffic. But it would be hard pressed to sustain an anti-shipping campaign sufficient to reduce oil flows drastically for weeks on end, especially in the face of an intense military response. Even if Iran were able to reduce oil flow though the strait by, say, 30 percent, global reserves could replace losses of that magnitude for more than nine months — plenty of time for the Navy to counter Iranian military operations.
Make no mistake, any major disruption — from a war, a terrorist attack or a natural disaster — would make prices jump until markets realized that the pipes feeding crude into refineries were not going to run dry. But recognizing the great capacity of global reserves to weather disruptions will go a long way to minimizing panic.
Emergency reserves have their limits. They cannot free the industrialized world from the underlying economic fundamentals that drive energy prices. As the global economy grows, demand for energy will rise and oil prices may remain high.
Government-controlled stockpiles should not be used to try to smooth out short-term blips in global supplies, the normal variations that companies account for with their inventories and financial hedging. Public inventories are a blunt instrument designed to protect the oil market as a whole from major disruptions — national strikes, hurricane damage, wars and attempts at geopolitical blackmail.
Paradoxically, our exaggerated fears over energy security have some benefits — for example, they may reduce the United States’ inclination to attack Iran. But they also have big costs. Politicians could be induced to try costly solutions for problems that don’t exist, like President Bush’s commitment to double the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Western leaders may also pay too much heed to an oil producer’s saber rattling. And, finally, exaggerated fear may encourage oil-market traders to panic at the first sign of even a small disturbance. When it comes to energy security, let’s not let fear get the best of common sense.
Eugene Gholz is an associate professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College.
THE MIDDLE EAST
All Gadhafi's children -- a drama that keeps on going
The Economist
Tuesday, September 02, 2008
However much of a mess it has made of Libya, the Gadhafi family certainly puts on a diverting show. Like a television serial with several sub-plots, the drama involving Moammar Gadhafi, who has run his oil-rich state since seizing power 39 years ago, and his eight children, manages to sustain suspense even as the story twists in different directions at once.
For the past few years, a striking sub-plot has been Libya's emergence from the international isolation brought by its involvement in terrorism in the 1980s.
This story has now taken a final happy turn with the inking of an agreement with the United States to settle all outstanding legal claims between the two countries.
A compensation fund, likely to be filled by a mix of Libyan oil money and "donations" from big American firms keen to do business with Libya, will now pay the remaining compensation to American victims of the PanAm aircraft blown up over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988 and for other Libyan-sponsored attacks, as well as for 40-plus Libyans killed by an American bombing raid in 1986 in retaliation for an earlier terrorist incident.
The deal opens the way to a full restoration of diplomatic ties, severed in 1980, and marks the final stage of a process begun in 2001 to reintegrate Libya into the international community.
American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is expected to visit Libya this month, the first such visit by so senior an American diplomat since 1953.
Though American qualms linger over Libya's nasty treatment of dissidents, the step is seen as a necessary reward for Gadhafi's close co-operation in fighting jihadist terrorism and his decision in 2003 to dismantle a program to develop nuclear and chemical weapons.
Another long-running drama involves a challenge to the elder Gadhafi from his urbane son, Seif al-Islam.
A 35-year-old engineer who dabbles in painting and espouses such causes as environmentalism and human rights, he has emerged as a champion of a different vision for Libya, which most Libyans heartily agree has been dreadfully mismanaged under the dictatorship disguised behind his father's quirky ideology of "direct democracy."
Some of the younger Gadhafi's initiatives have had a degree of success. Like his father, he has held no official position.
But Engineer Seif, as he is known, has been credited with solving such tricky issues as last year's release of Bulgarian medical workers, whom the Libyan authorities had jailed on charges of infecting hundreds of children with AIDS.
He has promoted freer public debate, financing Libya's first privately owned newspapers and television stations, and encouraging the return of exiled dissidents. He has also been careful to shield his father from direct criticism.
Yet, despite the easing of blanket censorship, the passage of some market reforms, surging state earnings from oil and a growing openness to the outside world, the government is still chaotic, oppressive and opaque.
In recent speeches, Seif has sounded increasingly impatient with the slowness of change; many Libyans think he had begun to tread on important toes, including those of some of his siblings.
In a wide-ranging address to thousands of youths Aug. 20, he decried the "forest of dictatorships" characterizing the region and the tendency for sons to inherit their fathers' throne. He then stunned the audience by declaring that he planned to step aside from politics.
Opinions divide over what prompted this move. Made cynical by decades of the older Gadhafi's antics, many Libyans think his son's abdication is a stunt. As evidence they point to the eruption of "spontaneous" demonstrations in Libyan cities, where protesters have pleaded for the elder Gadhafi to intervene and persuade his son to return to the fray.
Others take the younger man's decision more seriously, as a sign that his lower-profile younger brother, Mutasim, a powerful figure in Libya's security agencies, has quietly moved to demote his would-be reformist brother.
Only Gadhafi senior can provide Libyans with the clues they're looking for, as to which son may win his blessing, in one of the rambling speeches for which he is known.
One sure thing is that it will not be the fifth one, Hannibal.
In another running sub-plot, he was arrested in July, yet again, in embarrassing circumstances, while on holiday in Europe.
After previous brushes with the law in Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, he was charged in Switzerland with beating up two hotel servants.
Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
The Economist
Tuesday, September 02, 2008
However much of a mess it has made of Libya, the Gadhafi family certainly puts on a diverting show. Like a television serial with several sub-plots, the drama involving Moammar Gadhafi, who has run his oil-rich state since seizing power 39 years ago, and his eight children, manages to sustain suspense even as the story twists in different directions at once.
For the past few years, a striking sub-plot has been Libya's emergence from the international isolation brought by its involvement in terrorism in the 1980s.
This story has now taken a final happy turn with the inking of an agreement with the United States to settle all outstanding legal claims between the two countries.
A compensation fund, likely to be filled by a mix of Libyan oil money and "donations" from big American firms keen to do business with Libya, will now pay the remaining compensation to American victims of the PanAm aircraft blown up over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988 and for other Libyan-sponsored attacks, as well as for 40-plus Libyans killed by an American bombing raid in 1986 in retaliation for an earlier terrorist incident.
The deal opens the way to a full restoration of diplomatic ties, severed in 1980, and marks the final stage of a process begun in 2001 to reintegrate Libya into the international community.
American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is expected to visit Libya this month, the first such visit by so senior an American diplomat since 1953.
Though American qualms linger over Libya's nasty treatment of dissidents, the step is seen as a necessary reward for Gadhafi's close co-operation in fighting jihadist terrorism and his decision in 2003 to dismantle a program to develop nuclear and chemical weapons.
Another long-running drama involves a challenge to the elder Gadhafi from his urbane son, Seif al-Islam.
A 35-year-old engineer who dabbles in painting and espouses such causes as environmentalism and human rights, he has emerged as a champion of a different vision for Libya, which most Libyans heartily agree has been dreadfully mismanaged under the dictatorship disguised behind his father's quirky ideology of "direct democracy."
Some of the younger Gadhafi's initiatives have had a degree of success. Like his father, he has held no official position.
But Engineer Seif, as he is known, has been credited with solving such tricky issues as last year's release of Bulgarian medical workers, whom the Libyan authorities had jailed on charges of infecting hundreds of children with AIDS.
He has promoted freer public debate, financing Libya's first privately owned newspapers and television stations, and encouraging the return of exiled dissidents. He has also been careful to shield his father from direct criticism.
Yet, despite the easing of blanket censorship, the passage of some market reforms, surging state earnings from oil and a growing openness to the outside world, the government is still chaotic, oppressive and opaque.
In recent speeches, Seif has sounded increasingly impatient with the slowness of change; many Libyans think he had begun to tread on important toes, including those of some of his siblings.
In a wide-ranging address to thousands of youths Aug. 20, he decried the "forest of dictatorships" characterizing the region and the tendency for sons to inherit their fathers' throne. He then stunned the audience by declaring that he planned to step aside from politics.
Opinions divide over what prompted this move. Made cynical by decades of the older Gadhafi's antics, many Libyans think his son's abdication is a stunt. As evidence they point to the eruption of "spontaneous" demonstrations in Libyan cities, where protesters have pleaded for the elder Gadhafi to intervene and persuade his son to return to the fray.
Others take the younger man's decision more seriously, as a sign that his lower-profile younger brother, Mutasim, a powerful figure in Libya's security agencies, has quietly moved to demote his would-be reformist brother.
Only Gadhafi senior can provide Libyans with the clues they're looking for, as to which son may win his blessing, in one of the rambling speeches for which he is known.
One sure thing is that it will not be the fifth one, Hannibal.
In another running sub-plot, he was arrested in July, yet again, in embarrassing circumstances, while on holiday in Europe.
After previous brushes with the law in Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, he was charged in Switzerland with beating up two hotel servants.
Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
Soap opera Noor takes Arab world by storm
Globe and Mail Update
August 30, 2008 at 12:05 AM EDT
WEST BANK — It's ending today — just in time for the beginning of Ramadan — but the racy TV series called Noor will no doubt continue to generate controversy in the Arab world.
With its melodramatic subplots, which include abortion and extramarital affairs, its underlying feminist stand and its titillating romantic scenes, Noor has caused an uproar since it began airing five months ago.
In Saudi Arabia, between three and four million people watch Noor daily, out of a population of almost 28 million, according to MBC, the Saudi-owned Arab satellite channel that broadcasts the show. Elsewhere, millions more Arabs have arranged their daily plans around the soap opera, so they can watch the story of the young, beautiful, independent fashion designer named Noor and her handsome, romantic and supportive husband, Muhannad.
The blend of romance, feminism and tradition has entranced Muslim female — and young male — viewers, but some conservative Muslims say that Noor projects the wrong roles for women.
Enlarge Image
A family watches the Turkish soap opera 'Noor' in Jeddah July 26, 2008. The show which flopped when first broadcast in its native Turkey three years ago has taken the Arab world by storm, provoking a flood of Gulf Arab tourists to Turkey that even includes royalty. (Susan Baaghil/Reuters)
"May God curse this Noor show," swore Mazen Harallah, a taxi driver in Ramallah, as he drove through deserted streets minutes after the program began. "What problems it has caused!"
And, while numerous fans have named their babies after Noor and Muhannad and anything with the couple's picture on it flies off shopkeepers' shelves, there are also reports that many people have divorced as a result of the series.
Originally a Turkish soap opera that failed, the series was edited into shorter episodes and dubbed into Arabic by a Syrian production company.
Less conservative
Al-Quds al-Arabi, a London-based Arabic daily newspaper, called the show "an absolute phenomenon."
Western soap operas and series such as Friends have aired in the Arab world for years, but Noor — clearly set in a Muslim country with Muslim characters — has caused much more of a sensation.
Some aspects of the story follow Muslim traditions: The couple are the result of an arranged marriage, they live in a building shared with their extended family and they fast during Ramadan.
But the characters are less conservative than most Muslim Arabs. Some wear plunging necklines, others drink alcohol, one lives with his girlfriend. They kiss, touch and get pregnant without being married.
"This series collides with our Islamic religion, values and traditions," said Hamed Bitawi, an official of the Islamic Hamas movement and preacher in the West Bank city of Nablus, in an interview with The Associated Press.
Nevertheless, during a random visit to a five-storey building in the Ramallah suburb of Kufr Aqab, Noor was on TV screens in almost all of the 12 apartments and everyone at home was glued to the screen. Some husbands were conspicuously absent; they came home when it was over.
That may be because Muhannad is an almost impossible character to live up to, said the mother of the Al-Qadi family on the fourth floor. "Our society does not allow men to be romantic like Muhannad," said Um Sanad. "In our environment, with all the stress, it is very difficult to be romantic."
At the same time, her tall, dark-haired 16-year-old son, Sanad, sees the handsome Turkish actor as a role model.
"I want to be romantic like him," said the dark-haired Sanad, smiling softly.
'Apart of our lives'
One floor up at the Abu-Leileh home, Magdi, 20, waited until the commercials started before he answered the door. He and his friend Ahmed Bader, 18, watch the show religiously as they smoke L&M cigarettes and drink XL energy drinks.
"I love it because of the love stories and how the problems are solved," said Mr. Bader. Part of the reason for Noor's popularity over the numerous Egyptian soap operas was because "Egyptian soap operas are only 30 episodes, but this one has become a part of our lives," he said.
Across the hall, Tahiyeh Rayan, 36, has conflicted feelings as she watches Noor with four daughters and three sons. "It has destroyed the character of the young and old," she said. "It has a lot of romance." Unlike the characters on the show, all of her daughters cover their hair, as Islam requires.
As she spoke, the character Muhannad entered a bedroom where Noor lay on the bed wearing tight jeans. Muhannad leaned over her, looked deeply into her eyes and handed her a red rose.
Although Mrs. Rayan said she "opposed" the program, she watches it and said she liked Muhannad's mother, Sharifa, "because she's strong even though her husband left her and she always tries to bring the family together."
Mohammed Azmeh, a thin, bespectacled 39-year-old truck driver and father of four daughters and a son, leaves his fourth-floor apartment when Noor comes on and goes to the neighbourhood supermarket to watch the news.
But he has no opposition to his family watching it. On the contrary, he encourages his eldest daughter, 16-year-old Areen, to see it.
"It motivates women to develop their character," he said. "This show makes my daughter grow up stronger. She won't be a slave to her husband. She'll be independent."
Mr. Azmeh added that, "Any man who does not like the program for that reason has psychological problems."
Orly Halpern is a freelance writer based in Jerusalem.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ ... rnational/
Globe and Mail Update
August 30, 2008 at 12:05 AM EDT
WEST BANK — It's ending today — just in time for the beginning of Ramadan — but the racy TV series called Noor will no doubt continue to generate controversy in the Arab world.
With its melodramatic subplots, which include abortion and extramarital affairs, its underlying feminist stand and its titillating romantic scenes, Noor has caused an uproar since it began airing five months ago.
In Saudi Arabia, between three and four million people watch Noor daily, out of a population of almost 28 million, according to MBC, the Saudi-owned Arab satellite channel that broadcasts the show. Elsewhere, millions more Arabs have arranged their daily plans around the soap opera, so they can watch the story of the young, beautiful, independent fashion designer named Noor and her handsome, romantic and supportive husband, Muhannad.
The blend of romance, feminism and tradition has entranced Muslim female — and young male — viewers, but some conservative Muslims say that Noor projects the wrong roles for women.
Enlarge Image
A family watches the Turkish soap opera 'Noor' in Jeddah July 26, 2008. The show which flopped when first broadcast in its native Turkey three years ago has taken the Arab world by storm, provoking a flood of Gulf Arab tourists to Turkey that even includes royalty. (Susan Baaghil/Reuters)
"May God curse this Noor show," swore Mazen Harallah, a taxi driver in Ramallah, as he drove through deserted streets minutes after the program began. "What problems it has caused!"
And, while numerous fans have named their babies after Noor and Muhannad and anything with the couple's picture on it flies off shopkeepers' shelves, there are also reports that many people have divorced as a result of the series.
Originally a Turkish soap opera that failed, the series was edited into shorter episodes and dubbed into Arabic by a Syrian production company.
Less conservative
Al-Quds al-Arabi, a London-based Arabic daily newspaper, called the show "an absolute phenomenon."
Western soap operas and series such as Friends have aired in the Arab world for years, but Noor — clearly set in a Muslim country with Muslim characters — has caused much more of a sensation.
Some aspects of the story follow Muslim traditions: The couple are the result of an arranged marriage, they live in a building shared with their extended family and they fast during Ramadan.
But the characters are less conservative than most Muslim Arabs. Some wear plunging necklines, others drink alcohol, one lives with his girlfriend. They kiss, touch and get pregnant without being married.
"This series collides with our Islamic religion, values and traditions," said Hamed Bitawi, an official of the Islamic Hamas movement and preacher in the West Bank city of Nablus, in an interview with The Associated Press.
Nevertheless, during a random visit to a five-storey building in the Ramallah suburb of Kufr Aqab, Noor was on TV screens in almost all of the 12 apartments and everyone at home was glued to the screen. Some husbands were conspicuously absent; they came home when it was over.
That may be because Muhannad is an almost impossible character to live up to, said the mother of the Al-Qadi family on the fourth floor. "Our society does not allow men to be romantic like Muhannad," said Um Sanad. "In our environment, with all the stress, it is very difficult to be romantic."
At the same time, her tall, dark-haired 16-year-old son, Sanad, sees the handsome Turkish actor as a role model.
"I want to be romantic like him," said the dark-haired Sanad, smiling softly.
'Apart of our lives'
One floor up at the Abu-Leileh home, Magdi, 20, waited until the commercials started before he answered the door. He and his friend Ahmed Bader, 18, watch the show religiously as they smoke L&M cigarettes and drink XL energy drinks.
"I love it because of the love stories and how the problems are solved," said Mr. Bader. Part of the reason for Noor's popularity over the numerous Egyptian soap operas was because "Egyptian soap operas are only 30 episodes, but this one has become a part of our lives," he said.
Across the hall, Tahiyeh Rayan, 36, has conflicted feelings as she watches Noor with four daughters and three sons. "It has destroyed the character of the young and old," she said. "It has a lot of romance." Unlike the characters on the show, all of her daughters cover their hair, as Islam requires.
As she spoke, the character Muhannad entered a bedroom where Noor lay on the bed wearing tight jeans. Muhannad leaned over her, looked deeply into her eyes and handed her a red rose.
Although Mrs. Rayan said she "opposed" the program, she watches it and said she liked Muhannad's mother, Sharifa, "because she's strong even though her husband left her and she always tries to bring the family together."
Mohammed Azmeh, a thin, bespectacled 39-year-old truck driver and father of four daughters and a son, leaves his fourth-floor apartment when Noor comes on and goes to the neighbourhood supermarket to watch the news.
But he has no opposition to his family watching it. On the contrary, he encourages his eldest daughter, 16-year-old Areen, to see it.
"It motivates women to develop their character," he said. "This show makes my daughter grow up stronger. She won't be a slave to her husband. She'll be independent."
Mr. Azmeh added that, "Any man who does not like the program for that reason has psychological problems."
Orly Halpern is a freelance writer based in Jerusalem.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ ... rnational/
Painting over historic hatreds with the hope of children
This biblical community is proof that Arabs and Jews are not natural-born enemies
Paula Arab
Calgary Herald
Thursday, September 04, 2008
There's something universally special about children's artwork. One of my favourite pieces is hanging in my office, by artist Lily, the little daughter of my friend Donna.
Lily depicted our day on the beach and gave the sun a fancy pair of shades, which always makes me smile.
I'm also impressed (but chagrined) that she drew me shorter than her mom and dad. No vertically challenged jokes, please. My point is, lovely Lily captured the mood with enough detail to take me straight back to that beach whenever I look at her painting.
It reminds me art is a powerful storyteller. It's so powerful, it can break through cultural and political barriers, and conflict as old as the tensions in the Middle East.
Calgary is about to experience that power with the opening of the show See Us From Your Heart, exhibiting artwork by Israeli and Palestinian children. The kids made the paintings and drawings together, side-by-side, at a special overnight art workshop held in a magical-sounding place in Israel called Oasis of Peace.
Located between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Oasis of Peace is a co-operative village where an equal number of Jewish and Arab (Christian and Muslim) families have coexisted peacefully for more than 30 years.
The village school -- from primary to Grade 6 -- is binational and bilingual, with each class taught by two teachers -- one Arab and one Jewish. Kids learn both Arabic and Hebrew and are encouraged to speak candidly about the political climate around them.
This stunning community overlooking the biblical Ayalon Valley is proof that Arabs and Jews are not natural-born enemies. The human story of this troubled region jumps off the canvas and drawings, created just three months ago after 25 Palestinian 10- to 13-year-olds were invited to visit from a nearby refugee camp in the West Bank. They joined 25 Jewish and Arab kids the same age, who live in the village.
During their time together, the children created 80 pieces of art, 33 of which are in Calgary for the opening of what will be a cross-Canada exhibit, if organizers are able to find venues willing to participate. (Those interested should contact bdushinski@shaw.ca.)
"We don't hear stories of hope because people have given up on that part of the world," says Calgary nurse Brenda Hamdon-Dushinski, who visited the village last spring and, as part of the Canadian Friends of Oasis of Peace, is helping organize the exhibit.
"Art is a universal language that speaks to the heart of people better than words are able. I can see it in the paintings," she says of the work sitting in her living room ahead of Sunday's launch.
"They convey a story of pain, fear, hope and transformation."
Some paintings show bright images of colourful hillsides, peace symbols and doves. Others are profoundly heavy. In one, people are weeping blue tears that stream down their faces. Olive groves stand invitingly in the background, offering a branch of peace.
"You get a sense of where these children are and their current realities, but also their hopes and dreams. It shows through their art," says Hamdon-Dushinski. During her visit to the village as part of an independent medical team from Calgary, she befriended development director and former mayor Ahmand Hijazi.
He will be in Calgary for Sunday's launch at the Canyon Meadows Community Centre in the southwest. The art will be on display for a day, before relocating to the Telus science centre's Creative Kids Museum for the rest of September. It then moves to the Alberta Children's Hospital.
During the launch, Hijazi will conduct a presentation on the story of the village. It's hard to imagine the existence of a place like the Oasis of Peace, which has successfully lived up to the vision of the priest who created it, Bruno Hussar. Many actors and other celebrities, including Richard Gere, are supporters of Oasis of Peace and have visited the village.
Some 54 families live there today while more than 300 are on a waiting list to move there. Its elected administration has just reached a deal with the Catholic monastery next door to buy enough land to build an additional 90 family homes.
Hamdon-Dushinski, who has made three trips to the region, says "there are many seeds of hope in that part of the world we don't hear about."
But the seeds need to grow and push through the wall that divides the children in the West Bank refugee camp from the children in the village. Bringing them together to participate in a common childhood activity like painting nurtures such a goal. It allows kids the same age but of different cultures to meet and interact in a normal way.
That way hopefully one day pictures of smiling suns with funky sunglasses will replace guns and blue tears.
parab@theherald.canwest.com
© The Calgary Herald 2008
This biblical community is proof that Arabs and Jews are not natural-born enemies
Paula Arab
Calgary Herald
Thursday, September 04, 2008
There's something universally special about children's artwork. One of my favourite pieces is hanging in my office, by artist Lily, the little daughter of my friend Donna.
Lily depicted our day on the beach and gave the sun a fancy pair of shades, which always makes me smile.
I'm also impressed (but chagrined) that she drew me shorter than her mom and dad. No vertically challenged jokes, please. My point is, lovely Lily captured the mood with enough detail to take me straight back to that beach whenever I look at her painting.
It reminds me art is a powerful storyteller. It's so powerful, it can break through cultural and political barriers, and conflict as old as the tensions in the Middle East.
Calgary is about to experience that power with the opening of the show See Us From Your Heart, exhibiting artwork by Israeli and Palestinian children. The kids made the paintings and drawings together, side-by-side, at a special overnight art workshop held in a magical-sounding place in Israel called Oasis of Peace.
Located between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Oasis of Peace is a co-operative village where an equal number of Jewish and Arab (Christian and Muslim) families have coexisted peacefully for more than 30 years.
The village school -- from primary to Grade 6 -- is binational and bilingual, with each class taught by two teachers -- one Arab and one Jewish. Kids learn both Arabic and Hebrew and are encouraged to speak candidly about the political climate around them.
This stunning community overlooking the biblical Ayalon Valley is proof that Arabs and Jews are not natural-born enemies. The human story of this troubled region jumps off the canvas and drawings, created just three months ago after 25 Palestinian 10- to 13-year-olds were invited to visit from a nearby refugee camp in the West Bank. They joined 25 Jewish and Arab kids the same age, who live in the village.
During their time together, the children created 80 pieces of art, 33 of which are in Calgary for the opening of what will be a cross-Canada exhibit, if organizers are able to find venues willing to participate. (Those interested should contact bdushinski@shaw.ca.)
"We don't hear stories of hope because people have given up on that part of the world," says Calgary nurse Brenda Hamdon-Dushinski, who visited the village last spring and, as part of the Canadian Friends of Oasis of Peace, is helping organize the exhibit.
"Art is a universal language that speaks to the heart of people better than words are able. I can see it in the paintings," she says of the work sitting in her living room ahead of Sunday's launch.
"They convey a story of pain, fear, hope and transformation."
Some paintings show bright images of colourful hillsides, peace symbols and doves. Others are profoundly heavy. In one, people are weeping blue tears that stream down their faces. Olive groves stand invitingly in the background, offering a branch of peace.
"You get a sense of where these children are and their current realities, but also their hopes and dreams. It shows through their art," says Hamdon-Dushinski. During her visit to the village as part of an independent medical team from Calgary, she befriended development director and former mayor Ahmand Hijazi.
He will be in Calgary for Sunday's launch at the Canyon Meadows Community Centre in the southwest. The art will be on display for a day, before relocating to the Telus science centre's Creative Kids Museum for the rest of September. It then moves to the Alberta Children's Hospital.
During the launch, Hijazi will conduct a presentation on the story of the village. It's hard to imagine the existence of a place like the Oasis of Peace, which has successfully lived up to the vision of the priest who created it, Bruno Hussar. Many actors and other celebrities, including Richard Gere, are supporters of Oasis of Peace and have visited the village.
Some 54 families live there today while more than 300 are on a waiting list to move there. Its elected administration has just reached a deal with the Catholic monastery next door to buy enough land to build an additional 90 family homes.
Hamdon-Dushinski, who has made three trips to the region, says "there are many seeds of hope in that part of the world we don't hear about."
But the seeds need to grow and push through the wall that divides the children in the West Bank refugee camp from the children in the village. Bringing them together to participate in a common childhood activity like painting nurtures such a goal. It allows kids the same age but of different cultures to meet and interact in a normal way.
That way hopefully one day pictures of smiling suns with funky sunglasses will replace guns and blue tears.
parab@theherald.canwest.com
© The Calgary Herald 2008
September 6, 2008
Isolation Over, Libyan Leader Meets With Rice
By HELENE COOPER
TRIPOLI, Libya — For the first time in more than half a century, a sitting American secretary of state is in Libya. Condoleezza Rice arrived here on Friday to meet with the man whom Ronald Reagan famously called the “mad dog of the Middle East.”
But that was then. Ms. Rice, after waiting at the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel here for an hour as the Ramadan sun set, finally got word that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi was ready to receive her at his Bab al Azizia residence — the same compound bombed by American airstrikes in 1986 during the height of tensions with Libya.
Amid a swarm of cameras and reporters, she walked into the receiving room where Mr. Qaddafi, clad in a long, flowing white robe, purple and gold sash, and a green Africa brooch, stood waiting to greet her.
He didn’t shake her hand; instead, he put his hand against his heart in a gesture that North African men often use to greet women, then motioned for her to take a seat. It was a very different Libyan leader, in the eyes of Ms. Rice and the Bush administration, from the man who had bedeviled six American presidents over the past four decades.
As far as the Bush administration is concerned, the Libyan leader is rehabilitated, his country removed from the State Department’s terrorism list, his debt to the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 on its way to being paid, Libya’s stockpiles of chemical weapons destroyed and its secret nuclear weapons program dismantled.
His initial chat with Ms. Rice could not have been more pleasant. He politely inquired about her trip; Ms. Rice thanked him for his hospitality. He asked about the hurricanes; she told him America had dodged Gustav but was bracing for Hanna. And that was it for the public chit-chat, as the Libyan authorities quickly shooed the press out of the room while Ms. Rice sat, smiling broadly.
“Quite frankly, I never thought I would be visiting Libya, so it’s quite something,” she had told reporters aboard her flight to Tripoli.
She said she had thought through what she planned to say to Colonel Qaddafi, and, not mentioning him by name, added, “I look forward to listening to the leader’s worldview.”
Ms. Rice called the visit “a historic moment,” albeit “one that has come after a lot of difficulty, the suffering of many people that will never be forgotten or assuaged, a lot of Americans in particular. It is also the case that this comes out of a historic decision that Libya made to give up weapons of mass destruction and renounce terrorism.”
Although the State Department announced Ms. Rice’s trip a few days ago, details of the visit had been shrouded in so much secrecy that even as her plane left Lisbon for the three-hour flight to Libya, many on board still did not know where she would be meeting Colonel Qaddafi.
In the end they met at his compound in Tripoli. After the diplomatic niceties were dealt with, Ms. Rice and Colonel Qaddafi met one on one — though with note takers and interpreters, State Department officials said — for what had been billed as a more interesting private exchange than the usual diplomatic meetings.
After all, the Libyan leader had professed his “love” for the American secretary of state. “I support my darling black African woman,” Colonel Qaddafi told the network Al Jazeera last year. “I admire and am very proud of the way she leans back and gives orders to the Arab leaders.”
He continued: “Yes, Leezza, Leezza, Leezza... I love her very much.”
A senior administration official said that Ms. Rice planned to raise some nettlesome issues, including human rights and the final resolution of legal claims from the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, among other issues.
A Libyan dissident, Fathi al-Jahmi, remains in jail, where he has been off and on since 2002, despite repeated pleas for his release from Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, now the Democrats’ vice-presidential nominee, and Bush administration officials.
Ms. Rice’s visit has been two years in the making. The Bush administration announced in 2006 that it was restoring diplomatic ties with Libya as a reward for Colonel Qaddafi’s decision in 2003 to renounce terrorism and abandon work on weapons of mass destruction, a reversal that Bush administration officials were quick to attribute to the American invasion of Iraq.
The United States withdrew its ambassador from Libya in 1972 after Colonel Qaddafi renounced agreements with the West and repeatedly inveighed against the United States in speeches and public statements.
After a mob sacked and burned the American Embassy in 1979, the United States cut off relations. But the relationship did not reach its nadir until 1986, when the Reagan administration accused Libya of ordering the bombing of a German discothèque that killed three people. In response, the United States bombed targets in Tripoli and Benghazi.
The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, came nearly three years later. Investigators spent years accumulating evidence that Libyan agents were involved, and in 2001, a Libyan intelligence official was found guilty of murder in the case.
On the plane to Tripoli, a reporter asked Ms. Rice whether she attributed the Libyan turnaround to diplomacy or fear that it could have followed Iraq on the United States hit list.
“Quite obviously there was a long period of isolation,” she said, then added that Libya eventually signaled it was ready to renounce terrorism. “Anytime a country makes that choice,” she said, “diplomacy should be pursued.”
Isolation Over, Libyan Leader Meets With Rice
By HELENE COOPER
TRIPOLI, Libya — For the first time in more than half a century, a sitting American secretary of state is in Libya. Condoleezza Rice arrived here on Friday to meet with the man whom Ronald Reagan famously called the “mad dog of the Middle East.”
But that was then. Ms. Rice, after waiting at the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel here for an hour as the Ramadan sun set, finally got word that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi was ready to receive her at his Bab al Azizia residence — the same compound bombed by American airstrikes in 1986 during the height of tensions with Libya.
Amid a swarm of cameras and reporters, she walked into the receiving room where Mr. Qaddafi, clad in a long, flowing white robe, purple and gold sash, and a green Africa brooch, stood waiting to greet her.
He didn’t shake her hand; instead, he put his hand against his heart in a gesture that North African men often use to greet women, then motioned for her to take a seat. It was a very different Libyan leader, in the eyes of Ms. Rice and the Bush administration, from the man who had bedeviled six American presidents over the past four decades.
As far as the Bush administration is concerned, the Libyan leader is rehabilitated, his country removed from the State Department’s terrorism list, his debt to the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 on its way to being paid, Libya’s stockpiles of chemical weapons destroyed and its secret nuclear weapons program dismantled.
His initial chat with Ms. Rice could not have been more pleasant. He politely inquired about her trip; Ms. Rice thanked him for his hospitality. He asked about the hurricanes; she told him America had dodged Gustav but was bracing for Hanna. And that was it for the public chit-chat, as the Libyan authorities quickly shooed the press out of the room while Ms. Rice sat, smiling broadly.
“Quite frankly, I never thought I would be visiting Libya, so it’s quite something,” she had told reporters aboard her flight to Tripoli.
She said she had thought through what she planned to say to Colonel Qaddafi, and, not mentioning him by name, added, “I look forward to listening to the leader’s worldview.”
Ms. Rice called the visit “a historic moment,” albeit “one that has come after a lot of difficulty, the suffering of many people that will never be forgotten or assuaged, a lot of Americans in particular. It is also the case that this comes out of a historic decision that Libya made to give up weapons of mass destruction and renounce terrorism.”
Although the State Department announced Ms. Rice’s trip a few days ago, details of the visit had been shrouded in so much secrecy that even as her plane left Lisbon for the three-hour flight to Libya, many on board still did not know where she would be meeting Colonel Qaddafi.
In the end they met at his compound in Tripoli. After the diplomatic niceties were dealt with, Ms. Rice and Colonel Qaddafi met one on one — though with note takers and interpreters, State Department officials said — for what had been billed as a more interesting private exchange than the usual diplomatic meetings.
After all, the Libyan leader had professed his “love” for the American secretary of state. “I support my darling black African woman,” Colonel Qaddafi told the network Al Jazeera last year. “I admire and am very proud of the way she leans back and gives orders to the Arab leaders.”
He continued: “Yes, Leezza, Leezza, Leezza... I love her very much.”
A senior administration official said that Ms. Rice planned to raise some nettlesome issues, including human rights and the final resolution of legal claims from the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, among other issues.
A Libyan dissident, Fathi al-Jahmi, remains in jail, where he has been off and on since 2002, despite repeated pleas for his release from Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, now the Democrats’ vice-presidential nominee, and Bush administration officials.
Ms. Rice’s visit has been two years in the making. The Bush administration announced in 2006 that it was restoring diplomatic ties with Libya as a reward for Colonel Qaddafi’s decision in 2003 to renounce terrorism and abandon work on weapons of mass destruction, a reversal that Bush administration officials were quick to attribute to the American invasion of Iraq.
The United States withdrew its ambassador from Libya in 1972 after Colonel Qaddafi renounced agreements with the West and repeatedly inveighed against the United States in speeches and public statements.
After a mob sacked and burned the American Embassy in 1979, the United States cut off relations. But the relationship did not reach its nadir until 1986, when the Reagan administration accused Libya of ordering the bombing of a German discothèque that killed three people. In response, the United States bombed targets in Tripoli and Benghazi.
The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, came nearly three years later. Investigators spent years accumulating evidence that Libyan agents were involved, and in 2001, a Libyan intelligence official was found guilty of murder in the case.
On the plane to Tripoli, a reporter asked Ms. Rice whether she attributed the Libyan turnaround to diplomacy or fear that it could have followed Iraq on the United States hit list.
“Quite obviously there was a long period of isolation,” she said, then added that Libya eventually signaled it was ready to renounce terrorism. “Anytime a country makes that choice,” she said, “diplomacy should be pursued.”
September 9, 2008
Memo From Cairo
9/11 Rumors That Become Conventional Wisdom
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — Seven years later, it remains conventional wisdom here that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda could not have been solely responsible for the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and that the United States and Israel had to have been involved in their planning, if not their execution, too.
This is not the conclusion of a scientific survey, but it is what routinely comes up in conversations around the region — in a shopping mall in Dubai, in a park in Algiers, in a cafe in Riyadh and all over Cairo.
“Look, I don’t believe what your governments and press say. It just can’t be true,” said Ahmed Issab, 26, a Syrian engineer who lives and works in the United Arab Emirates. “Why would they tell the truth? I think the U.S. organized this so that they had an excuse to invade Iraq for the oil.”
It is easy for Americans to dismiss such thinking as bizarre. But that would miss a point that people in this part of the world think Western leaders, especially in Washington, need to understand: That such ideas persist represents the first failure in the fight against terrorism — the inability to convince people here that the United States is, indeed, waging a campaign against terrorism, not a crusade against Muslims.
“The United States should be concerned because in order to tell people that there is a real evil, they too have to believe it in order to help you,” said Mushairy al-Thaidy, a columnist in the Saudi-owned regional newspaper Asharq al Awsat. “Otherwise, it will diminish your ability to fight terrorism. It is not the kind of battle you can fight on your own; it is a collective battle.”
There were many reasons people here said they believed that the attacks of 9/11 were part of a conspiracy against Muslims. Some had nothing to do with Western actions, and some had everything to do with Western policies.
Again and again, people said they simply did not believe that a group of Arabs — like themselves — could possibly have waged such a successful operation against a superpower like the United States. But they also said that Washington’s post-9/11 foreign policy proved that the United States and Israel were behind the attacks, especially with the invasion of Iraq.
“Maybe people who executed the operation were Arabs, but the brains? No way,” said Mohammed Ibrahim, 36, a clothing-store owner in the Bulaq neighborhood of Cairo. “It was organized by other people, the United States or the Israelis.”
The rumors that spread shortly after 9/11 have been passed on so often that people no longer know where or when they first heard them. At this point, they have heard them so often, even on television, that they think they must be true.
First among these is that Jews did not go to work at the World Trade Center on that day. Asked how Jews might have been notified to stay home, or how they kept it a secret from co-workers, people here wave off the questions because they clash with their bedrock conviction that Jews are behind many of their troubles and that Western Jews will go to any length to protect Israel.
“Why is it that on 9/11, the Jews didn’t go to work in the building,” said Ahmed Saied, 25, who works in Cairo as a driver for a lawyer. “Everybody knows this. I saw it on TV, and a lot of people talk about this.”
Zein al-Abdin, 42, an electrician, who was drinking tea and chain-smoking cheap Cleopatra cigarettes in Al Shahat, a cafe in Bulaq, grew more and more animated as he laid out his thinking about what happened on Sept. 11.
“What matters is we think it was an attack against Arabs,” he said of the passenger planes crashing into American targets. “Why is it that they never caught him, bin Laden? How can they not know where he is when they know everything? They don’t catch him because he hasn’t done it. What happened in Iraq confirms that it has nothing to do with bin Laden or Qaeda. They went against Arabs and against Islam to serve Israel, that’s why.”
There is a reason so many people here talk with casual certainty — and no embarrassment — about the United States attacking itself to have a reason to go after Arabs and help Israel. It is a reflection of how they view government leaders, not just in Washington, but here in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. They do not believe them. The state-owned media are also distrusted. Therefore, they think that if the government is insisting that bin Laden was behind it, he must not have been.
“Mubarak says whatever the Americans want him to say, and he’s lying for them, of course,” Mr. Ibrahim said of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president.
Americans might better understand the region, experts here said, if they simply listen to what people are saying — and try to understand why — rather than taking offense. The broad view here is that even before Sept. 11, the United States was not a fair broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that it then capitalized on the attacks to buttress Israel and undermine the Muslim Arab world.
The single greatest proof, in most people’s eyes, was the invasion of Iraq. Trying to convince people here that it was not a quest for oil or a war on Muslims is like convincing many Americans that it was, and that the 9/11 attacks were the first step.
“It is the result of widespread mistrust, and the belief among Arabs and Muslims that the United States has a prejudice against them,” said Wahid Abdel Meguid, deputy director of the government-financed Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, the nation’s premier research center. “So they never think the United States is well intentioned, and they always feel that whatever it does has something behind it.”
Hisham Abbas, 22, studies tourism at Cairo University and hopes one day to work with foreigners for a living. But he does not give it a second thought when asked about Sept. 11. He said it made no sense at all that Mr. bin Laden could have carried out such an attack from Afghanistan. And like everyone else interviewed, he saw the events of the last seven years as proof positive that it was all a United States plan to go after Muslims.
“There are Arabs who hate America, a lot of them, but this is too much,” Mr. Abbas said as he fidgeted with his cellphone. “And look at what happened after this — the Americans invaded two Muslim countries. They used 9/11 as an excuse and went to Iraq. They killed Saddam, tortured people. How can you trust them?”
Nadim Audi contributed reporting.
Memo From Cairo
9/11 Rumors That Become Conventional Wisdom
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — Seven years later, it remains conventional wisdom here that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda could not have been solely responsible for the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and that the United States and Israel had to have been involved in their planning, if not their execution, too.
This is not the conclusion of a scientific survey, but it is what routinely comes up in conversations around the region — in a shopping mall in Dubai, in a park in Algiers, in a cafe in Riyadh and all over Cairo.
“Look, I don’t believe what your governments and press say. It just can’t be true,” said Ahmed Issab, 26, a Syrian engineer who lives and works in the United Arab Emirates. “Why would they tell the truth? I think the U.S. organized this so that they had an excuse to invade Iraq for the oil.”
It is easy for Americans to dismiss such thinking as bizarre. But that would miss a point that people in this part of the world think Western leaders, especially in Washington, need to understand: That such ideas persist represents the first failure in the fight against terrorism — the inability to convince people here that the United States is, indeed, waging a campaign against terrorism, not a crusade against Muslims.
“The United States should be concerned because in order to tell people that there is a real evil, they too have to believe it in order to help you,” said Mushairy al-Thaidy, a columnist in the Saudi-owned regional newspaper Asharq al Awsat. “Otherwise, it will diminish your ability to fight terrorism. It is not the kind of battle you can fight on your own; it is a collective battle.”
There were many reasons people here said they believed that the attacks of 9/11 were part of a conspiracy against Muslims. Some had nothing to do with Western actions, and some had everything to do with Western policies.
Again and again, people said they simply did not believe that a group of Arabs — like themselves — could possibly have waged such a successful operation against a superpower like the United States. But they also said that Washington’s post-9/11 foreign policy proved that the United States and Israel were behind the attacks, especially with the invasion of Iraq.
“Maybe people who executed the operation were Arabs, but the brains? No way,” said Mohammed Ibrahim, 36, a clothing-store owner in the Bulaq neighborhood of Cairo. “It was organized by other people, the United States or the Israelis.”
The rumors that spread shortly after 9/11 have been passed on so often that people no longer know where or when they first heard them. At this point, they have heard them so often, even on television, that they think they must be true.
First among these is that Jews did not go to work at the World Trade Center on that day. Asked how Jews might have been notified to stay home, or how they kept it a secret from co-workers, people here wave off the questions because they clash with their bedrock conviction that Jews are behind many of their troubles and that Western Jews will go to any length to protect Israel.
“Why is it that on 9/11, the Jews didn’t go to work in the building,” said Ahmed Saied, 25, who works in Cairo as a driver for a lawyer. “Everybody knows this. I saw it on TV, and a lot of people talk about this.”
Zein al-Abdin, 42, an electrician, who was drinking tea and chain-smoking cheap Cleopatra cigarettes in Al Shahat, a cafe in Bulaq, grew more and more animated as he laid out his thinking about what happened on Sept. 11.
“What matters is we think it was an attack against Arabs,” he said of the passenger planes crashing into American targets. “Why is it that they never caught him, bin Laden? How can they not know where he is when they know everything? They don’t catch him because he hasn’t done it. What happened in Iraq confirms that it has nothing to do with bin Laden or Qaeda. They went against Arabs and against Islam to serve Israel, that’s why.”
There is a reason so many people here talk with casual certainty — and no embarrassment — about the United States attacking itself to have a reason to go after Arabs and help Israel. It is a reflection of how they view government leaders, not just in Washington, but here in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. They do not believe them. The state-owned media are also distrusted. Therefore, they think that if the government is insisting that bin Laden was behind it, he must not have been.
“Mubarak says whatever the Americans want him to say, and he’s lying for them, of course,” Mr. Ibrahim said of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president.
Americans might better understand the region, experts here said, if they simply listen to what people are saying — and try to understand why — rather than taking offense. The broad view here is that even before Sept. 11, the United States was not a fair broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that it then capitalized on the attacks to buttress Israel and undermine the Muslim Arab world.
The single greatest proof, in most people’s eyes, was the invasion of Iraq. Trying to convince people here that it was not a quest for oil or a war on Muslims is like convincing many Americans that it was, and that the 9/11 attacks were the first step.
“It is the result of widespread mistrust, and the belief among Arabs and Muslims that the United States has a prejudice against them,” said Wahid Abdel Meguid, deputy director of the government-financed Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, the nation’s premier research center. “So they never think the United States is well intentioned, and they always feel that whatever it does has something behind it.”
Hisham Abbas, 22, studies tourism at Cairo University and hopes one day to work with foreigners for a living. But he does not give it a second thought when asked about Sept. 11. He said it made no sense at all that Mr. bin Laden could have carried out such an attack from Afghanistan. And like everyone else interviewed, he saw the events of the last seven years as proof positive that it was all a United States plan to go after Muslims.
“There are Arabs who hate America, a lot of them, but this is too much,” Mr. Abbas said as he fidgeted with his cellphone. “And look at what happened after this — the Americans invaded two Muslim countries. They used 9/11 as an excuse and went to Iraq. They killed Saddam, tortured people. How can you trust them?”
Nadim Audi contributed reporting.
There is a related multimedia linked at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/world ... cairo.html
September 20, 2008
In Cairo, Living in Fear at a Cliff’s Sharp Edge
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — People still live at the cliff’s edge. Hundreds of children play at the cliff’s edge. And the cliff is crumbling, right under their feet, huge mustard-colored boulders, tumbling away from the mountain wall. The children play. Their parents worry.
“If they just gave us tents, we would go live in those tents,” said Samah Abdel Qader, 45, a nurse who has two children and lives at the cliff’s edge, literally.
The police have cordoned off the neighborhood; they don’t want any prying reporters, foreign observers or charity groups to get in. “It’s a crisis,” barked one state security agent, when asked why the area was sealed. A crisis for the government seems to be what he meant.
On Sept. 6 a huge piece of this cliff broke off and crushed the lives below, poor people living on the edge of the city. So far, 101 bodies have been recovered, but the true scope of what happened remains hidden beneath massive rocks that rest where they fell.
Now the government faces a reckoning: What to do with all the people still buried; what to do with all the people, the many thousands, still living beneath the fragile cliff; what to do with the many people living on top of the cliff; what to do about its own reputation, having failed repeatedly to manage any recent crisis in a way that did not leave survivors angry and alienated.
“There is fear of another rockslide every moment,” said a general in the Interior Ministry, the state’s internal security agency, which has taken the lead in this crisis — as it has in all the others. The general is not authorized to release his name but did offer a surprising degree of candor, expressing frustration with the system, top to bottom, that has let so many people down.
“There is negligence,” the general said. “The whole country is responsible and every person sitting in his chair is responsible.”
It was late morning, and the neighbors were frustrated by their police-imposed isolation. So they led a tour, passing messages by cellphones to avoid the police and informants, taking visitors onto the cliff, with its frightening view of the pit.
Down below was Douaiqa, a poor corner of Manshayet Nasser, a sprawling neighborhood of more than one million residents. Three large excavators were parked and silent. A large awning was set up to shade the plastic chairs for the officers, stars on their shoulders. No work was going on, and neighbors said that as the days had passed the pace of recovery had slowed.
“There used to be more people here, but every day it is less and less,” said Said Yousef, who lives on top of the cliff, a safe distance from the edge.
“There,” he said, excitedly, pointing to a pile of boulders that had fallen a day earlier. “And there, too,” he said, pointing out a pile of sand way below that he said was also part of the cliff wall just 24 hours earlier.
Some of the homes at the cliff’s edge seemed to have crumbled when the ledge broke away. The area feels like a war zone, like Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, after Russia invaded. People here came out of the ruins, many barefoot, all asking to be listened to. They had ghostly, frightened expressions.
“Look at this,” Ms. Qader, the nurse, said, as she pressed her foot on the ground. It seemed to warp under her weight, and then pop back up. She kept her foot pumping at the ground. “Look,” she said again, in a kind of disbelief.
She pointed to the buckled wall of her neighbor Hamdi Hussain’s home. He lives in a small brick and concrete room just big enough for his king-size bed. Like the others here, he wanted help from the government. “We went to the municipality, and they just chased us away,” he said. So he went back to his bed, which is a few feet from the cliff’s edge.
The government’s initial response was to tell the people here that it was their fault for living in such a dangerous place, that this was a shantytown of illegal dwellings. But that misses a much broader reality: about 70 percent of Cairo lives in informal communities, which like this one were built without government planning or permission.
This corner of Manshayet Nasser is dirt poor but it remains a community of brick houses, some three and four stories tall, running along rocky dirt roads. Officials say that about 100,000 people live there.
As the morning grew hotter, the skyline disappeared in a haze of smog. Five women sat in a circle chatting. One was holding a small child on her lap. Another stood up and leaned against a metal cane.
“Of course we are afraid,” said Sabah Muhammad Hussein, 35, a mother of three who was sitting with her neighborhood friends. “They keep telling us, ‘When your turn comes up, we will move you.’ We have lived here for 15 years.”
Suddenly, Mr. Yousef grew panicky. “They are coming,” he said, his voice tight with fear. “They are coming.”
The police were coming and so he fled, into his house. He has not yet moved his family back from the cliff, but he ran from the police.
The government has made some effort to help. Hundreds of families have been moved from buildings beneath the cliffs that were most vulnerable to another rockslide, put first in tents, then in new apartments.
But with a bureaucracy that is slow and inefficient in the best of times, the state ended up infuriating the victims, too. One of them, Ahmed Mohammed Mahmoud, 42, first went to the municipal council asking for help — only to be told, he said, that he needed to have proof he had lost a house. Many people, the authorities said, tried to piggyback on the disaster to get a new apartment.
“My wife told them we lost everything,” Mr. Mahmoud recalled. He said they told him to get a witness. “My wife said they are all dead,” he said. “Are we supposed to bring them back from the dead?”
Mr. Mahmoud’s quandary ended the next morning when Al Ahram, the main state-owned daily newspaper, hit the stands. On the front page was a picture of a rescue worker holding Mr. Mahmoud’s son.
He moved into a tent. He hated the tent so he sneaked out of the camp, leaving his family behind, to seek help. He was arrested when he returned, he said.
There was no way to verify his account, but he said that the police blindfolded him and asked him, “How long have you been trying to overthrow the government?” They eventually let him go, and he lives now in a rented storeroom. His wife took the children to stay with her mother.
The government put several hundred families in new apartments, then a few days later discovered that about 20 of those families had not been residents of the area crushed in the rockslide. So they were kicked out.
“They are all poor, but there are priorities,” the general from the Interior Ministry said. “Maybe they will get a chance another time.”
Mona El-Naggar contributed reporting.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/world ... cairo.html
September 20, 2008
In Cairo, Living in Fear at a Cliff’s Sharp Edge
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — People still live at the cliff’s edge. Hundreds of children play at the cliff’s edge. And the cliff is crumbling, right under their feet, huge mustard-colored boulders, tumbling away from the mountain wall. The children play. Their parents worry.
“If they just gave us tents, we would go live in those tents,” said Samah Abdel Qader, 45, a nurse who has two children and lives at the cliff’s edge, literally.
The police have cordoned off the neighborhood; they don’t want any prying reporters, foreign observers or charity groups to get in. “It’s a crisis,” barked one state security agent, when asked why the area was sealed. A crisis for the government seems to be what he meant.
On Sept. 6 a huge piece of this cliff broke off and crushed the lives below, poor people living on the edge of the city. So far, 101 bodies have been recovered, but the true scope of what happened remains hidden beneath massive rocks that rest where they fell.
Now the government faces a reckoning: What to do with all the people still buried; what to do with all the people, the many thousands, still living beneath the fragile cliff; what to do with the many people living on top of the cliff; what to do about its own reputation, having failed repeatedly to manage any recent crisis in a way that did not leave survivors angry and alienated.
“There is fear of another rockslide every moment,” said a general in the Interior Ministry, the state’s internal security agency, which has taken the lead in this crisis — as it has in all the others. The general is not authorized to release his name but did offer a surprising degree of candor, expressing frustration with the system, top to bottom, that has let so many people down.
“There is negligence,” the general said. “The whole country is responsible and every person sitting in his chair is responsible.”
It was late morning, and the neighbors were frustrated by their police-imposed isolation. So they led a tour, passing messages by cellphones to avoid the police and informants, taking visitors onto the cliff, with its frightening view of the pit.
Down below was Douaiqa, a poor corner of Manshayet Nasser, a sprawling neighborhood of more than one million residents. Three large excavators were parked and silent. A large awning was set up to shade the plastic chairs for the officers, stars on their shoulders. No work was going on, and neighbors said that as the days had passed the pace of recovery had slowed.
“There used to be more people here, but every day it is less and less,” said Said Yousef, who lives on top of the cliff, a safe distance from the edge.
“There,” he said, excitedly, pointing to a pile of boulders that had fallen a day earlier. “And there, too,” he said, pointing out a pile of sand way below that he said was also part of the cliff wall just 24 hours earlier.
Some of the homes at the cliff’s edge seemed to have crumbled when the ledge broke away. The area feels like a war zone, like Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, after Russia invaded. People here came out of the ruins, many barefoot, all asking to be listened to. They had ghostly, frightened expressions.
“Look at this,” Ms. Qader, the nurse, said, as she pressed her foot on the ground. It seemed to warp under her weight, and then pop back up. She kept her foot pumping at the ground. “Look,” she said again, in a kind of disbelief.
She pointed to the buckled wall of her neighbor Hamdi Hussain’s home. He lives in a small brick and concrete room just big enough for his king-size bed. Like the others here, he wanted help from the government. “We went to the municipality, and they just chased us away,” he said. So he went back to his bed, which is a few feet from the cliff’s edge.
The government’s initial response was to tell the people here that it was their fault for living in such a dangerous place, that this was a shantytown of illegal dwellings. But that misses a much broader reality: about 70 percent of Cairo lives in informal communities, which like this one were built without government planning or permission.
This corner of Manshayet Nasser is dirt poor but it remains a community of brick houses, some three and four stories tall, running along rocky dirt roads. Officials say that about 100,000 people live there.
As the morning grew hotter, the skyline disappeared in a haze of smog. Five women sat in a circle chatting. One was holding a small child on her lap. Another stood up and leaned against a metal cane.
“Of course we are afraid,” said Sabah Muhammad Hussein, 35, a mother of three who was sitting with her neighborhood friends. “They keep telling us, ‘When your turn comes up, we will move you.’ We have lived here for 15 years.”
Suddenly, Mr. Yousef grew panicky. “They are coming,” he said, his voice tight with fear. “They are coming.”
The police were coming and so he fled, into his house. He has not yet moved his family back from the cliff, but he ran from the police.
The government has made some effort to help. Hundreds of families have been moved from buildings beneath the cliffs that were most vulnerable to another rockslide, put first in tents, then in new apartments.
But with a bureaucracy that is slow and inefficient in the best of times, the state ended up infuriating the victims, too. One of them, Ahmed Mohammed Mahmoud, 42, first went to the municipal council asking for help — only to be told, he said, that he needed to have proof he had lost a house. Many people, the authorities said, tried to piggyback on the disaster to get a new apartment.
“My wife told them we lost everything,” Mr. Mahmoud recalled. He said they told him to get a witness. “My wife said they are all dead,” he said. “Are we supposed to bring them back from the dead?”
Mr. Mahmoud’s quandary ended the next morning when Al Ahram, the main state-owned daily newspaper, hit the stands. On the front page was a picture of a rescue worker holding Mr. Mahmoud’s son.
He moved into a tent. He hated the tent so he sneaked out of the camp, leaving his family behind, to seek help. He was arrested when he returned, he said.
There was no way to verify his account, but he said that the police blindfolded him and asked him, “How long have you been trying to overthrow the government?” They eventually let him go, and he lives now in a rented storeroom. His wife took the children to stay with her mother.
The government put several hundred families in new apartments, then a few days later discovered that about 20 of those families had not been residents of the area crushed in the rockslide. So they were kicked out.
“They are all poor, but there are priorities,” the general from the Interior Ministry said. “Maybe they will get a chance another time.”
Mona El-Naggar contributed reporting.
Here is an interesting point:
http://samsonblinded.org/news/governmen ... nians-3127
Israeli analyst argues that the 98% peace deal is fake because Israel
inherently cannot pull it off.
http://samsonblinded.org/news/governmen ... nians-3127
Israeli analyst argues that the 98% peace deal is fake because Israel
inherently cannot pull it off.
September 22, 2008
Young and Arab in Land of Mosques and Bars
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — In his old life in Cairo, Rami Galal knew his place and his fate: to become a maintenance man in a hotel, just like his father. But here, in glittering, manic Dubai, he is confronting the unsettling freedom to make his own choices.
Here Mr. Galal, 24, drinks beer almost every night and considers a young Russian prostitute his girlfriend. But he also makes it to work every morning, not something he could say when he lived back in Egypt. Everything is up to him, everything: what meals he eats, whether he goes to the mosque or a bar, who his friends are.
“I was more religious in Egypt,” Mr. Galal said, taking a drag from yet another of his ever-burning Marlboros. “It is moving too fast here. In Egypt there is more time, they have more control over you. It’s hard here. I hope to stop drinking beer; I know it’s wrong. In Egypt, people keep you in check. Here, no one keeps you in check.”
In Egypt, and across much of the Arab world, there is an Islamic revival being driven by young people, where faith and ritual are increasingly the cornerstone of identity. But that is not true amid the ethnic mix that is Dubai, where 80 percent of the people are expatriates, with 200 nationalities.
This economically vital, socially freewheeling yet unmistakably Muslim state has had a transforming effect on young men. Religion has become more of a personal choice and Islam less of a common bond than national identity.
Dubai is, in some ways, a vision of what the rest of the Arab world could become — if it offered comparable economic opportunity, insistence on following the law and tolerance for cultural diversity. In this environment, religion is not something young men turn to because it fills a void or because they are bowing to a collective demand. That, in turn, creates an atmosphere that is open not only to those inclined to a less observant way of life, but also to those who are more religious. In Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Algeria, a man with a long beard is often treated as an Islamist — and sometimes denied work. Not here in Dubai.
“Here, I can practice my religion in a natural and free way because it is a Muslim country and I can also achieve my ambition at work,” said Ahmed Kassab, 30, an electrical engineer from Zagazig Egypt, who wears a long dark beard and has a prayer mark on his forehead. “People here judge the person based on productivity more than what he looks like. It’s different in Egypt, of course.”
A Playground for All Sides
No one can say for sure why Dubai has been spared the kind of religion-fueled extremism that has plagued other countries in the region. There are not even metal detectors at hotel and mall entrances, standard fare from Morocco to Saudi Arabia. Some speculate that Dubai is like Vienna during the cold war, a playground for all sides. There is a robust state security system. But there is also a feeling that diversity, tolerance and opportunity help breed moderation.
“There is not going to be somebody who has a grudge against the system,” said Tarik Yousef, dean of the Dubai School of Government. “You might have a problem with something, but there’s enough to make you happy. You have a job — and the mosque is open 24 hours.”
More....
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world ... ?th&emc=th
Young and Arab in Land of Mosques and Bars
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — In his old life in Cairo, Rami Galal knew his place and his fate: to become a maintenance man in a hotel, just like his father. But here, in glittering, manic Dubai, he is confronting the unsettling freedom to make his own choices.
Here Mr. Galal, 24, drinks beer almost every night and considers a young Russian prostitute his girlfriend. But he also makes it to work every morning, not something he could say when he lived back in Egypt. Everything is up to him, everything: what meals he eats, whether he goes to the mosque or a bar, who his friends are.
“I was more religious in Egypt,” Mr. Galal said, taking a drag from yet another of his ever-burning Marlboros. “It is moving too fast here. In Egypt there is more time, they have more control over you. It’s hard here. I hope to stop drinking beer; I know it’s wrong. In Egypt, people keep you in check. Here, no one keeps you in check.”
In Egypt, and across much of the Arab world, there is an Islamic revival being driven by young people, where faith and ritual are increasingly the cornerstone of identity. But that is not true amid the ethnic mix that is Dubai, where 80 percent of the people are expatriates, with 200 nationalities.
This economically vital, socially freewheeling yet unmistakably Muslim state has had a transforming effect on young men. Religion has become more of a personal choice and Islam less of a common bond than national identity.
Dubai is, in some ways, a vision of what the rest of the Arab world could become — if it offered comparable economic opportunity, insistence on following the law and tolerance for cultural diversity. In this environment, religion is not something young men turn to because it fills a void or because they are bowing to a collective demand. That, in turn, creates an atmosphere that is open not only to those inclined to a less observant way of life, but also to those who are more religious. In Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Algeria, a man with a long beard is often treated as an Islamist — and sometimes denied work. Not here in Dubai.
“Here, I can practice my religion in a natural and free way because it is a Muslim country and I can also achieve my ambition at work,” said Ahmed Kassab, 30, an electrical engineer from Zagazig Egypt, who wears a long dark beard and has a prayer mark on his forehead. “People here judge the person based on productivity more than what he looks like. It’s different in Egypt, of course.”
A Playground for All Sides
No one can say for sure why Dubai has been spared the kind of religion-fueled extremism that has plagued other countries in the region. There are not even metal detectors at hotel and mall entrances, standard fare from Morocco to Saudi Arabia. Some speculate that Dubai is like Vienna during the cold war, a playground for all sides. There is a robust state security system. But there is also a feeling that diversity, tolerance and opportunity help breed moderation.
“There is not going to be somebody who has a grudge against the system,” said Tarik Yousef, dean of the Dubai School of Government. “You might have a problem with something, but there’s enough to make you happy. You have a job — and the mosque is open 24 hours.”
More....
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world ... ?th&emc=th
Published Date: September 23, 2008
DUBAI : Human Rights Watch urged the Saudi government on Monday to end its 'systematic discrimination' of minority Ismaili Shiites, charging that they are treated as second-class citizens. 'The Saudi government preaches religious tolerance abroad, but it has consistently penalised its Ismaili citizens for their religious beliefs,' said Joe Stork, deputy
Middle East director of the New York-based watchdog.
The government should stop treating Ismailis as second-class in employment, the justice system and education,' he said in a statement. A HRW report released documents 'a pattern of discrimination against the Ismailis in government employment, education, religious freedom and the justice system,' the statement said. HRW said that several hundred thousand, 'perhaps as many as one million,' Ismailis live in Saudi Arabia , which hosts Islam's holiest shrines and applies a rigorous doctrine of Sunni Islam known
as Wahhabism.
Most live in Najran province on the southwestern border with
Yemen .
Saudi Arabia took control of Najran from
Yemen in 1934, incorporating into the kingdom the local Sulaimani Ismaili community, an offshoot of Shiite Islam. More than 70 years on, 'Saudi authorities at the highest levels continue to propagate hate speech' against them, HRW said. In April 2007, the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, the body tasked with officially interpreting Islamic faith, termed Ismailis 'corrupt infidels, debauched ath
eists.
Hundreds of Ismailis were arrested following clashes with security forces in Najran in April 2000 and some 400 others were purged from the local bureaucracy, the rights watchdog said. Seventeen Ismailis are still serving jail terms over the unrest. According to HRW, Wahhabi judges in Saudi Islamic courts 'routinely discriminate against Ismailis,' such as when a judge annulled the marriage of an Ismaili man to a Sunni woman in March 2006 on grounds that he lacked religious qualification.
HRW noted that King Abdullah opened an interfaith conference initiated by
Saudi Arabia in Spain in July. But 'the measure of Saudi religious tolerance will be its practice at home, not only what it preaches abroad,' Stork said. The rights group called on Riyadh to set up a national institution to recommend remedies for discriminatory policies and respond to individual claims.
In its annual International Religious Freedom Report issued on Friday, the US State Department said community leaders in Najran reported government discrimination against Ismailis, including 'allowing Sunni religious leaders to declare them unbelievers' and relocating them to other parts of the country.
The Najran Ismailis are a separate branch of the broader Shiite sect and do not follow the Aga Khan who heads the mainstream Ismailis. Ismaili activists have also alleged that the government is seizing lands in Najran to settle Sunni Yemeni tribesmen who are granted Saudi citizenship in an attempt to alter the area's demographic and religious composition. The State Department report said that while Saudi Arabia continued to place severe restrictions on religious freedom, there were 'incremental improvement
s in specific areas, such as better protection of the right to possess and use personal religious materials.' - AFP
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.ph ... M3MDg1OA==
DUBAI : Human Rights Watch urged the Saudi government on Monday to end its 'systematic discrimination' of minority Ismaili Shiites, charging that they are treated as second-class citizens. 'The Saudi government preaches religious tolerance abroad, but it has consistently penalised its Ismaili citizens for their religious beliefs,' said Joe Stork, deputy
Middle East director of the New York-based watchdog.
The government should stop treating Ismailis as second-class in employment, the justice system and education,' he said in a statement. A HRW report released documents 'a pattern of discrimination against the Ismailis in government employment, education, religious freedom and the justice system,' the statement said. HRW said that several hundred thousand, 'perhaps as many as one million,' Ismailis live in Saudi Arabia , which hosts Islam's holiest shrines and applies a rigorous doctrine of Sunni Islam known
as Wahhabism.
Most live in Najran province on the southwestern border with
Yemen .
Saudi Arabia took control of Najran from
Yemen in 1934, incorporating into the kingdom the local Sulaimani Ismaili community, an offshoot of Shiite Islam. More than 70 years on, 'Saudi authorities at the highest levels continue to propagate hate speech' against them, HRW said. In April 2007, the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, the body tasked with officially interpreting Islamic faith, termed Ismailis 'corrupt infidels, debauched ath
eists.
Hundreds of Ismailis were arrested following clashes with security forces in Najran in April 2000 and some 400 others were purged from the local bureaucracy, the rights watchdog said. Seventeen Ismailis are still serving jail terms over the unrest. According to HRW, Wahhabi judges in Saudi Islamic courts 'routinely discriminate against Ismailis,' such as when a judge annulled the marriage of an Ismaili man to a Sunni woman in March 2006 on grounds that he lacked religious qualification.
HRW noted that King Abdullah opened an interfaith conference initiated by
Saudi Arabia in Spain in July. But 'the measure of Saudi religious tolerance will be its practice at home, not only what it preaches abroad,' Stork said. The rights group called on Riyadh to set up a national institution to recommend remedies for discriminatory policies and respond to individual claims.
In its annual International Religious Freedom Report issued on Friday, the US State Department said community leaders in Najran reported government discrimination against Ismailis, including 'allowing Sunni religious leaders to declare them unbelievers' and relocating them to other parts of the country.
The Najran Ismailis are a separate branch of the broader Shiite sect and do not follow the Aga Khan who heads the mainstream Ismailis. Ismaili activists have also alleged that the government is seizing lands in Najran to settle Sunni Yemeni tribesmen who are granted Saudi citizenship in an attempt to alter the area's demographic and religious composition. The State Department report said that while Saudi Arabia continued to place severe restrictions on religious freedom, there were 'incremental improvement
s in specific areas, such as better protection of the right to possess and use personal religious materials.' - AFP
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.ph ... M3MDg1OA==
September 30, 2008
Olmert Says Israel Should Pull Out of West Bank
By ETHAN BRONNER
JERUSALEM — Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in an interview published on Monday that Israel must withdraw from nearly all of the West Bank as well as East Jerusalem to attain peace with the Palestinians and that any occupied land it held onto would have to be exchanged for the same quantity of Israeli territory.
He also dismissed as “megalomania” any thought that Israel would or should attack Iran on its own to stop it from developing nuclear weapons, saying the international community and not Israel alone was charged with handling the issue.
In an unusually frank and soul-searching interview granted after he resigned to fight corruption charges — he remains interim prime minister until a new government is sworn in — Mr. Olmert discarded longstanding Israeli defense doctrine and called for radical new thinking, in words that are sure to stir controversy as his expected successor, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, tries to build a coalition.
“What I am saying to you now has not been said by any Israeli leader before me,” Mr. Olmert told the newspaper Yediot Aharonot in the interview on the occasion of the Jewish new year, observed from Monday evening till Wednesday evening. “The time has come to say these things.”
He said that traditional Israeli defense strategists had learned nothing from past experiences and that they seemed stuck in the considerations of the 1948 war of independence.
“With them, it is all about tanks and land and controlling territories and controlled territories and this hilltop and that hilltop,” he said. “All these things are worthless.”
He added, “Who thinks seriously that if we sit on another hilltop, on another hundred meters, that this is what will make the difference for the State of Israel’s basic security?”
Over the last year, Mr. Olmert has publicly castigated himself for his earlier right-wing views and he did so again in this interview. On Jerusalem, for example, he said: “I am the first who wanted to enforce Israeli sovereignty on the entire city. I admit it. I am not trying to justify retroactively what I did for 35 years. For a large portion of these years, I was unwilling to look at reality in all its depth.”
He said that maintaining sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem, Israel’s official policy, would involve bringing 270,000 Palestinians inside Israel’s security barrier. It would mean a continuing risk of terrorist attacks against civilians like those carried out this year by Jerusalem Palestinian residents with front-end loaders.
“A decision has to be made,” he said. “This decision is difficult, terrible, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our innermost desires, our collective memories, the prayers of the Jewish people for 2,000 years.”
The government’s public stand on Jerusalem until now has been to assert that the status of the city was not under discussion. But Mr. Olmert made clear that the eastern, predominantly Arab, sector had to be yielded “with special solutions” for the holy sites.
On peace with the Palestinians, Mr. Olmert said in the interview: “We face the need to decide but are not willing to tell ourselves, yes, this is what we have to do. We have to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, the meaning of which is that in practice we will withdraw from almost all the territories, if not all the territories. We will leave a percentage of these territories in our hands, but will have to give the Palestinians a similar percentage, because without that there will be no peace.”
Elsewhere in the interview, when discussing a land swap with the Palestinians, he said the exchange would have to be “more or less one to one.”
Mr. Olmert also addressed the question of Syria, saying that Israel had to be prepared to give up the Golan Heights but that in turn Damascus knew it had to change the nature of its relationship with Iran and its support for Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia.
On Iran, Mr. Olmert said Israel would act within the international system, adding: “Part of our megalomania and our loss of proportions is the things that are said here about Iran. We are a country that has lost a sense of proportion about itself.”
Reaction from the Israeli right was swift. Avigdor Lieberman, who leads the Yisrael Beiteinu party, said on the radio that Mr. Olmert was “endangering the existence of the State of Israel irresponsibly.”
He added that those who thought Israel’s problem was a lack of defined borders — as Mr. Olmert stated in the interview — “are ignoramuses who don’t understand anything, and they invite war.”
As they reacted to Mr. Olmert’s remarks, Palestinian negotiators said it was satisfying to hear Mr. Olmert’s words but they said the words did not match what he had offered them so far. Yasser Abed Rabbo, a senior Palestinian official, told Palestinian Radio that it would have been better if Mr. Olmert had taken this position while in office rather than while leaving it and that Mr. Olmert had not yet presented a detailed plan for a border between Israel and a Palestinian state.
In theory, Mr. Olmert will continue peace negotiations while awaiting the new government. But analysts generally say that having been forced to resign his post, he will not be able to close a deal.
*****
Holy holidays highlight cultural divide in Jerusalem
Olmert urges Israel to exit Golan, West Bank, E. Jerusalem
Matthew Fisher
Canwest News Service
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert marked the onset of the Jewish New Year on Monday by telling the Yediot Aharonoth newspaper that if Israel wanted peace it has to exit East Jerusalem, the Golan and almost all of the West Bank.
Olmert's remarks hours before Rosh Hashanah, which is traditionally a period of soul-searching and atonement for past wrongs, may be seen as an olive branch to Israel's Arab neighbours or as another sign of Olmert's fast-waning power.
"A decision has to be made," said Olmert, who had insisted when he was Jerusalem's mayor that the city would never be divided. "This decision is difficult, terrible, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our innermost desires, our collective memories, the prayers of the Jewish people for 2,000 years."
While Israel controls almost every official aspect of life in Jerusalem, the holy city's 450,000 Jews and 270,000 Muslims almost never have anything to do with each other outside the workplace and the shopping malls.
Jerusalem's two solitudes have been especially noticeable this week. With the holy month of Ramadan having ended Monday night and the feast of Eid to be celebrated Tuesday, and with the Jewish New Year having begun at sunset on Monday, the most important Muslim and Jewish religious holidays will overlap for the first time in 12 years.
"I don't know of one Palestinian who will spend Rosh Hashanah or Eid with a Jewish Israeli," said Ryad Meshal, a 40-year-old taxi driver from a Palestinian suburb, who intends to celebrate Eid on Tuesday evening with a feast with family and friends.
Although Jews constitute about 80 per cent of his taxi business, Meshal said it would be unimaginable for him to ever invite Jews to an Eid dinner. Nor did he think it possible that any of the thousands of Jewish families living within walking distance of his home would ever invite him to break bread with them at Rosh Hashanah.
"Muslims and Jews may mix a little in Jaffa or Haifa but never in Jerusalem," Meshal said. "The problem is: Who does the city belong to? We think it is ours. They think it is theirs."
Like Meshal, the Palestinian taxi driver, Avi Pazner, who is an Israeli government spokesman and former ambassador, said he had never attended a private gathering "where an Arab had been invited. This is not a decision dictated by others. People here -- Muslims and Jews -- just don't feel like it."
Tensions have risen somewhat recently in Jerusalem because of three incidents in which Palestinians used vehicles to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli drivers and pedestrians.
"But the amazing thing is that there is so little terrorism here," Pazner said. Many Israeli commentators and politicians have dismissed what Olmert had to say about relinquishing control of East Jerusalem and almost all of the West Bank as a futile attempt by the prime minister to leave some kind of legacy not connected to the corruption allegations that he faces.
Meshal also rejected Olmert's epiphany. "It's just talk," he said. "It only matters if something is actually done."
© The Calgary Herald 2008
Olmert Says Israel Should Pull Out of West Bank
By ETHAN BRONNER
JERUSALEM — Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in an interview published on Monday that Israel must withdraw from nearly all of the West Bank as well as East Jerusalem to attain peace with the Palestinians and that any occupied land it held onto would have to be exchanged for the same quantity of Israeli territory.
He also dismissed as “megalomania” any thought that Israel would or should attack Iran on its own to stop it from developing nuclear weapons, saying the international community and not Israel alone was charged with handling the issue.
In an unusually frank and soul-searching interview granted after he resigned to fight corruption charges — he remains interim prime minister until a new government is sworn in — Mr. Olmert discarded longstanding Israeli defense doctrine and called for radical new thinking, in words that are sure to stir controversy as his expected successor, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, tries to build a coalition.
“What I am saying to you now has not been said by any Israeli leader before me,” Mr. Olmert told the newspaper Yediot Aharonot in the interview on the occasion of the Jewish new year, observed from Monday evening till Wednesday evening. “The time has come to say these things.”
He said that traditional Israeli defense strategists had learned nothing from past experiences and that they seemed stuck in the considerations of the 1948 war of independence.
“With them, it is all about tanks and land and controlling territories and controlled territories and this hilltop and that hilltop,” he said. “All these things are worthless.”
He added, “Who thinks seriously that if we sit on another hilltop, on another hundred meters, that this is what will make the difference for the State of Israel’s basic security?”
Over the last year, Mr. Olmert has publicly castigated himself for his earlier right-wing views and he did so again in this interview. On Jerusalem, for example, he said: “I am the first who wanted to enforce Israeli sovereignty on the entire city. I admit it. I am not trying to justify retroactively what I did for 35 years. For a large portion of these years, I was unwilling to look at reality in all its depth.”
He said that maintaining sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem, Israel’s official policy, would involve bringing 270,000 Palestinians inside Israel’s security barrier. It would mean a continuing risk of terrorist attacks against civilians like those carried out this year by Jerusalem Palestinian residents with front-end loaders.
“A decision has to be made,” he said. “This decision is difficult, terrible, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our innermost desires, our collective memories, the prayers of the Jewish people for 2,000 years.”
The government’s public stand on Jerusalem until now has been to assert that the status of the city was not under discussion. But Mr. Olmert made clear that the eastern, predominantly Arab, sector had to be yielded “with special solutions” for the holy sites.
On peace with the Palestinians, Mr. Olmert said in the interview: “We face the need to decide but are not willing to tell ourselves, yes, this is what we have to do. We have to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, the meaning of which is that in practice we will withdraw from almost all the territories, if not all the territories. We will leave a percentage of these territories in our hands, but will have to give the Palestinians a similar percentage, because without that there will be no peace.”
Elsewhere in the interview, when discussing a land swap with the Palestinians, he said the exchange would have to be “more or less one to one.”
Mr. Olmert also addressed the question of Syria, saying that Israel had to be prepared to give up the Golan Heights but that in turn Damascus knew it had to change the nature of its relationship with Iran and its support for Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia.
On Iran, Mr. Olmert said Israel would act within the international system, adding: “Part of our megalomania and our loss of proportions is the things that are said here about Iran. We are a country that has lost a sense of proportion about itself.”
Reaction from the Israeli right was swift. Avigdor Lieberman, who leads the Yisrael Beiteinu party, said on the radio that Mr. Olmert was “endangering the existence of the State of Israel irresponsibly.”
He added that those who thought Israel’s problem was a lack of defined borders — as Mr. Olmert stated in the interview — “are ignoramuses who don’t understand anything, and they invite war.”
As they reacted to Mr. Olmert’s remarks, Palestinian negotiators said it was satisfying to hear Mr. Olmert’s words but they said the words did not match what he had offered them so far. Yasser Abed Rabbo, a senior Palestinian official, told Palestinian Radio that it would have been better if Mr. Olmert had taken this position while in office rather than while leaving it and that Mr. Olmert had not yet presented a detailed plan for a border between Israel and a Palestinian state.
In theory, Mr. Olmert will continue peace negotiations while awaiting the new government. But analysts generally say that having been forced to resign his post, he will not be able to close a deal.
*****
Holy holidays highlight cultural divide in Jerusalem
Olmert urges Israel to exit Golan, West Bank, E. Jerusalem
Matthew Fisher
Canwest News Service
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert marked the onset of the Jewish New Year on Monday by telling the Yediot Aharonoth newspaper that if Israel wanted peace it has to exit East Jerusalem, the Golan and almost all of the West Bank.
Olmert's remarks hours before Rosh Hashanah, which is traditionally a period of soul-searching and atonement for past wrongs, may be seen as an olive branch to Israel's Arab neighbours or as another sign of Olmert's fast-waning power.
"A decision has to be made," said Olmert, who had insisted when he was Jerusalem's mayor that the city would never be divided. "This decision is difficult, terrible, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our innermost desires, our collective memories, the prayers of the Jewish people for 2,000 years."
While Israel controls almost every official aspect of life in Jerusalem, the holy city's 450,000 Jews and 270,000 Muslims almost never have anything to do with each other outside the workplace and the shopping malls.
Jerusalem's two solitudes have been especially noticeable this week. With the holy month of Ramadan having ended Monday night and the feast of Eid to be celebrated Tuesday, and with the Jewish New Year having begun at sunset on Monday, the most important Muslim and Jewish religious holidays will overlap for the first time in 12 years.
"I don't know of one Palestinian who will spend Rosh Hashanah or Eid with a Jewish Israeli," said Ryad Meshal, a 40-year-old taxi driver from a Palestinian suburb, who intends to celebrate Eid on Tuesday evening with a feast with family and friends.
Although Jews constitute about 80 per cent of his taxi business, Meshal said it would be unimaginable for him to ever invite Jews to an Eid dinner. Nor did he think it possible that any of the thousands of Jewish families living within walking distance of his home would ever invite him to break bread with them at Rosh Hashanah.
"Muslims and Jews may mix a little in Jaffa or Haifa but never in Jerusalem," Meshal said. "The problem is: Who does the city belong to? We think it is ours. They think it is theirs."
Like Meshal, the Palestinian taxi driver, Avi Pazner, who is an Israeli government spokesman and former ambassador, said he had never attended a private gathering "where an Arab had been invited. This is not a decision dictated by others. People here -- Muslims and Jews -- just don't feel like it."
Tensions have risen somewhat recently in Jerusalem because of three incidents in which Palestinians used vehicles to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli drivers and pedestrians.
"But the amazing thing is that there is so little terrorism here," Pazner said. Many Israeli commentators and politicians have dismissed what Olmert had to say about relinquishing control of East Jerusalem and almost all of the West Bank as a futile attempt by the prime minister to leave some kind of legacy not connected to the corruption allegations that he faces.
Meshal also rejected Olmert's epiphany. "It's just talk," he said. "It only matters if something is actually done."
© The Calgary Herald 2008
October 5, 2008
Boomtown Feels Effects of a Global Crisis
By ROBERT F. WORTH
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — On the surface, this glittering Arabian boomtown seems immune to the financial crisis plaguing the global economy.
The skyline still bristles with cranes — an estimated 20 percent of the world’s total — and the papers are full of ads promoting spectacular new building projects. On Sept. 24, tourists from around the world flocked to the opening of Atlantis, a gargantuan, pink, $1.5 billion resort hotel built on an artificial, palm-shaped island. There was no shortage of people willing to pay as much as $25,000 a night for a room, to gaze at the sharks and rays in a vast glass-lined aquarium in the lobby and to dine at marquee restaurants like Nobu and Brasserie Rostang.
But as recession looms in the West, cracks are appearing in the oil-fueled boom that has made Dubai, with its futuristic skyscrapers on the turquoise waters of the Persian Gulf, a global byword for unfettered growth.
Banks are reining in lending, casting a pall over corporate finance and building plans. Oil prices have been dropping. Stock markets across the region have been falling since June. After insisting for days that the oil-rich Persian Gulf region was fully “insulated” from financial troubles abroad, the Emirates’ Central Bank made about $13.6 billion available on Sept. 22 to ease credit problems, in an echo of bailout measures in the United States. Already, some bankers are saying it is not enough.
Some of Dubai’s more extravagant building projects — the ever-bigger malls, islands and indoor ski slopes — are likely to be dropped if they do not already have financing lined up, bankers say. The credit crisis could also reduce demand from buyers, who will have a harder time getting mortgages.
The shrinkage will be more severe if the financial crisis worsens in the West. Property prices and rents, which have remained steady until now, are widely expected to start dropping soon.
At the same time, investor confidence has been harmed by a long string of high-level corporate scandals, jeopardizing Dubai’s long-term ambition of becoming a regional financial capital.
“Plenty of people are worried,” said Gilbert Bazi, 25, a real estate broker from Lebanon who moved here a year ago. “They are waiting to see if what happened in the United States will happen here.”
When he first arrived, Mr. Bazi said, making money was almost absurdly easy. “Iranians, Russians, Europeans — everybody was buying,” he said. “I didn’t have to call people; they were calling me.”
Now, Mr. Bazi stalks the lobbies of hotels, trying to find clients.
“The market is sleeping,” he said.
In fairness, Dubai still looks rosy when set against the financial turmoil elsewhere. Although it lacks the oil wealth of its sister emirate Abu Dhabi, Dubai has huge budget and current account surpluses, and the government of the Emirates federation is able and willing — like its Persian Gulf neighbors — to inject an almost unlimited amount of money into the system to ease credit problems.
The governments of Saudi Arabia and Qatar have reaped so much profit from oil and gas in recent years that they are more worried about how to spend it than about managing any downturn. But the Persian Gulf’s governments face real economic challenges, albeit ones that are profoundly different from those in the West.
Until recently, credit in Dubai was growing by 49 percent a year, according to the Emirates’ Central Bank — a rate almost double that of bank deposits’ growth. That unnerved some bankers here, who felt it could lead to a collapse.
“In the U.S., the challenge is about keeping the banks going,” said Marios Maratheftis, chief economist for Standard Chartered Bank. “Here, the economy has been overheated, a correction is needed, and it’s about making sure the slowdown happens in a smooth, orderly manner.”
If that sounds like an easy problem to have, consider the manic vicissitudes of Dubai’s real estate market. Speculators often got bank loans to put down 10 percent on a property that had not yet been built, only to flip it for a huge profit to another buyer, who would do the same thing, and on and on. That was easy to do when housing prices here were surging so fast that some properties multiplied tenfold in value in just a few years.
But the Dubai authorities began getting nervous about this and imposed new regulations this summer to limit speculation.
Many analysts say the slowdown in Dubai’s economy, assuming it does not worsen to a slump, will make the city’s growth more sustainable and healthy by reducing its dependence on loans and speculation.
Similarly, the authorities hope that recent arrests in corporate scandals will root out the culture of corruption that plagues so many Arab countries. Some of those arrested have been Emiratis with connections to the ruling family, in a gesture clearly intended to send the message that no one is exempt.
As Dubai’s frenzied growth slows, whether there is a hard or soft landing will depend in great part on the banks, the link between the region’s declining stock markets and its still-thriving property sector.
“Banks will have to start lending to end-users,” said Robert McKinnon, a real estate analyst and head of equity research at Al Mal Capital here, referring to people who actually plan on occupying properties as opposed to trading them for profit. “There are some questions about how the banks will handle that transition.”
At worst, if the global economy worsened and some Dubai banks failed, there would be a firm crutch to lean on. In the early 1980s, after several Dubai banks stumbled, the government rescued them and relaunched them as the Emirates Bank International. In the early 1990s, two more banks were rescued. At that time, of course, Dubai was far smaller. The repercussions of such a government bailout today would be far more damaging to Dubai’s image as the epicenter of Persian Gulf development.
The government cushion appears to be part of the reason most local people do not seem anxious right now.
“We don’t worry about it,” said Hassan al-Hassani, 26, a civil engineer and an Emirati citizen, who was drinking coffee late Wednesday night with relatives and friends at a faux-Bedouin-style tent, set up among Dubai’s hypermodern skyscrapers in honor of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. “Maybe it’s good for things to calm down.”
A few yards away, guests admired a miniature model of a new residential and commercial Dubai development called the City of Arabia, which includes what will be — if it is really built — the biggest mall in the world.
“Sometimes we wonder, will people really come to live in these places?” Mr. Hassani asked. But he quickly brushed off the thought with a smile, reminding his listener that native Emiratis — unlike the foreigners, who make up a majority of Dubai’s 1.3 million residents — have a different perspective.
“Remember, 30 years ago almost nobody had phones here,” he said. “There was maybe one tall building. My family only had one car.”
Boomtown Feels Effects of a Global Crisis
By ROBERT F. WORTH
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — On the surface, this glittering Arabian boomtown seems immune to the financial crisis plaguing the global economy.
The skyline still bristles with cranes — an estimated 20 percent of the world’s total — and the papers are full of ads promoting spectacular new building projects. On Sept. 24, tourists from around the world flocked to the opening of Atlantis, a gargantuan, pink, $1.5 billion resort hotel built on an artificial, palm-shaped island. There was no shortage of people willing to pay as much as $25,000 a night for a room, to gaze at the sharks and rays in a vast glass-lined aquarium in the lobby and to dine at marquee restaurants like Nobu and Brasserie Rostang.
But as recession looms in the West, cracks are appearing in the oil-fueled boom that has made Dubai, with its futuristic skyscrapers on the turquoise waters of the Persian Gulf, a global byword for unfettered growth.
Banks are reining in lending, casting a pall over corporate finance and building plans. Oil prices have been dropping. Stock markets across the region have been falling since June. After insisting for days that the oil-rich Persian Gulf region was fully “insulated” from financial troubles abroad, the Emirates’ Central Bank made about $13.6 billion available on Sept. 22 to ease credit problems, in an echo of bailout measures in the United States. Already, some bankers are saying it is not enough.
Some of Dubai’s more extravagant building projects — the ever-bigger malls, islands and indoor ski slopes — are likely to be dropped if they do not already have financing lined up, bankers say. The credit crisis could also reduce demand from buyers, who will have a harder time getting mortgages.
The shrinkage will be more severe if the financial crisis worsens in the West. Property prices and rents, which have remained steady until now, are widely expected to start dropping soon.
At the same time, investor confidence has been harmed by a long string of high-level corporate scandals, jeopardizing Dubai’s long-term ambition of becoming a regional financial capital.
“Plenty of people are worried,” said Gilbert Bazi, 25, a real estate broker from Lebanon who moved here a year ago. “They are waiting to see if what happened in the United States will happen here.”
When he first arrived, Mr. Bazi said, making money was almost absurdly easy. “Iranians, Russians, Europeans — everybody was buying,” he said. “I didn’t have to call people; they were calling me.”
Now, Mr. Bazi stalks the lobbies of hotels, trying to find clients.
“The market is sleeping,” he said.
In fairness, Dubai still looks rosy when set against the financial turmoil elsewhere. Although it lacks the oil wealth of its sister emirate Abu Dhabi, Dubai has huge budget and current account surpluses, and the government of the Emirates federation is able and willing — like its Persian Gulf neighbors — to inject an almost unlimited amount of money into the system to ease credit problems.
The governments of Saudi Arabia and Qatar have reaped so much profit from oil and gas in recent years that they are more worried about how to spend it than about managing any downturn. But the Persian Gulf’s governments face real economic challenges, albeit ones that are profoundly different from those in the West.
Until recently, credit in Dubai was growing by 49 percent a year, according to the Emirates’ Central Bank — a rate almost double that of bank deposits’ growth. That unnerved some bankers here, who felt it could lead to a collapse.
“In the U.S., the challenge is about keeping the banks going,” said Marios Maratheftis, chief economist for Standard Chartered Bank. “Here, the economy has been overheated, a correction is needed, and it’s about making sure the slowdown happens in a smooth, orderly manner.”
If that sounds like an easy problem to have, consider the manic vicissitudes of Dubai’s real estate market. Speculators often got bank loans to put down 10 percent on a property that had not yet been built, only to flip it for a huge profit to another buyer, who would do the same thing, and on and on. That was easy to do when housing prices here were surging so fast that some properties multiplied tenfold in value in just a few years.
But the Dubai authorities began getting nervous about this and imposed new regulations this summer to limit speculation.
Many analysts say the slowdown in Dubai’s economy, assuming it does not worsen to a slump, will make the city’s growth more sustainable and healthy by reducing its dependence on loans and speculation.
Similarly, the authorities hope that recent arrests in corporate scandals will root out the culture of corruption that plagues so many Arab countries. Some of those arrested have been Emiratis with connections to the ruling family, in a gesture clearly intended to send the message that no one is exempt.
As Dubai’s frenzied growth slows, whether there is a hard or soft landing will depend in great part on the banks, the link between the region’s declining stock markets and its still-thriving property sector.
“Banks will have to start lending to end-users,” said Robert McKinnon, a real estate analyst and head of equity research at Al Mal Capital here, referring to people who actually plan on occupying properties as opposed to trading them for profit. “There are some questions about how the banks will handle that transition.”
At worst, if the global economy worsened and some Dubai banks failed, there would be a firm crutch to lean on. In the early 1980s, after several Dubai banks stumbled, the government rescued them and relaunched them as the Emirates Bank International. In the early 1990s, two more banks were rescued. At that time, of course, Dubai was far smaller. The repercussions of such a government bailout today would be far more damaging to Dubai’s image as the epicenter of Persian Gulf development.
The government cushion appears to be part of the reason most local people do not seem anxious right now.
“We don’t worry about it,” said Hassan al-Hassani, 26, a civil engineer and an Emirati citizen, who was drinking coffee late Wednesday night with relatives and friends at a faux-Bedouin-style tent, set up among Dubai’s hypermodern skyscrapers in honor of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. “Maybe it’s good for things to calm down.”
A few yards away, guests admired a miniature model of a new residential and commercial Dubai development called the City of Arabia, which includes what will be — if it is really built — the biggest mall in the world.
“Sometimes we wonder, will people really come to live in these places?” Mr. Hassani asked. But he quickly brushed off the thought with a smile, reminding his listener that native Emiratis — unlike the foreigners, who make up a majority of Dubai’s 1.3 million residents — have a different perspective.
“Remember, 30 years ago almost nobody had phones here,” he said. “There was maybe one tall building. My family only had one car.”
Saudi Arabia
Can it make peace in the wider region?
Oct 9th 2008 | CAIRO
From The Economist print edition
Saudi Arabia has had mixed success in its diplomacy, but it has raised its profile and should keep on trying
Illustration by David Simonds
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast- ... d=12380962
BY TRADITION, Muslim leaders seal pacts by bowing together in prayer, side by side. And what better place to do this than in Mecca, the city Muslims face for their devotions, and where pilgrims of every sect and faction mingle peaceably by the million? So it is natural that Saudi Arabia’s rulers, who not only control the holy city but also happen to be colossally rich, should adopt the role of peacemakers.
In recent years, as an ailing Egyptian government has faded from its former role as the Arab world’s chief broker, the Saudis have tried interceding in regional troubles ranging from Lebanon to Israel-Palestine, Somalia and Iraq. Yet for all the pious ritual and lavish banqueting enjoyed by their guests, and for all the moral authority carried by King Abdullah, who styles himself the Servant of the Holy Places, the Saudis have an uneven record of success.
The king appeared, for instance, to have brokered a power-sharing deal between the bickering Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, in 2007, only to see it unravel when Hamas mounted a bloody coup in Gaza, ousting its rival from the enclave. A deal signed last year under the Saudi aegis between quarrelling Somali factions looked hopeful too, but failed to make the country governable. And though the Saudis did help fix an accord in Taif in 1989 that brought an end to Lebanon’s 15-year-long civil war, their more recent Lebanese diplomacy has been less effective. Being a bastion of arch-conservative Sunnism, the kingdom has been seen as acting simply as a patron of Lebanon’s Sunni minority rather than as a neutral arbiter. In the end, it was the tiny Gulf state of Qatar that brokered Lebanon’s peace this year, which came largely by way of concessions prised out of the Saudis’ Sunni clients.
With its overriding interest in blunting any expansion of influence by Iran, the region’s leading Shia power, Saudi Arabia has run into similar trouble in Iraq. Iraq’s majority Shias, freed from centuries of Sunni rule, mistrust a ruling family whose forebears, 200 years ago, led ferocious Sunni raids on the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. The mistrust is mutual. Though other Sunni Arab countries have reached out to Iraq’s Shia-dominated government, by opening embassies, cancelling debt and hosting Iraqi refugees, Saudi Arabia has preferred to give it a cold shoulder, though there have been hints of a slight warming.
Despite tribal as well as sectarian ties, Iraq’s Sunnis have notably failed to turn to the kingdom as a protector. This reflects, in part, disillusionment with the Saudi-influenced version of Sunnism espoused by al-Qaeda, many of whose suicide bombers in Iraq hailed from across the Saudi border. So Saudi diplomats have more or less excluded themselves from the Iraqi debate.
The kingdom’s latest reported diplomatic venture may have a slightly better chance. In Mecca at the end of September, King Abdullah hosted a Ramadan breakfast that gathered representatives of Afghanistan’s Western-backed government as well as of the Taliban rebels who were overthrown seven years ago. Both the Afghan government and its opponents have been quick to deny that anything like real negotiations took place. The denial is understandable, since both parties are divided, with factions bitterly opposed to any accommodation. Even if talks did go beyond polite requests to pass the salt, full-scale negotiation is a long way off.
Yet the Saudi initiative to bring the sides together comes at an opportune time, when interests may start slowly to converge towards a negotiated solution. Despite calls for more coalition troops to back President Hamid Karzai’s government, a growing number of Western soldiers and diplomats reckon there can be no purely military solution in Afghanistan. And though Taliban guerrillas have got bolder, they have suffered heavy losses. An offensive by Pakistan’s army on its own side of a lawless border seeks to deny the Taliban their main sanctuary. With elections in Afghanistan next year, there is a chance that at least some factions of the Taliban may see a chance to secure political gains by popular mandate rather than at gunpoint.
So Saudi Arabia may yet be well placed to serve as an interlocutor. It may dangle cheap oil to the Afghans as an incentive to parley. The kingdom remains a close ally of America, as well as of Pakistan. But it is also one of the very few countries to have recognised the Islamic emirate declared by the Taliban from 1996-2001. Moreover, the Saudis’ Wahhabist strain of Islam is nearly as puritan as the Taliban’s. And the Saudis share with most governments, from Western ones to the Afghan parties and Pakistan, a desire to thwart plans that Iran may have for meddling in the Afghan mire.
Can it make peace in the wider region?
Oct 9th 2008 | CAIRO
From The Economist print edition
Saudi Arabia has had mixed success in its diplomacy, but it has raised its profile and should keep on trying
Illustration by David Simonds
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast- ... d=12380962
BY TRADITION, Muslim leaders seal pacts by bowing together in prayer, side by side. And what better place to do this than in Mecca, the city Muslims face for their devotions, and where pilgrims of every sect and faction mingle peaceably by the million? So it is natural that Saudi Arabia’s rulers, who not only control the holy city but also happen to be colossally rich, should adopt the role of peacemakers.
In recent years, as an ailing Egyptian government has faded from its former role as the Arab world’s chief broker, the Saudis have tried interceding in regional troubles ranging from Lebanon to Israel-Palestine, Somalia and Iraq. Yet for all the pious ritual and lavish banqueting enjoyed by their guests, and for all the moral authority carried by King Abdullah, who styles himself the Servant of the Holy Places, the Saudis have an uneven record of success.
The king appeared, for instance, to have brokered a power-sharing deal between the bickering Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, in 2007, only to see it unravel when Hamas mounted a bloody coup in Gaza, ousting its rival from the enclave. A deal signed last year under the Saudi aegis between quarrelling Somali factions looked hopeful too, but failed to make the country governable. And though the Saudis did help fix an accord in Taif in 1989 that brought an end to Lebanon’s 15-year-long civil war, their more recent Lebanese diplomacy has been less effective. Being a bastion of arch-conservative Sunnism, the kingdom has been seen as acting simply as a patron of Lebanon’s Sunni minority rather than as a neutral arbiter. In the end, it was the tiny Gulf state of Qatar that brokered Lebanon’s peace this year, which came largely by way of concessions prised out of the Saudis’ Sunni clients.
With its overriding interest in blunting any expansion of influence by Iran, the region’s leading Shia power, Saudi Arabia has run into similar trouble in Iraq. Iraq’s majority Shias, freed from centuries of Sunni rule, mistrust a ruling family whose forebears, 200 years ago, led ferocious Sunni raids on the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. The mistrust is mutual. Though other Sunni Arab countries have reached out to Iraq’s Shia-dominated government, by opening embassies, cancelling debt and hosting Iraqi refugees, Saudi Arabia has preferred to give it a cold shoulder, though there have been hints of a slight warming.
Despite tribal as well as sectarian ties, Iraq’s Sunnis have notably failed to turn to the kingdom as a protector. This reflects, in part, disillusionment with the Saudi-influenced version of Sunnism espoused by al-Qaeda, many of whose suicide bombers in Iraq hailed from across the Saudi border. So Saudi diplomats have more or less excluded themselves from the Iraqi debate.
The kingdom’s latest reported diplomatic venture may have a slightly better chance. In Mecca at the end of September, King Abdullah hosted a Ramadan breakfast that gathered representatives of Afghanistan’s Western-backed government as well as of the Taliban rebels who were overthrown seven years ago. Both the Afghan government and its opponents have been quick to deny that anything like real negotiations took place. The denial is understandable, since both parties are divided, with factions bitterly opposed to any accommodation. Even if talks did go beyond polite requests to pass the salt, full-scale negotiation is a long way off.
Yet the Saudi initiative to bring the sides together comes at an opportune time, when interests may start slowly to converge towards a negotiated solution. Despite calls for more coalition troops to back President Hamid Karzai’s government, a growing number of Western soldiers and diplomats reckon there can be no purely military solution in Afghanistan. And though Taliban guerrillas have got bolder, they have suffered heavy losses. An offensive by Pakistan’s army on its own side of a lawless border seeks to deny the Taliban their main sanctuary. With elections in Afghanistan next year, there is a chance that at least some factions of the Taliban may see a chance to secure political gains by popular mandate rather than at gunpoint.
So Saudi Arabia may yet be well placed to serve as an interlocutor. It may dangle cheap oil to the Afghans as an incentive to parley. The kingdom remains a close ally of America, as well as of Pakistan. But it is also one of the very few countries to have recognised the Islamic emirate declared by the Taliban from 1996-2001. Moreover, the Saudis’ Wahhabist strain of Islam is nearly as puritan as the Taliban’s. And the Saudis share with most governments, from Western ones to the Afghan parties and Pakistan, a desire to thwart plans that Iran may have for meddling in the Afghan mire.
Beheadings rise in Saudi Arabia
Reuters
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Saudi Arabia executes convicted criminals at a rate of more than two a week and almost half of them are foreigners from poor countries, Amnesty International said on Tuesday.
Saudi Arabia regularly executes murderers, rapists and drug traffickers, usually by public beheading, but judges sometimes give the death sentence to armed robbers and people accused of "sorcery" or desecrating the Qur'an.
The number of death sentences carried out last year shot up to 158, the London-based rights group said, from 36 the year before. Saudi media have talked about a wave of crime by organized gangs, blaming poor Asian labourers.
"The Saudi Arabian government's continuing high use of the death penalty runs counter to the growing international trend towards abolition," Amnesty said.
"The process by which the death penalty is imposed and carried out is harsh, largely secretive and grossly unfair. Judges, all men, have wide discretion and can hand down death sentences for vaguely worded and non-violent offences."
A Saudi official spokesman was not immediately available to comment.
The report says that poor Asian and African nationals form a disproportionately high percentage of executions because they do not understand Arabic and have no access to influential figures who are able to intercede on their behalf.
More than seven million of a population of 25 million are foreigners, mainly blue-collar workers from Africa and Asia.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
Reuters
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Saudi Arabia executes convicted criminals at a rate of more than two a week and almost half of them are foreigners from poor countries, Amnesty International said on Tuesday.
Saudi Arabia regularly executes murderers, rapists and drug traffickers, usually by public beheading, but judges sometimes give the death sentence to armed robbers and people accused of "sorcery" or desecrating the Qur'an.
The number of death sentences carried out last year shot up to 158, the London-based rights group said, from 36 the year before. Saudi media have talked about a wave of crime by organized gangs, blaming poor Asian labourers.
"The Saudi Arabian government's continuing high use of the death penalty runs counter to the growing international trend towards abolition," Amnesty said.
"The process by which the death penalty is imposed and carried out is harsh, largely secretive and grossly unfair. Judges, all men, have wide discretion and can hand down death sentences for vaguely worded and non-violent offences."
A Saudi official spokesman was not immediately available to comment.
The report says that poor Asian and African nationals form a disproportionately high percentage of executions because they do not understand Arabic and have no access to influential figures who are able to intercede on their behalf.
More than seven million of a population of 25 million are foreigners, mainly blue-collar workers from Africa and Asia.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
October 23, 2008
Op-Ed Columnist
Iran Is Job One
By ROGER COHEN
Until he retired from the State Department earlier this year, Nicholas Burns was, as under secretary of state for political affairs, the lead U.S. negotiator on Iran.
And how many times, during his three years in this role, did he meet with an Iranian?
Not once.
Burns wasn’t allowed to. His presence was supposed to be the reward if the Iranians suspended uranium enrichment and sat down at the table.
Burns, now 52, joined the State Department in 1980. He’s among a generation of U.S. diplomats who have never set foot in Iran, the rising power of the Middle East, even with oil at $70 rather than double that.
Let me put this bluntly: If we’re serious about the Middle East, this has got to change.
Wall Street has marginalized foreign policy in the U.S. election campaign, but it will return to center stage on Nov. 5. The in-box of the next president will include two intractable wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and a tight timetable, of perhaps two years, for preventing Iran from securing nuclear weapons capability.
That’s an Iran-dominated agenda. Apart from the nuclear issue, which has tended to override everything, long-term stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan is inconceivable without some Iranian cooperation, as is peace in Lebanon and a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
On Iran, Barack Obama and John McCain could scarcely be further apart. Obama has said of Iran that, “For us not to be in a conversation with them doesn’t make sense.”
McCain has sung “Bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran” to the tune of a Beach Boys number — a joke, no doubt, but one reflective of the confrontational tone of his foreign policy pronouncements.
“Country first,” the McCain campaign slogan, seems to mean “Rest of the world last.” Certainly that’s where Sarah Palin, his running mate with a taste for “pro-America” parts of the country, places it.
Burns, like Obama, believes it’s time to talk to Iran. “The U.S. needs to commit to a more ambitious diplomatic strategy,” he told me. “We have a responsibility, after Iraq, before we consider the use of force, to demonstrate that every diplomatic avenue has been explored. If they come to the table and balk, we have more leverage over the Chinese and Russians to press for much tougher sanctions.”
It’s time to drop the condition that Iran suspend enrichment before we talk. The condition serves little purpose — Iran can always resume enrichment — and has given the mullahs an alibi.
It’s also time — next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution — to rethink the whole U.S. approach to Iran. A good place to start would be getting inside the head of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme Iranian religious leader.
The Iranian revolution was a religious uprising, but also a nationalist one against U.S. meddling in the country, including the C.I.A.-engineered 1953 coup and support for the shah. Khamenei knows that identification still underwrites his power, and that Iran’s leadership of an anti-American front still counts on the Muslim street.
He also knows how much Iranian power has grown in recent years, through the U.S. removal of its arch-enemy Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the ushering of fellow Shiites to power in Baghdad. He knows that Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas are now entrenched forces. He knows how stretched the U.S. is militarily. He knows how popular the nuclear program is domestically as a symbol of Iran’s regional ambitions. And he knows that Israel has the bomb.
These are realities. They may be unpalatable, but if there’s a lesson to the Bush years, it’s that dealing in illusions is unhelpful. The cost to Khamenei of a handshake with America is high.
But Iran also has some shared interests with America — in preventing a breakup of Iraq, in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in avoiding a violent confrontation of the Sunni and Shia worlds. It wants security, more economic access and, eventually, restored diplomatic relations with the United States.
All of this says to me: think big. Don’t obsess about the nuclear issue, critical as it is. Get everything on the table. Be realistic, as in: We have interests. You have interests. Are there areas in which they coincide?
Don’t lecture. Don’t moralize. Don’t demand everything — an end to the nuclear program and terrorism and Lebanese and Gazan interference — without the means to back such demands. That’s been the Bush failure.
I can already hear the outrage. But Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president at least until elections next year, wants to wipe Israel off the map! He denies the Holocaust! Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia will race for their own bomb unless we take out the Iranian centrifuges!
To which I say: Focus on today’s reality, coldly. Iran does not have nuclear capacity yet. It’s time to talk.
And it’s time to find the greatest Americans, irrespective of party, to get that talking going. As Obama has noted: “We negotiated with Stalin. We negotiated with Mao.”
Op-Ed Columnist
Iran Is Job One
By ROGER COHEN
Until he retired from the State Department earlier this year, Nicholas Burns was, as under secretary of state for political affairs, the lead U.S. negotiator on Iran.
And how many times, during his three years in this role, did he meet with an Iranian?
Not once.
Burns wasn’t allowed to. His presence was supposed to be the reward if the Iranians suspended uranium enrichment and sat down at the table.
Burns, now 52, joined the State Department in 1980. He’s among a generation of U.S. diplomats who have never set foot in Iran, the rising power of the Middle East, even with oil at $70 rather than double that.
Let me put this bluntly: If we’re serious about the Middle East, this has got to change.
Wall Street has marginalized foreign policy in the U.S. election campaign, but it will return to center stage on Nov. 5. The in-box of the next president will include two intractable wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and a tight timetable, of perhaps two years, for preventing Iran from securing nuclear weapons capability.
That’s an Iran-dominated agenda. Apart from the nuclear issue, which has tended to override everything, long-term stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan is inconceivable without some Iranian cooperation, as is peace in Lebanon and a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
On Iran, Barack Obama and John McCain could scarcely be further apart. Obama has said of Iran that, “For us not to be in a conversation with them doesn’t make sense.”
McCain has sung “Bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran” to the tune of a Beach Boys number — a joke, no doubt, but one reflective of the confrontational tone of his foreign policy pronouncements.
“Country first,” the McCain campaign slogan, seems to mean “Rest of the world last.” Certainly that’s where Sarah Palin, his running mate with a taste for “pro-America” parts of the country, places it.
Burns, like Obama, believes it’s time to talk to Iran. “The U.S. needs to commit to a more ambitious diplomatic strategy,” he told me. “We have a responsibility, after Iraq, before we consider the use of force, to demonstrate that every diplomatic avenue has been explored. If they come to the table and balk, we have more leverage over the Chinese and Russians to press for much tougher sanctions.”
It’s time to drop the condition that Iran suspend enrichment before we talk. The condition serves little purpose — Iran can always resume enrichment — and has given the mullahs an alibi.
It’s also time — next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution — to rethink the whole U.S. approach to Iran. A good place to start would be getting inside the head of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme Iranian religious leader.
The Iranian revolution was a religious uprising, but also a nationalist one against U.S. meddling in the country, including the C.I.A.-engineered 1953 coup and support for the shah. Khamenei knows that identification still underwrites his power, and that Iran’s leadership of an anti-American front still counts on the Muslim street.
He also knows how much Iranian power has grown in recent years, through the U.S. removal of its arch-enemy Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the ushering of fellow Shiites to power in Baghdad. He knows that Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas are now entrenched forces. He knows how stretched the U.S. is militarily. He knows how popular the nuclear program is domestically as a symbol of Iran’s regional ambitions. And he knows that Israel has the bomb.
These are realities. They may be unpalatable, but if there’s a lesson to the Bush years, it’s that dealing in illusions is unhelpful. The cost to Khamenei of a handshake with America is high.
But Iran also has some shared interests with America — in preventing a breakup of Iraq, in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in avoiding a violent confrontation of the Sunni and Shia worlds. It wants security, more economic access and, eventually, restored diplomatic relations with the United States.
All of this says to me: think big. Don’t obsess about the nuclear issue, critical as it is. Get everything on the table. Be realistic, as in: We have interests. You have interests. Are there areas in which they coincide?
Don’t lecture. Don’t moralize. Don’t demand everything — an end to the nuclear program and terrorism and Lebanese and Gazan interference — without the means to back such demands. That’s been the Bush failure.
I can already hear the outrage. But Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president at least until elections next year, wants to wipe Israel off the map! He denies the Holocaust! Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia will race for their own bomb unless we take out the Iranian centrifuges!
To which I say: Focus on today’s reality, coldly. Iran does not have nuclear capacity yet. It’s time to talk.
And it’s time to find the greatest Americans, irrespective of party, to get that talking going. As Obama has noted: “We negotiated with Stalin. We negotiated with Mao.”
There is a related multimedia linked at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/world ... 4tomb.html
October 24, 2008
Pilgrimage to Roots of Faith and Strife
By ISABEL KERSHNER
NABLUS, West Bank — They came in waves, ardent Jewish settlers, religious women from central Israel, black-clad followers of Hasidic courts and groups of teenage boys and girls, almost a thousand of them in all.
Crammed into a dozen buses and escorted by the Israeli military, the Jewish pilgrims slid quietly along deserted streets throughout the early hours of a recent morning while the residents of this Palestinian city, a militant stronghold ruled until recently by armed gangs, slept in their beds.
The destination was the holy place known as Joseph’s Tomb, a tiny half-derelict stone compound in the heart of a residential district that many Jews believe is the final burial place of the son of Jacob, the biblical patriarch.
The first group arrived around midnight. Rushing through the darkness into the tomb, they crowded around the rough mound of the grave and started reciting Psalms by the glow of their cellphones, not waiting for the portable generator to power up a crude fluorescent light.
They were praying to be infused with some of the righteousness of Joseph, as well as to be able to return. A gaping hole in the domed, charred roof of the tomb left it partly open to the sky, a reminder of the turmoil of the recent past.
The Palestinians seek Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and full control over cities like this one. But these religious Jews, spurred on by mystical fervor and the local Jewish settler leadership, are strengthening their bond.
To them this is not Nablus, one of the largest Palestinian cities, with a population of more than 120,000, but the site of the ancient biblical city of Shechem. The tomb, they believe, sits on the parcel of ground that Jacob bought for a hundred pieces of silver, according to Joshua 24:32, an inheritance of the children of Joseph, meaning that its ownership is not in doubt.
Here, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is boiled down to its very essence of competing territorial, national and religious claims. The renewed focus on what the Jewish devotees call the pull or power of Joseph appears to reflect a wider trend: a move by the settler movement at large away from tired security arguments and a return to its fundamental raison d’être — the religious conviction that this land is the Jews’ historical birthright and is not up for grabs.
“We are as connected to this place as we are to our patriarchs in Hebron,” said Malachi Levinger, a son of Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who founded the first Jewish settlement in that city after the 1967 war. The younger Mr. Levinger had come to the tomb with his wife and three small daughters at 2 a.m.
By day, Nablus is the realm of the Palestinian police, who have largely managed in recent months to restore law and order and to keep the gunmen off the streets. By night the police melt away to avoid encounters with the Israeli forces that still carry out frequent raids.
Under the Israeli-Palestinian agreements of the mid-1990s known as the Oslo accords, Israel withdrew from the Palestinian cities but was assured free access to Jewish holy sites. The army turned Joseph’s Tomb into a fortified post, and a small yeshiva continued to operate there.
But the tomb became a frequent flash point. In 1996, six Israeli soldiers were killed there in a wave of riots by the Palestinian police and militants throughout the West Bank. The second Palestinian uprising broke out in September 2000, and the tomb was the scene of a battle in which 18 Palestinians and an Israeli border policeman were killed; the policeman was left to bleed to death inside. (The settlers note pointedly that the family name of the Israeli, a Druse, was Yusef, Arabic for Joseph.)
To avoid further friction, the Israeli prime minister at the time, Ehud Barak, ordered the army to vacate the tomb and hand it over to the protection of the Palestinian police.
Some declared the tomb an Islamic holy site and painted the dome green; Joseph is considered a prophet in Islam, and his story is related extensively in the Koran. Others believe that the compound is actually the tomb of a Muslim sheik also called Yusef.
Hours after the handover, however, a Palestinian mob ransacked the structure, smashing the dome with pickaxes and setting the compound on fire.
Since then, according to the settlers, the Palestinians have continued to desecrate the tomb, using it as a local garbage dump and sometimes burning tires inside. Though the Palestinian authorities recently cleaned up the tomb, an acrid smell hung in the air, and the walls and floor remained covered in soot.
Since Israel forfeited the site in 2000, Jewish pilgrims, particularly Breslov Hasidim, have visited sporadically, sometimes stealing into Nablus alone in the dark.
The local settlers say they are now working on establishing a routine. Since the beginning of the year, Gershon Mesika, the newly elected mayor of the Samaria Council, which represents settlers in the northern West Bank, has made the resumption of regular visits a priority, coordinating with the army to organize entries at least once a month.
“Our hold on Joseph’s Tomb strengthens our hold on the whole country,” said Eli Rosenfeld, an employee of the council and a former administrator of the yeshiva at the tomb.
Now their goal is to make the visits weekly, then to re-establish the kind of permanent presence that existed before 2000 so that the pilgrims will no longer have to come, as Mr. Mesika put it, “like thieves in the night.”
The recent nighttime pilgrimage, during the Jewish festival of Sukkot, had been organized with precision and was shrouded in secrecy until the last minute, according to a Samaria Council spokesman, David Ha’ivri, not least to avoid hundreds of would-be worshipers’ just showing up.
The operation began just before midnight, as the leaders of the regional council of Samaria, which takes the biblical name for the northern West Bank, gathered at a nearby army base. Boarding a bulletproof minibus, they headed for Nablus. The bus was whisked through a military checkpoint into the city, where the army had secured the tomb in advance and military vehicles were stationed at every junction along the route.
Over the course of the night the buses came and went in convoys according to a tightly organized schedule, bearing pilgrims from the Hebron area, Jerusalem and locations all over Israel. Some of them said they had been on a waiting list for months.
A few of the women cradled babies and toddlers in their arms. Some of the long-skirted teenage girls prayed so intensely that they wept; one rubbed ashes into the palm of her hand.
Growing numbers of soldiers in battle gear joined the worshipers, swept up by the spiritual aura as tea lights flickered on the grave.
As Karlin and Breslov Hasidim surged into the compound, many in fur hats and black silk coats, they spoke excitedly in Yiddish and photographed one another with their cellphones in the sunken courtyard where a mulberry tree once grew. “I come to Joseph, and I feel new,” said one of them, Moshe Tanzer, 22.
In a side chamber that used to house the yeshiva, a lone clarinetist played klezmer music and men sang and danced in circles. Outside, in a hastily erected sukkah, a temporary dwelling for the holiday, pilgrims feasted on sweet and spicy kugel and orange squash.
For those present it was as if the tomb, like Joseph, betrayed by his jealous brothers and sold into slavery in Egypt, had been temporarily redeemed.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/world ... 4tomb.html
October 24, 2008
Pilgrimage to Roots of Faith and Strife
By ISABEL KERSHNER
NABLUS, West Bank — They came in waves, ardent Jewish settlers, religious women from central Israel, black-clad followers of Hasidic courts and groups of teenage boys and girls, almost a thousand of them in all.
Crammed into a dozen buses and escorted by the Israeli military, the Jewish pilgrims slid quietly along deserted streets throughout the early hours of a recent morning while the residents of this Palestinian city, a militant stronghold ruled until recently by armed gangs, slept in their beds.
The destination was the holy place known as Joseph’s Tomb, a tiny half-derelict stone compound in the heart of a residential district that many Jews believe is the final burial place of the son of Jacob, the biblical patriarch.
The first group arrived around midnight. Rushing through the darkness into the tomb, they crowded around the rough mound of the grave and started reciting Psalms by the glow of their cellphones, not waiting for the portable generator to power up a crude fluorescent light.
They were praying to be infused with some of the righteousness of Joseph, as well as to be able to return. A gaping hole in the domed, charred roof of the tomb left it partly open to the sky, a reminder of the turmoil of the recent past.
The Palestinians seek Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and full control over cities like this one. But these religious Jews, spurred on by mystical fervor and the local Jewish settler leadership, are strengthening their bond.
To them this is not Nablus, one of the largest Palestinian cities, with a population of more than 120,000, but the site of the ancient biblical city of Shechem. The tomb, they believe, sits on the parcel of ground that Jacob bought for a hundred pieces of silver, according to Joshua 24:32, an inheritance of the children of Joseph, meaning that its ownership is not in doubt.
Here, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is boiled down to its very essence of competing territorial, national and religious claims. The renewed focus on what the Jewish devotees call the pull or power of Joseph appears to reflect a wider trend: a move by the settler movement at large away from tired security arguments and a return to its fundamental raison d’être — the religious conviction that this land is the Jews’ historical birthright and is not up for grabs.
“We are as connected to this place as we are to our patriarchs in Hebron,” said Malachi Levinger, a son of Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who founded the first Jewish settlement in that city after the 1967 war. The younger Mr. Levinger had come to the tomb with his wife and three small daughters at 2 a.m.
By day, Nablus is the realm of the Palestinian police, who have largely managed in recent months to restore law and order and to keep the gunmen off the streets. By night the police melt away to avoid encounters with the Israeli forces that still carry out frequent raids.
Under the Israeli-Palestinian agreements of the mid-1990s known as the Oslo accords, Israel withdrew from the Palestinian cities but was assured free access to Jewish holy sites. The army turned Joseph’s Tomb into a fortified post, and a small yeshiva continued to operate there.
But the tomb became a frequent flash point. In 1996, six Israeli soldiers were killed there in a wave of riots by the Palestinian police and militants throughout the West Bank. The second Palestinian uprising broke out in September 2000, and the tomb was the scene of a battle in which 18 Palestinians and an Israeli border policeman were killed; the policeman was left to bleed to death inside. (The settlers note pointedly that the family name of the Israeli, a Druse, was Yusef, Arabic for Joseph.)
To avoid further friction, the Israeli prime minister at the time, Ehud Barak, ordered the army to vacate the tomb and hand it over to the protection of the Palestinian police.
Some declared the tomb an Islamic holy site and painted the dome green; Joseph is considered a prophet in Islam, and his story is related extensively in the Koran. Others believe that the compound is actually the tomb of a Muslim sheik also called Yusef.
Hours after the handover, however, a Palestinian mob ransacked the structure, smashing the dome with pickaxes and setting the compound on fire.
Since then, according to the settlers, the Palestinians have continued to desecrate the tomb, using it as a local garbage dump and sometimes burning tires inside. Though the Palestinian authorities recently cleaned up the tomb, an acrid smell hung in the air, and the walls and floor remained covered in soot.
Since Israel forfeited the site in 2000, Jewish pilgrims, particularly Breslov Hasidim, have visited sporadically, sometimes stealing into Nablus alone in the dark.
The local settlers say they are now working on establishing a routine. Since the beginning of the year, Gershon Mesika, the newly elected mayor of the Samaria Council, which represents settlers in the northern West Bank, has made the resumption of regular visits a priority, coordinating with the army to organize entries at least once a month.
“Our hold on Joseph’s Tomb strengthens our hold on the whole country,” said Eli Rosenfeld, an employee of the council and a former administrator of the yeshiva at the tomb.
Now their goal is to make the visits weekly, then to re-establish the kind of permanent presence that existed before 2000 so that the pilgrims will no longer have to come, as Mr. Mesika put it, “like thieves in the night.”
The recent nighttime pilgrimage, during the Jewish festival of Sukkot, had been organized with precision and was shrouded in secrecy until the last minute, according to a Samaria Council spokesman, David Ha’ivri, not least to avoid hundreds of would-be worshipers’ just showing up.
The operation began just before midnight, as the leaders of the regional council of Samaria, which takes the biblical name for the northern West Bank, gathered at a nearby army base. Boarding a bulletproof minibus, they headed for Nablus. The bus was whisked through a military checkpoint into the city, where the army had secured the tomb in advance and military vehicles were stationed at every junction along the route.
Over the course of the night the buses came and went in convoys according to a tightly organized schedule, bearing pilgrims from the Hebron area, Jerusalem and locations all over Israel. Some of them said they had been on a waiting list for months.
A few of the women cradled babies and toddlers in their arms. Some of the long-skirted teenage girls prayed so intensely that they wept; one rubbed ashes into the palm of her hand.
Growing numbers of soldiers in battle gear joined the worshipers, swept up by the spiritual aura as tea lights flickered on the grave.
As Karlin and Breslov Hasidim surged into the compound, many in fur hats and black silk coats, they spoke excitedly in Yiddish and photographed one another with their cellphones in the sunken courtyard where a mulberry tree once grew. “I come to Joseph, and I feel new,” said one of them, Moshe Tanzer, 22.
In a side chamber that used to house the yeshiva, a lone clarinetist played klezmer music and men sang and danced in circles. Outside, in a hastily erected sukkah, a temporary dwelling for the holiday, pilgrims feasted on sweet and spicy kugel and orange squash.
For those present it was as if the tomb, like Joseph, betrayed by his jealous brothers and sold into slavery in Egypt, had been temporarily redeemed.
October 29, 2008
Slowdown in Persian Gulf Reverberates in Middle East
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — For many of the financially strapped nations of the Middle East, the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf have served for years as an economic lifeline, providing jobs for their citizens, who in turn sent millions of dollars back home; tourists, who filled their hotels when Westerners were reluctant to visit; direct investment; and the kind of checkbook diplomacy that has helped stabilize an often volatile region.
Suddenly, that lifeline appears frayed, dangerously so for countries like Egypt and Jordan, as the energy-rich nations find themselves pulled into the global financial crisis and undermined by dropping oil prices. Across the Persian Gulf, stock markets are down, causing panic among investors. Even in the boomtown of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, the once-mighty real estate market has cooled as access to credit has tightened.
Governments across the region have intervened.
The United Arab Emirates injected $32 billion into its banking system and guaranteed bank deposits. Saudi Arabia has offered billions of dollars to make loans available to its citizens. And Kuwait, which had already cut its benchmark rate, this week moved to prop up its second largest bank.
But the era of sky-high oil prices, while now a memory, left most of the region’s capitals with enough cash reserves to cushion the blow, economists and financial experts in the region said. And as long as oil sells for more than $55 a barrel, most of the governments will take in more than they have allocated in their budgets, regional analysts said.
“We are not calling for a recession in the gulf,” said Marios Maratheftis, regional head of research for Standard Chartered Bank in Dubai. “We are looking at a slowdown.”
But a slowdown in the Persian Gulf might feel like a crash landing in places like Egypt, Jordan and Syria, where gulf money has helped prop up strained economies.
“When there is growth in the gulf, there will be growth in the whole Arab world,” said Rashad Abdou, a professor of economics and international finance at Cairo University. “There would be more tourism, more money in the stock market, more investments. And the opposite is true. With a shrinking or recession, they will not come for tourism, they will not put their money in the stock market, they will not invest and they will not be able to hire Egyptian workers.”
Egypt receives about half of its $6 billion in annual remittances from more than two million citizens living and working in the Persian Gulf area, while about 60 percent of its tourists come from that region, Egyptian economists estimated. Syria has benefited from gulf investments in large real estate projects, helping offset some of the isolation imposed by United States sanctions. Jordan receives about $2 billion annually in remittances from workers in the Persian Gulf and takes in about $500 million in financial aid from Saudi Arabia alone.
“I expect investments from the gulf to slow down or stop because they have to deal with their own problems before they invest in other countries,” said Nabil Samman, an economist who runs the Damascus-based Center for Research and Documentation. “Syria will be affected in terms of the Syrian people who send money from the gulf. There are close to a million Syrians in the gulf area.”
Extravagant oil wealth has helped transform not only the Persian Gulf nations on which it was bestowed but also the greater Arab world. Egypt, once the cultural and political capital of a region that stretched from Morocco to Iraq, has taken a back seat to the petro-fueled economies and politics of places like Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The Persian Gulf states took on an aura of invincibility, especially as oil prices crested this summer near $150 a barrel. And even as the financial crisis spread from the United States to Europe and into Asia, there was a feeling in the Middle East that oil-rich nations would be spared. But then the price of oil began to drop, precipitously, revealing a financial anatomy in many nations that was far from invincible.
Sparkling Dubai was powered by the greatest construction boom in Middle Eastern history. But it was a dream built on a promissory note. Debt increased 49 percent from 2007 to 2008, so when the credit crisis came it hit Dubai hard, financial experts there said.
Dubai had to turn to the government of the United Arab Emirates for an injection of capital to keep its banks afloat. Optimists are hoping that the cooling of Dubai’s overheated real estate market will ultimately have a positive effect on the emirate, though they recognized it would not be without pain.
“The subprime crisis, which started in the U.S. in 2007, has developed into a full-blown international crisis with potentially severe consequences for the G.C.C. countries and their growth models,” Eckart Woertz, an economist at the Gulf Research Center, wrote in a report issued this month. The G.C.C., or Gulf Cooperation Council, is a regional association that includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain.
On Sunday, Kuwait suspended trading in shares of its second largest bank, Gulf Bank, after a customer defaulted on a derivatives contract costing the bank hundreds of millions of dollars. That further spooked the equities market in Kuwait, where the main index has dropped 19 percent for the year.
“Every single person who has $100,000, which is to say, 20,000 dinars, is really involved in this,” Suleiman al-Mutawa, a former planning minister in Kuwait, said of those invested in stocks. “It adds up to family budgets, to family expenditures, to vacations, hence people are upset.”
But Kuwait has done well compared with Saudi Arabia, where the main stock index has lost half its value since the start of the year.
While the G.C.C. wrestles with its growing problems, its neighbors anxiously await the potential fallout from next door. There are signs that the pain is spreading.
In Cairo, Karim Hussein, 27, has worked for the last three years in offices that arrange work visas for Egyptians looking for employment in the Emirates. He said in the past they would get requests for up to 70 visas a month. Now they get 10, he said, “if we get anything at all.”
In Amman, Jordan, Manal Saleh, 35, works for a company that sends skilled workers to the Persian Gulf. She said opportunities there have dropped by about half since the start of the year. “In light of the financial situation, demand has shrunk,” she said.
Mona el-Naggar contributed reporting.
*****
October 29, 2008
Op-Ed Columnist
Sleepless in Tehran
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
I’ve always been dubious about Barack Obama’s offer to negotiate with Iran — not because I didn’t believe that it was the right strategy, but because I didn’t believe we had enough leverage to succeed. And negotiating in the Middle East without leverage is like playing baseball without a bat.
Well, if Obama does win the presidency, my gut tells me that he’s going to get a chance to negotiate with the Iranians — with a bat in his hand.
Have you seen the reports that Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is suffering from exhaustion? It’s probably because he is not sleeping at night. I know why. Watching oil prices fall from $147 a barrel to $57 is not like counting sheep. It’s the kind of thing that gives an Iranian autocrat bad dreams.
After all, it was the collapse of global oil prices in the early 1990s that brought down the Soviet Union. And Iran today is looking very Soviet to me.
As Vladimir Mau, president of Russia’s Academy of National Economy, pointed out to me, it was the long period of high oil prices followed by sharply lower oil prices that killed the Soviet Union. The spike in oil prices in the 1970s deluded the Kremlin into overextending subsidies at home and invading Afghanistan abroad — and then the collapse in prices in the ‘80s helped bring down that overextended empire.
(Incidentally, this was exactly what happened to the shah of Iran: 1) Sudden surge in oil prices. 2) Delusions of grandeur. 3) Sudden contraction of oil prices. 4) Dramatic downfall. 5) You’re toast.)
Under Ahmadinejad, Iran’s mullahs have gone on a domestic subsidy binge — using oil money to cushion the prices of food, gasoline, mortgages and to create jobs — to buy off the Iranian people. But the one thing Ahmadinejad couldn’t buy was real economic growth. Iran today has 30 percent inflation, 11 percent unemployment and huge underemployment with thousands of young college grads, engineers and architects selling pizzas and driving taxis. And now with oil prices falling, Iran — just like the Soviet Union — is going to have to pull back spending across the board. Fasten your seat belts.
The U.N. has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Iran since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 because of Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment. But high oil prices minimized those sanctions; collapsing oil prices will now magnify those sanctions. If prices stay low, there is a good chance Iran will be open to negotiating over its nuclear program with the next U.S. president.
That is a good thing because Iran also funds Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and the anti-U.S. Shiites in Iraq. If America wants to get out of Iraq and leave behind a decent outcome, plus break the deadlocks in Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, it needs to end the cold war with Iran. Possible? I don’t know, but the collapse of oil prices should give us a shot.
But let’s use our leverage smartly and not exaggerate Iran’s strength. Just as I believe that we should drop the reward for the capture of Osama bin Laden — from $50 million to one penny, plus an autographed picture of Dick Cheney — we need to deflate the Iranian mullahs as well. Let them chase us.
Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, compares it to bargaining for a Persian carpet in Tehran. “When you go inside the carpet shop, the first thing you are supposed to do is feign disinterest,” he explains. “The last thing you want to suggest is ‘We are not leaving without that carpet.’ ‘Well,’ the dealer will say, ‘if you feel so strongly about it ...’ ”
The other lesson from the carpet bazaar, says Sadjadpour, “is that there is never a price tag on any carpet. The dealer is not looking for a fixed price, but the highest price he can get — and the Iran price is constantly fluctuating depending on the price of oil.” Let’s now use that to our advantage.
Barack Hussein Obama would present another challenge for Iran’s mullahs. Their whole rationale for being is that they are resisting a hegemonic American power that wants to keep everyone down. Suddenly, next week, Iranians may look up and see that the country their leaders call “The Great Satan” has just elected “a guy whose middle name is the central figure in Shiite Islam — Hussein — and whose last name — Obama — when transliterated into Farsi, means ‘He is with us,’ ” said Sadjadpour.
Iran is ripe for deflating. Its power was inflated by the price of oil and the popularity of its leader, who was cheered simply because he was willing to poke America with a stick. But as a real nation-building enterprise, the Islamic Revolution in Iran has been an abject failure.
“When you ask young Arabs which leaders in the region they most admire,” said Sadjadpour, they will usually answer the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. “When you ask them where in the Middle East would you most like to live,” he added, “the answer is usually socially open places like Dubai or Beirut. The Islamic Republic of Iran is never in the top 10.”
Slowdown in Persian Gulf Reverberates in Middle East
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — For many of the financially strapped nations of the Middle East, the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf have served for years as an economic lifeline, providing jobs for their citizens, who in turn sent millions of dollars back home; tourists, who filled their hotels when Westerners were reluctant to visit; direct investment; and the kind of checkbook diplomacy that has helped stabilize an often volatile region.
Suddenly, that lifeline appears frayed, dangerously so for countries like Egypt and Jordan, as the energy-rich nations find themselves pulled into the global financial crisis and undermined by dropping oil prices. Across the Persian Gulf, stock markets are down, causing panic among investors. Even in the boomtown of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, the once-mighty real estate market has cooled as access to credit has tightened.
Governments across the region have intervened.
The United Arab Emirates injected $32 billion into its banking system and guaranteed bank deposits. Saudi Arabia has offered billions of dollars to make loans available to its citizens. And Kuwait, which had already cut its benchmark rate, this week moved to prop up its second largest bank.
But the era of sky-high oil prices, while now a memory, left most of the region’s capitals with enough cash reserves to cushion the blow, economists and financial experts in the region said. And as long as oil sells for more than $55 a barrel, most of the governments will take in more than they have allocated in their budgets, regional analysts said.
“We are not calling for a recession in the gulf,” said Marios Maratheftis, regional head of research for Standard Chartered Bank in Dubai. “We are looking at a slowdown.”
But a slowdown in the Persian Gulf might feel like a crash landing in places like Egypt, Jordan and Syria, where gulf money has helped prop up strained economies.
“When there is growth in the gulf, there will be growth in the whole Arab world,” said Rashad Abdou, a professor of economics and international finance at Cairo University. “There would be more tourism, more money in the stock market, more investments. And the opposite is true. With a shrinking or recession, they will not come for tourism, they will not put their money in the stock market, they will not invest and they will not be able to hire Egyptian workers.”
Egypt receives about half of its $6 billion in annual remittances from more than two million citizens living and working in the Persian Gulf area, while about 60 percent of its tourists come from that region, Egyptian economists estimated. Syria has benefited from gulf investments in large real estate projects, helping offset some of the isolation imposed by United States sanctions. Jordan receives about $2 billion annually in remittances from workers in the Persian Gulf and takes in about $500 million in financial aid from Saudi Arabia alone.
“I expect investments from the gulf to slow down or stop because they have to deal with their own problems before they invest in other countries,” said Nabil Samman, an economist who runs the Damascus-based Center for Research and Documentation. “Syria will be affected in terms of the Syrian people who send money from the gulf. There are close to a million Syrians in the gulf area.”
Extravagant oil wealth has helped transform not only the Persian Gulf nations on which it was bestowed but also the greater Arab world. Egypt, once the cultural and political capital of a region that stretched from Morocco to Iraq, has taken a back seat to the petro-fueled economies and politics of places like Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The Persian Gulf states took on an aura of invincibility, especially as oil prices crested this summer near $150 a barrel. And even as the financial crisis spread from the United States to Europe and into Asia, there was a feeling in the Middle East that oil-rich nations would be spared. But then the price of oil began to drop, precipitously, revealing a financial anatomy in many nations that was far from invincible.
Sparkling Dubai was powered by the greatest construction boom in Middle Eastern history. But it was a dream built on a promissory note. Debt increased 49 percent from 2007 to 2008, so when the credit crisis came it hit Dubai hard, financial experts there said.
Dubai had to turn to the government of the United Arab Emirates for an injection of capital to keep its banks afloat. Optimists are hoping that the cooling of Dubai’s overheated real estate market will ultimately have a positive effect on the emirate, though they recognized it would not be without pain.
“The subprime crisis, which started in the U.S. in 2007, has developed into a full-blown international crisis with potentially severe consequences for the G.C.C. countries and their growth models,” Eckart Woertz, an economist at the Gulf Research Center, wrote in a report issued this month. The G.C.C., or Gulf Cooperation Council, is a regional association that includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain.
On Sunday, Kuwait suspended trading in shares of its second largest bank, Gulf Bank, after a customer defaulted on a derivatives contract costing the bank hundreds of millions of dollars. That further spooked the equities market in Kuwait, where the main index has dropped 19 percent for the year.
“Every single person who has $100,000, which is to say, 20,000 dinars, is really involved in this,” Suleiman al-Mutawa, a former planning minister in Kuwait, said of those invested in stocks. “It adds up to family budgets, to family expenditures, to vacations, hence people are upset.”
But Kuwait has done well compared with Saudi Arabia, where the main stock index has lost half its value since the start of the year.
While the G.C.C. wrestles with its growing problems, its neighbors anxiously await the potential fallout from next door. There are signs that the pain is spreading.
In Cairo, Karim Hussein, 27, has worked for the last three years in offices that arrange work visas for Egyptians looking for employment in the Emirates. He said in the past they would get requests for up to 70 visas a month. Now they get 10, he said, “if we get anything at all.”
In Amman, Jordan, Manal Saleh, 35, works for a company that sends skilled workers to the Persian Gulf. She said opportunities there have dropped by about half since the start of the year. “In light of the financial situation, demand has shrunk,” she said.
Mona el-Naggar contributed reporting.
*****
October 29, 2008
Op-Ed Columnist
Sleepless in Tehran
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
I’ve always been dubious about Barack Obama’s offer to negotiate with Iran — not because I didn’t believe that it was the right strategy, but because I didn’t believe we had enough leverage to succeed. And negotiating in the Middle East without leverage is like playing baseball without a bat.
Well, if Obama does win the presidency, my gut tells me that he’s going to get a chance to negotiate with the Iranians — with a bat in his hand.
Have you seen the reports that Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is suffering from exhaustion? It’s probably because he is not sleeping at night. I know why. Watching oil prices fall from $147 a barrel to $57 is not like counting sheep. It’s the kind of thing that gives an Iranian autocrat bad dreams.
After all, it was the collapse of global oil prices in the early 1990s that brought down the Soviet Union. And Iran today is looking very Soviet to me.
As Vladimir Mau, president of Russia’s Academy of National Economy, pointed out to me, it was the long period of high oil prices followed by sharply lower oil prices that killed the Soviet Union. The spike in oil prices in the 1970s deluded the Kremlin into overextending subsidies at home and invading Afghanistan abroad — and then the collapse in prices in the ‘80s helped bring down that overextended empire.
(Incidentally, this was exactly what happened to the shah of Iran: 1) Sudden surge in oil prices. 2) Delusions of grandeur. 3) Sudden contraction of oil prices. 4) Dramatic downfall. 5) You’re toast.)
Under Ahmadinejad, Iran’s mullahs have gone on a domestic subsidy binge — using oil money to cushion the prices of food, gasoline, mortgages and to create jobs — to buy off the Iranian people. But the one thing Ahmadinejad couldn’t buy was real economic growth. Iran today has 30 percent inflation, 11 percent unemployment and huge underemployment with thousands of young college grads, engineers and architects selling pizzas and driving taxis. And now with oil prices falling, Iran — just like the Soviet Union — is going to have to pull back spending across the board. Fasten your seat belts.
The U.N. has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Iran since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 because of Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment. But high oil prices minimized those sanctions; collapsing oil prices will now magnify those sanctions. If prices stay low, there is a good chance Iran will be open to negotiating over its nuclear program with the next U.S. president.
That is a good thing because Iran also funds Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and the anti-U.S. Shiites in Iraq. If America wants to get out of Iraq and leave behind a decent outcome, plus break the deadlocks in Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, it needs to end the cold war with Iran. Possible? I don’t know, but the collapse of oil prices should give us a shot.
But let’s use our leverage smartly and not exaggerate Iran’s strength. Just as I believe that we should drop the reward for the capture of Osama bin Laden — from $50 million to one penny, plus an autographed picture of Dick Cheney — we need to deflate the Iranian mullahs as well. Let them chase us.
Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, compares it to bargaining for a Persian carpet in Tehran. “When you go inside the carpet shop, the first thing you are supposed to do is feign disinterest,” he explains. “The last thing you want to suggest is ‘We are not leaving without that carpet.’ ‘Well,’ the dealer will say, ‘if you feel so strongly about it ...’ ”
The other lesson from the carpet bazaar, says Sadjadpour, “is that there is never a price tag on any carpet. The dealer is not looking for a fixed price, but the highest price he can get — and the Iran price is constantly fluctuating depending on the price of oil.” Let’s now use that to our advantage.
Barack Hussein Obama would present another challenge for Iran’s mullahs. Their whole rationale for being is that they are resisting a hegemonic American power that wants to keep everyone down. Suddenly, next week, Iranians may look up and see that the country their leaders call “The Great Satan” has just elected “a guy whose middle name is the central figure in Shiite Islam — Hussein — and whose last name — Obama — when transliterated into Farsi, means ‘He is with us,’ ” said Sadjadpour.
Iran is ripe for deflating. Its power was inflated by the price of oil and the popularity of its leader, who was cheered simply because he was willing to poke America with a stick. But as a real nation-building enterprise, the Islamic Revolution in Iran has been an abject failure.
“When you ask young Arabs which leaders in the region they most admire,” said Sadjadpour, they will usually answer the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. “When you ask them where in the Middle East would you most like to live,” he added, “the answer is usually socially open places like Dubai or Beirut. The Islamic Republic of Iran is never in the top 10.”
November 7, 2008
Op-Ed Contributors
Arab Bloggers Size Up Obama
Introduction by JOSIE DELAP
Barack Obama’s election in the United States has fired imaginations around the globe, perhaps nowhere more than in the Middle East, where people wonder how the future president’s approach to the Arab world will differ from that of his predecessor.
For the moment, Arabs are mainly excited about Mr. Obama’s victory, and have much good will toward him and the country that chose him. But Middle Easterners are more skeptical than anyone else about American politicians and their intentions, and already it seems Mr. Obama is no exception.
His speech during the primaries to Aipac, the powerful pro-Israel lobby group, did little to assuage fears that America will continue to support Israel unconditionally. And there remains a more general anxiety that, like previous American presidents, Mr. Obama will somehow let the people of the Middle East down.
To provide a sense of what Middle Easterners are thinking about the American election, here are excerpts, translated by me where necessary, of blog postings from the day after Mr. Obama’s victory.
— JOSIE DELAP, an editor for Economist.com
•
Tamem, Egypt (tamem.wordpress.com)
The victory of Barack Hussein Obama that we, along with the rest of the world, are witnessing today is another historic moment, not just for America but for the whole world by virtue of America’s huge influence, whether we like it or not. Personally I, like others, doubted Americans’ ability to overcome racism, but in electing “Abu Hussein,” they created a historic moment by accepting the first black president to govern not just America but the white West as a whole. With this, they removed all such doubts and the impossible dream of Martin Luther King became possible.
(translated from the Arabic)
•
Syrian Dream, Syria (syriandream.com)
The world arose today to welcome Barack Obama as the first black president of the United States, and Africa danced with joy.
The whole world is optimistic about what he offers but doubts remain about him, a great question mark.
What will Syria’s fate be under him? Will he give the green light to bombing us?
(translated from the Arabic)
•
The Damascene Blog, Syria (damasceneblog.com)
Dare we hope that the eight-year nightmare is over?
•
Egyptian Chronicles, Egypt (egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com)
The Egyptian people are glad that Obama won despite their previous knowledge of his bias to Israel, and his V.P. is a Zionist. But still they are happy because they can’t stand the Republicans anymore.
Good for the Americans.
•
Esra’a, Bahrain (mideastyouth.com)
I can honestly say that we can finally wave goodbye to the overwhelming anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bigotry that we have suffered with for the past eight years under the Bush administration. We can expect less wars, less corruption, less political abuse. It won’t be perfect, but it will get better. I am so happy and proud of all the Americans who worked extremely hard for Obama, understanding fully well the importance of change in every sense of the word. This moment is not just historical but crucial to us here in the Middle East.
This is a win for all of us, not just America.
This is a win for civil rights and justice.
For all the pessimists out there, allow us to enjoy this moment. If you learned anything from this campaign, you would learn that it starts with hope — not cynicism. And hope is what I have right now, for America and the Middle East.
We can do it, and this time, we can be sure that we can do it together.
I haven’t said this in a really long time, but I am loving America right now.
•
The Black Iris, Jordan (black-iris.com)
Congratulations are in order to the American people and the Obama fan base.
So begins a new chapter in American history, to say nothing of world history.
Fingers crossed that it’ll be a positive one, especially for this region.
•
The Skeptic, Egypt (elijahzarwan.net/blog)
A new day dawned in Cairo today. As it does every day.
And it started as it always does: with birds, schoolchildren and car horns. No national holiday here.
I’m looking forward to going out in the streets to hear the reaction. The best reaction I’ve heard so far: “Black Man Given Nation’s Worst Job.”
Bah humbug. I confess I’m moved.
•
Mashrabeya, Egypt (mashrabeya.blogspot.com)
Only time would tell if Obama is real, or just too good to be true!
Sometimes, it is not enough to have a Big Dream. What matters is to have enough strength to resist the pressures to give up a Big Dream!
•
Land and People, Lebanon (landandpeople.blogspot.com)
My take on this is that he is the president of the United States, and not Barack Obama. That said, I would really like to hope for change. After all, Obama showed that change was possible: he himself changed from a supporter of Palestinian rights into a man who believes that Jerusalem is the historic capital of Israel. He also changed during his campaign from “No Iraq war for me please, I’m trying to quit” into “All right I’ll have some, but a tiny piece please.”
People in the Middle East are expecting to see Obama act differently from previous U.S. presidents because he is darker-skinned. Time will show again that the color of the skin has little to do with politics, democracy and equity. Just look at the Arab world with its homegrown dictatorships.
But the question that really interests me is about the relationship between Obama and the true center of world power, Kapital. There was an awful lot of money in Obama’s campaign ... A great chunk must have come from carefully planned investments by C.E.O.’s and multinationals. Will Obama be able to confront the mega-corporations? Does he want to? The poor and the colored population of the world, including that of the U.S., is the one that suffers most from malnutrition and hunger and food insecurity. We know now that mega-corporations, pushing for more profit at any cost, are responsible for most of the damage. Will Obama do something about that? Does he want to? Can he?
•
An Arab Woman Blues, Iraq (arabwomanblues.blogspot.com)
So Obama, the booma, won the elections. I had already predicted that in my post “A long American-Iranian Film.”
I said the following, “My hunch is — and my hunches are rarely wrong — if Obama the booma wins, and he will, by a small margin, Iraq will be handed over to Iran ...”
I also said that Obama will strike a deal with Ahmadinejad on Iraq and in particular southern Iraq.
And lo and behold, the vice president for the booma Obama is none other than J. Biden. J. Biden, the Zionist, is an ardent supporter of the partition of Iraq into three statelets. No wonder Maliki & Co. were also backing the booma along with Iran. I also know that Iran had generously contributed to the Obama campaign.
... I shall not congratulate you on your 44th president. He will simply finish off what the other Zionists had started — the final partition of my country.
To hell with all of you and all of your presidents.
•
Neurotic Iraqi Wife, Iraq (neurotic-iraqi-wife.blogspot.com)
For me, this is not just about history, this is about someone who was able to bring down the very people that broke my country. It’s a great punch to the very people that destroyed the individual Iraqi. And that to me is an enough victory.
I will only have to say to Mr. Obama, don’t let us down.
•
Ali, Jordan (alidahmash.blogspot.com)
This is what America is all about. The land of the free, dreams and opportunities. Despite all the catastrophic mistakes that America committed the past years, the American Constitution and system prevailed. The people of America have chosen for change, they voted for Barack Obama. They have learned from their past mistakes with the Republicans. They chose Barack Obama not because of his skin color, but for what he stands for, because they believe he will change America ...
Barack Obama is not a wizard either, he won’t be in the office until Jan. 20, and by then he must choose his cabinet wisely. It will take many months until the economy improves, which was the main concern for Americans in this election. Unlike the elections in 2004, terrorism (the Bush game) was the least concern. It will require a lot of time and sacrifices to get out of Iraq, though I doubt that American lobbyists are ready to give up the oil in Iraq and the Gulf region. As for the Middle East peace process, I will not only hope that Obama doesn’t side with the Israelis only and the Israeli lobby in America, but to put real effort on achieving a fair and just peace for the Palestinians and the Israelis. And hoping is not enough, as Arab leaders and organizations should move quickly towards building an alliance with Obama.
Op-Ed Contributors
Arab Bloggers Size Up Obama
Introduction by JOSIE DELAP
Barack Obama’s election in the United States has fired imaginations around the globe, perhaps nowhere more than in the Middle East, where people wonder how the future president’s approach to the Arab world will differ from that of his predecessor.
For the moment, Arabs are mainly excited about Mr. Obama’s victory, and have much good will toward him and the country that chose him. But Middle Easterners are more skeptical than anyone else about American politicians and their intentions, and already it seems Mr. Obama is no exception.
His speech during the primaries to Aipac, the powerful pro-Israel lobby group, did little to assuage fears that America will continue to support Israel unconditionally. And there remains a more general anxiety that, like previous American presidents, Mr. Obama will somehow let the people of the Middle East down.
To provide a sense of what Middle Easterners are thinking about the American election, here are excerpts, translated by me where necessary, of blog postings from the day after Mr. Obama’s victory.
— JOSIE DELAP, an editor for Economist.com
•
Tamem, Egypt (tamem.wordpress.com)
The victory of Barack Hussein Obama that we, along with the rest of the world, are witnessing today is another historic moment, not just for America but for the whole world by virtue of America’s huge influence, whether we like it or not. Personally I, like others, doubted Americans’ ability to overcome racism, but in electing “Abu Hussein,” they created a historic moment by accepting the first black president to govern not just America but the white West as a whole. With this, they removed all such doubts and the impossible dream of Martin Luther King became possible.
(translated from the Arabic)
•
Syrian Dream, Syria (syriandream.com)
The world arose today to welcome Barack Obama as the first black president of the United States, and Africa danced with joy.
The whole world is optimistic about what he offers but doubts remain about him, a great question mark.
What will Syria’s fate be under him? Will he give the green light to bombing us?
(translated from the Arabic)
•
The Damascene Blog, Syria (damasceneblog.com)
Dare we hope that the eight-year nightmare is over?
•
Egyptian Chronicles, Egypt (egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com)
The Egyptian people are glad that Obama won despite their previous knowledge of his bias to Israel, and his V.P. is a Zionist. But still they are happy because they can’t stand the Republicans anymore.
Good for the Americans.
•
Esra’a, Bahrain (mideastyouth.com)
I can honestly say that we can finally wave goodbye to the overwhelming anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bigotry that we have suffered with for the past eight years under the Bush administration. We can expect less wars, less corruption, less political abuse. It won’t be perfect, but it will get better. I am so happy and proud of all the Americans who worked extremely hard for Obama, understanding fully well the importance of change in every sense of the word. This moment is not just historical but crucial to us here in the Middle East.
This is a win for all of us, not just America.
This is a win for civil rights and justice.
For all the pessimists out there, allow us to enjoy this moment. If you learned anything from this campaign, you would learn that it starts with hope — not cynicism. And hope is what I have right now, for America and the Middle East.
We can do it, and this time, we can be sure that we can do it together.
I haven’t said this in a really long time, but I am loving America right now.
•
The Black Iris, Jordan (black-iris.com)
Congratulations are in order to the American people and the Obama fan base.
So begins a new chapter in American history, to say nothing of world history.
Fingers crossed that it’ll be a positive one, especially for this region.
•
The Skeptic, Egypt (elijahzarwan.net/blog)
A new day dawned in Cairo today. As it does every day.
And it started as it always does: with birds, schoolchildren and car horns. No national holiday here.
I’m looking forward to going out in the streets to hear the reaction. The best reaction I’ve heard so far: “Black Man Given Nation’s Worst Job.”
Bah humbug. I confess I’m moved.
•
Mashrabeya, Egypt (mashrabeya.blogspot.com)
Only time would tell if Obama is real, or just too good to be true!
Sometimes, it is not enough to have a Big Dream. What matters is to have enough strength to resist the pressures to give up a Big Dream!
•
Land and People, Lebanon (landandpeople.blogspot.com)
My take on this is that he is the president of the United States, and not Barack Obama. That said, I would really like to hope for change. After all, Obama showed that change was possible: he himself changed from a supporter of Palestinian rights into a man who believes that Jerusalem is the historic capital of Israel. He also changed during his campaign from “No Iraq war for me please, I’m trying to quit” into “All right I’ll have some, but a tiny piece please.”
People in the Middle East are expecting to see Obama act differently from previous U.S. presidents because he is darker-skinned. Time will show again that the color of the skin has little to do with politics, democracy and equity. Just look at the Arab world with its homegrown dictatorships.
But the question that really interests me is about the relationship between Obama and the true center of world power, Kapital. There was an awful lot of money in Obama’s campaign ... A great chunk must have come from carefully planned investments by C.E.O.’s and multinationals. Will Obama be able to confront the mega-corporations? Does he want to? The poor and the colored population of the world, including that of the U.S., is the one that suffers most from malnutrition and hunger and food insecurity. We know now that mega-corporations, pushing for more profit at any cost, are responsible for most of the damage. Will Obama do something about that? Does he want to? Can he?
•
An Arab Woman Blues, Iraq (arabwomanblues.blogspot.com)
So Obama, the booma, won the elections. I had already predicted that in my post “A long American-Iranian Film.”
I said the following, “My hunch is — and my hunches are rarely wrong — if Obama the booma wins, and he will, by a small margin, Iraq will be handed over to Iran ...”
I also said that Obama will strike a deal with Ahmadinejad on Iraq and in particular southern Iraq.
And lo and behold, the vice president for the booma Obama is none other than J. Biden. J. Biden, the Zionist, is an ardent supporter of the partition of Iraq into three statelets. No wonder Maliki & Co. were also backing the booma along with Iran. I also know that Iran had generously contributed to the Obama campaign.
... I shall not congratulate you on your 44th president. He will simply finish off what the other Zionists had started — the final partition of my country.
To hell with all of you and all of your presidents.
•
Neurotic Iraqi Wife, Iraq (neurotic-iraqi-wife.blogspot.com)
For me, this is not just about history, this is about someone who was able to bring down the very people that broke my country. It’s a great punch to the very people that destroyed the individual Iraqi. And that to me is an enough victory.
I will only have to say to Mr. Obama, don’t let us down.
•
Ali, Jordan (alidahmash.blogspot.com)
This is what America is all about. The land of the free, dreams and opportunities. Despite all the catastrophic mistakes that America committed the past years, the American Constitution and system prevailed. The people of America have chosen for change, they voted for Barack Obama. They have learned from their past mistakes with the Republicans. They chose Barack Obama not because of his skin color, but for what he stands for, because they believe he will change America ...
Barack Obama is not a wizard either, he won’t be in the office until Jan. 20, and by then he must choose his cabinet wisely. It will take many months until the economy improves, which was the main concern for Americans in this election. Unlike the elections in 2004, terrorism (the Bush game) was the least concern. It will require a lot of time and sacrifices to get out of Iraq, though I doubt that American lobbyists are ready to give up the oil in Iraq and the Gulf region. As for the Middle East peace process, I will not only hope that Obama doesn’t side with the Israelis only and the Israeli lobby in America, but to put real effort on achieving a fair and just peace for the Palestinians and the Israelis. And hoping is not enough, as Arab leaders and organizations should move quickly towards building an alliance with Obama.
November 9, 2008
Deprogramming Jihadists
By KATHERINE ZOEPF
The sunset prayer had just ended, and Sheik Ahmad al-Jilani was already calling his class to order. When the latecomers slipped into the front row, Jilani nodded at them briskly. “Young men,” he began, “who can tell me why we do jihad?”
The members of the class were still new and a bit shy. Jilani clasped his hands and smiled encouragingly. Before him, sitting in school desks, were a dozen young Saudi men who had served time in prison for belonging to militant Islamic groups. Now they were inmates in a new rehabilitation center, part of a Saudi government initiative that seeks to deprogram Islamic extremists.
Jilani has been teaching his class, which is called Understandings of Jihad, since the center was established early last year. A stout man who makes constant, self-deprecating references to his weight, the sheik is an avuncular figure, popular with his students. On this chilly evening he had on a woolly, brocade-trimmed bisht, the cloak that Saudi men wear on formal occasions or in cool weather, which gave him a slightly imposing air. But behind his thick glasses, his eyes shone warmly as he surveyed the classroom.
Finally, someone answered: “We do jihad to fight our enemies.”
“To defeat God’s enemies?” another suggested.
“To help weak Muslims,” a third offered.
“Good, good,” Jilani said. “All good answers. Is there someone else? What about you, Ali?” Ali, in the second row, looked away, then faltered: “To . . . answer . . . calls for jihad?”
Jilani frowned slightly and wrote Ali’s answer up on the white board behind him. He read it out to the class before turning back to Ali. “All right, Ali,” the sheik said. “Why do we answer calls for jihad? Is it because all Muslim leaders want to make God’s word highest? Do we kill if these leaders tell us to kill?”
Ali looked confused, but whispered, “Yes.”
“No — wrong!” Jilani cried as Ali blushed. “Of course we want to make God’s word highest, but not every Muslim leader has this as his goal. There are right jihads and wrong jihads, and we must examine the situation for ourselves. For example, if a person wants to go to hajj now, is it right?”
More....
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/magaz ... nted=print
Deprogramming Jihadists
By KATHERINE ZOEPF
The sunset prayer had just ended, and Sheik Ahmad al-Jilani was already calling his class to order. When the latecomers slipped into the front row, Jilani nodded at them briskly. “Young men,” he began, “who can tell me why we do jihad?”
The members of the class were still new and a bit shy. Jilani clasped his hands and smiled encouragingly. Before him, sitting in school desks, were a dozen young Saudi men who had served time in prison for belonging to militant Islamic groups. Now they were inmates in a new rehabilitation center, part of a Saudi government initiative that seeks to deprogram Islamic extremists.
Jilani has been teaching his class, which is called Understandings of Jihad, since the center was established early last year. A stout man who makes constant, self-deprecating references to his weight, the sheik is an avuncular figure, popular with his students. On this chilly evening he had on a woolly, brocade-trimmed bisht, the cloak that Saudi men wear on formal occasions or in cool weather, which gave him a slightly imposing air. But behind his thick glasses, his eyes shone warmly as he surveyed the classroom.
Finally, someone answered: “We do jihad to fight our enemies.”
“To defeat God’s enemies?” another suggested.
“To help weak Muslims,” a third offered.
“Good, good,” Jilani said. “All good answers. Is there someone else? What about you, Ali?” Ali, in the second row, looked away, then faltered: “To . . . answer . . . calls for jihad?”
Jilani frowned slightly and wrote Ali’s answer up on the white board behind him. He read it out to the class before turning back to Ali. “All right, Ali,” the sheik said. “Why do we answer calls for jihad? Is it because all Muslim leaders want to make God’s word highest? Do we kill if these leaders tell us to kill?”
Ali looked confused, but whispered, “Yes.”
“No — wrong!” Jilani cried as Ali blushed. “Of course we want to make God’s word highest, but not every Muslim leader has this as his goal. There are right jihads and wrong jihads, and we must examine the situation for ourselves. For example, if a person wants to go to hajj now, is it right?”
More....
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/magaz ... nted=print
Israel's Peres praises Saudi Arabia's king
Abdullah's Middle East peace initiative lauded
Steven Edwards
Canwest News Service
Thursday, November 13, 2008
The head of the United Nations General Assembly decried the West's "unbridled greed" Wednesday as he opened a conference on religious tolerance that appeared to be full of contradictions.
Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann spoke just ahead of Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, who called for interfaith respect despite laws in his country permitting the practice of only one narrow sect of Islam.
But the gathering also saw Israeli President Shimon Peres use his speech to not only directly address Abdullah, but praise the Arab leader for his call and ideas on Middle East peace.
Such a gesture has rarely been possible given Saudi Arabia's refusal to recognize the existence of Israel, which it calls the "Zionist entity."
U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown are among speakers slated for today at the high-level two-day meeting, titled Culture of Peace because the UN does not officially host religion-based events.
Delivering Canada's address, Ambassador John McNee is expected to emphasize how being open to diversity and intercultural dialogue has "strengthened Canadian society."
Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary general, told the assembly the meeting would work only if countries carried through on what was being said in their name.
"We cannot be satisfied with declarations of intent and commonality, important as those are," he said. "What we need is dialogue that delivers."
Brockmann, president of the 192-country assembly since September, organized the conference. It is "sponsored" by Saudi Arabia, which had sought a UN followup to efforts aimed at promoting interfaith dialogue held last July in Madrid.
Abdullah focused on the need to combat terrorism as part of a now-familiar diplomatic bid by the Saudi monarch to improve the image of his country's austere Wahhabi Islam. Wahhabism faced international criticism after it emerged 15 of the 19 Arabs who hijacked the planes in the 9/11 attacks were Saudis acting in the name of Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
"We state with a unified voice that religions through which Almighty God sought to bring happiness to mankind should not be turned into instruments to cause misery," Abdullah said.
Peres said: "I wish that your (Abdullah's) voice would become the prevailing voice of the region, of all people. It is right, it is needed, it is promising."
© The Calgary Herald 2008
Abdullah's Middle East peace initiative lauded
Steven Edwards
Canwest News Service
Thursday, November 13, 2008
The head of the United Nations General Assembly decried the West's "unbridled greed" Wednesday as he opened a conference on religious tolerance that appeared to be full of contradictions.
Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann spoke just ahead of Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, who called for interfaith respect despite laws in his country permitting the practice of only one narrow sect of Islam.
But the gathering also saw Israeli President Shimon Peres use his speech to not only directly address Abdullah, but praise the Arab leader for his call and ideas on Middle East peace.
Such a gesture has rarely been possible given Saudi Arabia's refusal to recognize the existence of Israel, which it calls the "Zionist entity."
U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown are among speakers slated for today at the high-level two-day meeting, titled Culture of Peace because the UN does not officially host religion-based events.
Delivering Canada's address, Ambassador John McNee is expected to emphasize how being open to diversity and intercultural dialogue has "strengthened Canadian society."
Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary general, told the assembly the meeting would work only if countries carried through on what was being said in their name.
"We cannot be satisfied with declarations of intent and commonality, important as those are," he said. "What we need is dialogue that delivers."
Brockmann, president of the 192-country assembly since September, organized the conference. It is "sponsored" by Saudi Arabia, which had sought a UN followup to efforts aimed at promoting interfaith dialogue held last July in Madrid.
Abdullah focused on the need to combat terrorism as part of a now-familiar diplomatic bid by the Saudi monarch to improve the image of his country's austere Wahhabi Islam. Wahhabism faced international criticism after it emerged 15 of the 19 Arabs who hijacked the planes in the 9/11 attacks were Saudis acting in the name of Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
"We state with a unified voice that religions through which Almighty God sought to bring happiness to mankind should not be turned into instruments to cause misery," Abdullah said.
Peres said: "I wish that your (Abdullah's) voice would become the prevailing voice of the region, of all people. It is right, it is needed, it is promising."
© The Calgary Herald 2008
December 8, 2008
Op-Ed Contributor
Trouble in the Other Middle East
By ROBERT D. KAPLAN
Washington
THE divisions we split the world into during the cold war have at long last crumbled thanks to the Mumbai terrorist attacks. No longer will we view South Asia as a region distinct from the Middle East. Now there is only one long continuum stretching from the Mediterranean to the jungles of Burma, with every crisis from the Israeli-Palestinian dispute in the west to the Hindu-Muslim dispute in the east interlocked with the one next door.
Yet this elongated Greater Near East does not signify something new but something old.
For significant parts of medieval and early modern history, Delhi was under the same sovereignty as Kabul, yet under a different one from Bangalore. From the 16th to the 18th centuries, the Mughal dynasty, created by Muslims from Central Asia, governed a sprawling empire encompassing northern and central India, almost all of Pakistan and much of Afghanistan — even as Hindu Maratha warriors in India’s south held out against Mughal armies. India’s whole history — what has created its rich syncretic civilization of Turko-Persian gems like the Taj Mahal and the elaborate Hindu temples of Orissa — is a story of waves of Muslim invaders in turn killing, interacting with and ultimately being influenced by indigenous Hindus. There is even a name for the kind of enchanting architecture that punctuates India and blends Islamic and Hindu styles: Indo-Saracenic, a reference to the Saracens, the term by which Arabs were known to Europeans of the Middle Ages.
Hindu-Muslim relations have historically been tense. Remember that the 1947 partition of the subcontinent uprooted at least 15 million people and led to the violent deaths of around half a million. Given this record, the relatively peaceful relations between the majority Hindus and India’s 150 million Muslims has been testimony to India’s successful experiment in democracy. Democracy has so far kept the lid on an ethnic and religious divide that, while its roots run centuries back, has in recent years essentially become a reinvented modern hostility.
The culprit has been globalization. The secular Indian nationalism of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Congress Party, built around a rejection of Western colonialism, is more and more a thing of the past. As the dynamic Indian economy merges with that of the wider world, Hindus and Muslims have begun separate searches for roots to anchor them inside a bland global civilization. Mass communications have produced a uniform and severe Hinduism from a host of local variants, even as the country’s economically disenfranchised Muslims are increasingly part of an Islamic world community.
The Muslim reaction to this Hindu nationalism has been less anger and violence than simple psychological withdrawal: into beards, skull caps and burkas in some cases; self-segregating into Muslim ghettos in others. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai had a number of aims, one of which was to set a fuse to this tense intercommunal standoff. The jihadists not only want to destroy Pakistan, they want to destroy India as well. India in their eyes is everything they hate: Hindu, vibrantly free and democratic, implicitly and increasingly pro-American, and militarily cozy with Israel. For Washington, this is no simple matter of defending Pakistan against chaos by moving troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. It is a whole region we are dealing with. Thus for the jihadists, the concept of a 9/11-scale attack on India was brilliant.
Just as the chaos in Iraq through early 2007 threatened the post-Ottoman state system from Lebanon to Iran, creeping anarchy in Pakistan undermines not only Afghanistan but also the whole Indian subcontinent. The existence of terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba that have links with the Pakistani security apparatus but are outside the control of Pakistan’s own civilian authorities is the very definition of chaos.
A collapsing Pakistan, and with it the loss of any real border separating India from Afghanistan, is India’s worst nightmare. It brings us back toward the borders of the Mughal world, but not in a peaceful way. Indeed, the route that intelligence agencies feel was taken by the fishing boat hijacked by the terrorists — from Porbandar in India’s Gujarat State, then north to Karachi in Pakistan, and then south to Mumbai — follows centuries-old Indian Ocean trade routes.
The jihadist attack on India’s financial center not only damages Indian-Pakistani relations, but makes Pakistan’s new civilian government — which has genuinely tried to improve ties with India — look utterly pathetic. Thus, the attack weakens both countries. Any understanding over Kashmir, the disputed Muslim-majority territory claimed by Pakistan, is now further than ever from materializing, with mass violence there a distinct possibility.
This, in turn, reduces the chance of an Indian-Pakistani rapprochement on Afghanistan, whose government Pakistan seeks to undermine and India sends millions of dollars in aid to help prop up. The Pakistani security services want a radical Islamized Afghanistan as a strategic rear base against India, while India wants a moderate, secular Afghanistan as a weapon against Pakistan.
Pakistan is not only chaotic but dangerously lonely. Islam has not proved effective in bringing together its regionally based ethnic groups, and thus a resort to a fierce ideology as a unifying device among fundamentalist Muslims has been the country’s signal tragedy. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military suspects that Washington will desert their nation the moment the leadership of Al Qaeda is, by any chance, killed or captured.
Making matters worse, every time the United States launches an air attack into Pakistan from Afghanistan, it further destabilizes the Pakistani state. That is why the Mumbai attacks bring true joy to the most dangerous elements of the Pakistani security establishment: the tragedy has caused the world to focus on India’s weaknesses — its lax security, its vulnerability to age-old maritime infiltration and, most of all, the constant threat of caste and tribal violence — that have been obscured by its economic success. See, many Pakistanis are saying, your beloved India is not so stable either.
This is nonsense, of course. India, with all its troubles, is far more stable than Pakistan. In the meantime, every day that goes by without riots in India is a defeat for the Mumbai terrorists. Indeed, India’s own Muslims have demonstrated against the attacks.
But India, not just Pakistan, desperately needs help. Just as solving or at least neutralizing the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is a requirement for reducing radicalism and Iranian influence throughout the Levant, the same is true of the Indian-Pakistani dispute at the other end of the Greater Middle East. Our notion of the “peace process” is antiquated and needs expanding. We need a second special negotiator for the Middle East, a skilled diplomat shuttling regularly among New Delhi, Islamabad and Kabul. (There has been some speculation, in fact, that Barack Obama is considering Richard Holbrooke, the former United Nations ambassador, for just such a job.)
The Middle East is back to where it was centuries ago, not because of ancient hatreds but because of globalization. Instead of bold lines on a map we have a child’s messy finger painting, as the circumvention of borders and the ease of communications allow the brisk movement of ideas and people and terrorists from one place to another. Our best strategy is, as difficult and trite as it sounds, to be at all places at once, Not with troops, necessarily, but with every bit of energy and constant attention that our entire national security apparatus — and those of our allies — can bring to bear.
Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
Op-Ed Contributor
Trouble in the Other Middle East
By ROBERT D. KAPLAN
Washington
THE divisions we split the world into during the cold war have at long last crumbled thanks to the Mumbai terrorist attacks. No longer will we view South Asia as a region distinct from the Middle East. Now there is only one long continuum stretching from the Mediterranean to the jungles of Burma, with every crisis from the Israeli-Palestinian dispute in the west to the Hindu-Muslim dispute in the east interlocked with the one next door.
Yet this elongated Greater Near East does not signify something new but something old.
For significant parts of medieval and early modern history, Delhi was under the same sovereignty as Kabul, yet under a different one from Bangalore. From the 16th to the 18th centuries, the Mughal dynasty, created by Muslims from Central Asia, governed a sprawling empire encompassing northern and central India, almost all of Pakistan and much of Afghanistan — even as Hindu Maratha warriors in India’s south held out against Mughal armies. India’s whole history — what has created its rich syncretic civilization of Turko-Persian gems like the Taj Mahal and the elaborate Hindu temples of Orissa — is a story of waves of Muslim invaders in turn killing, interacting with and ultimately being influenced by indigenous Hindus. There is even a name for the kind of enchanting architecture that punctuates India and blends Islamic and Hindu styles: Indo-Saracenic, a reference to the Saracens, the term by which Arabs were known to Europeans of the Middle Ages.
Hindu-Muslim relations have historically been tense. Remember that the 1947 partition of the subcontinent uprooted at least 15 million people and led to the violent deaths of around half a million. Given this record, the relatively peaceful relations between the majority Hindus and India’s 150 million Muslims has been testimony to India’s successful experiment in democracy. Democracy has so far kept the lid on an ethnic and religious divide that, while its roots run centuries back, has in recent years essentially become a reinvented modern hostility.
The culprit has been globalization. The secular Indian nationalism of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Congress Party, built around a rejection of Western colonialism, is more and more a thing of the past. As the dynamic Indian economy merges with that of the wider world, Hindus and Muslims have begun separate searches for roots to anchor them inside a bland global civilization. Mass communications have produced a uniform and severe Hinduism from a host of local variants, even as the country’s economically disenfranchised Muslims are increasingly part of an Islamic world community.
The Muslim reaction to this Hindu nationalism has been less anger and violence than simple psychological withdrawal: into beards, skull caps and burkas in some cases; self-segregating into Muslim ghettos in others. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai had a number of aims, one of which was to set a fuse to this tense intercommunal standoff. The jihadists not only want to destroy Pakistan, they want to destroy India as well. India in their eyes is everything they hate: Hindu, vibrantly free and democratic, implicitly and increasingly pro-American, and militarily cozy with Israel. For Washington, this is no simple matter of defending Pakistan against chaos by moving troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. It is a whole region we are dealing with. Thus for the jihadists, the concept of a 9/11-scale attack on India was brilliant.
Just as the chaos in Iraq through early 2007 threatened the post-Ottoman state system from Lebanon to Iran, creeping anarchy in Pakistan undermines not only Afghanistan but also the whole Indian subcontinent. The existence of terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba that have links with the Pakistani security apparatus but are outside the control of Pakistan’s own civilian authorities is the very definition of chaos.
A collapsing Pakistan, and with it the loss of any real border separating India from Afghanistan, is India’s worst nightmare. It brings us back toward the borders of the Mughal world, but not in a peaceful way. Indeed, the route that intelligence agencies feel was taken by the fishing boat hijacked by the terrorists — from Porbandar in India’s Gujarat State, then north to Karachi in Pakistan, and then south to Mumbai — follows centuries-old Indian Ocean trade routes.
The jihadist attack on India’s financial center not only damages Indian-Pakistani relations, but makes Pakistan’s new civilian government — which has genuinely tried to improve ties with India — look utterly pathetic. Thus, the attack weakens both countries. Any understanding over Kashmir, the disputed Muslim-majority territory claimed by Pakistan, is now further than ever from materializing, with mass violence there a distinct possibility.
This, in turn, reduces the chance of an Indian-Pakistani rapprochement on Afghanistan, whose government Pakistan seeks to undermine and India sends millions of dollars in aid to help prop up. The Pakistani security services want a radical Islamized Afghanistan as a strategic rear base against India, while India wants a moderate, secular Afghanistan as a weapon against Pakistan.
Pakistan is not only chaotic but dangerously lonely. Islam has not proved effective in bringing together its regionally based ethnic groups, and thus a resort to a fierce ideology as a unifying device among fundamentalist Muslims has been the country’s signal tragedy. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military suspects that Washington will desert their nation the moment the leadership of Al Qaeda is, by any chance, killed or captured.
Making matters worse, every time the United States launches an air attack into Pakistan from Afghanistan, it further destabilizes the Pakistani state. That is why the Mumbai attacks bring true joy to the most dangerous elements of the Pakistani security establishment: the tragedy has caused the world to focus on India’s weaknesses — its lax security, its vulnerability to age-old maritime infiltration and, most of all, the constant threat of caste and tribal violence — that have been obscured by its economic success. See, many Pakistanis are saying, your beloved India is not so stable either.
This is nonsense, of course. India, with all its troubles, is far more stable than Pakistan. In the meantime, every day that goes by without riots in India is a defeat for the Mumbai terrorists. Indeed, India’s own Muslims have demonstrated against the attacks.
But India, not just Pakistan, desperately needs help. Just as solving or at least neutralizing the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is a requirement for reducing radicalism and Iranian influence throughout the Levant, the same is true of the Indian-Pakistani dispute at the other end of the Greater Middle East. Our notion of the “peace process” is antiquated and needs expanding. We need a second special negotiator for the Middle East, a skilled diplomat shuttling regularly among New Delhi, Islamabad and Kabul. (There has been some speculation, in fact, that Barack Obama is considering Richard Holbrooke, the former United Nations ambassador, for just such a job.)
The Middle East is back to where it was centuries ago, not because of ancient hatreds but because of globalization. Instead of bold lines on a map we have a child’s messy finger painting, as the circumvention of borders and the ease of communications allow the brisk movement of ideas and people and terrorists from one place to another. Our best strategy is, as difficult and trite as it sounds, to be at all places at once, Not with troops, necessarily, but with every bit of energy and constant attention that our entire national security apparatus — and those of our allies — can bring to bear.
Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
December 24, 2008
Generation Faithful
Jordanian Students Rebel, Embracing Conservative Islam
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
AMMAN, Jordan — Muhammad Fawaz is a very serious college junior with a stern gaze and a reluctant smile that barely cloaks suppressed anger. He never wanted to attend Jordan University. He hates spending hours each day commuting.
As a high school student, Mr. Fawaz, 20, had dreamed of earning a scholarship to study abroad. But that was impossible, he said, because he did not have a “wasta,” or connection. In Jordan, connections are seen as essential for advancement and the wasta system is routinely cited by young people as their primary grievance with their country.
So Mr. Fawaz decided to rebel. He adopted the serene, disciplined demeanor of an Islamic activist. In his sophomore year he was accepted into the student group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s largest, most influential religious, social and political movement, one that would ultimately like to see the state governed by Islamic law, or Shariah. Now he works to recruit other students to the cause.
“I find there is justice in the Islamic movement,” Mr. Fawaz said one day as he walked beneath the towering cypress trees at Jordan University. “I can express myself. There is no wasta needed.”
Across the Middle East, young people like Mr. Fawaz, angry, alienated and deprived of opportunity, have accepted Islam as an agent of change and rebellion. It is their rock ’n’ roll, their long hair and love beads. Through Islam, they defy the status quo and challenge governments seen as corrupt and incompetent.
These young people — 60 percent of those in the region are under 25 — are propelling a worldwide Islamic revival, driven by a thirst for political change and social justice. That fervor has popularized a more conservative interpretation of the faith.
“Islamism for us is what pan-Arabism was for our parents,” said Naseem Tarawnah, 25, a business writer and blogger, who is not part of the movement.
The long-term implications of this are likely to complicate American foreign policy calculations, making it more costly to continue supporting governments that do not let secular or moderate religious political movements take root.
Washington will also be likely to find it harder to maintain the policy of shunning leaders of groups like the Brotherhood in Egypt, or Hamas in Gaza, or Hezbollah in Lebanon, which command tremendous public sympathy.
More and a related multimedia at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/world ... ordan.html
Generation Faithful
Jordanian Students Rebel, Embracing Conservative Islam
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
AMMAN, Jordan — Muhammad Fawaz is a very serious college junior with a stern gaze and a reluctant smile that barely cloaks suppressed anger. He never wanted to attend Jordan University. He hates spending hours each day commuting.
As a high school student, Mr. Fawaz, 20, had dreamed of earning a scholarship to study abroad. But that was impossible, he said, because he did not have a “wasta,” or connection. In Jordan, connections are seen as essential for advancement and the wasta system is routinely cited by young people as their primary grievance with their country.
So Mr. Fawaz decided to rebel. He adopted the serene, disciplined demeanor of an Islamic activist. In his sophomore year he was accepted into the student group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s largest, most influential religious, social and political movement, one that would ultimately like to see the state governed by Islamic law, or Shariah. Now he works to recruit other students to the cause.
“I find there is justice in the Islamic movement,” Mr. Fawaz said one day as he walked beneath the towering cypress trees at Jordan University. “I can express myself. There is no wasta needed.”
Across the Middle East, young people like Mr. Fawaz, angry, alienated and deprived of opportunity, have accepted Islam as an agent of change and rebellion. It is their rock ’n’ roll, their long hair and love beads. Through Islam, they defy the status quo and challenge governments seen as corrupt and incompetent.
These young people — 60 percent of those in the region are under 25 — are propelling a worldwide Islamic revival, driven by a thirst for political change and social justice. That fervor has popularized a more conservative interpretation of the faith.
“Islamism for us is what pan-Arabism was for our parents,” said Naseem Tarawnah, 25, a business writer and blogger, who is not part of the movement.
The long-term implications of this are likely to complicate American foreign policy calculations, making it more costly to continue supporting governments that do not let secular or moderate religious political movements take root.
Washington will also be likely to find it harder to maintain the policy of shunning leaders of groups like the Brotherhood in Egypt, or Hamas in Gaza, or Hezbollah in Lebanon, which command tremendous public sympathy.
More and a related multimedia at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/world ... ordan.html
December 31, 2008
Moderate Arab States Feel Popular Anger
By ROBERT F. WORTH
BEIRUT, Lebanon — After four days of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, an outpouring of popular anger is putting pressure on American allies in the Arab world and appears to be worsening divisions in the region.
The sharpest rhetorical attacks have been aimed at Egypt, which is widely seen as having aided the Israeli campaign by closing its border with Gaza.
But as major street demonstrations continued Tuesday from North Africa to Yemen, some marchers and opinion-makers also lashed out at other moderate Arab governments for failing to take a stronger stand. Syria and Iran, meanwhile, have drawn praise for their militancy.
The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, gave a televised address to defend his decision not to open the border with Gaza except for humanitarian purposes. He derided “those who are seeking political gains at the expense of the Palestinian people.”
Although Jordan and Saudi Arabia — solid American allies — have been careful not to blame Hamas publicly, the violence has put them on the defensive, too.
“It’s becoming clear that if you are silent, the Arab street is going to consider you part of the enemy,” said Muhammad al-Masri, a researcher and political analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordan. “There is no way to be in the middle.”
The polarization appears to have ended a thaw that had taken place in the past year, Mr. Masri said. Syria had been reaching out to the West and holding indirect peace talks with Israel. Lebanon’s political factions had reached a peace deal. Syria and Saudi Arabia had made gestures toward resolving their feud.
Now, fault lines visible during the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah have reappeared. Syria has been pressing for an emergency Arab summit meeting, but Egypt and Saudi Arabia have resisted.
Although the conflict has sectarian overtones — many Sunni Arabs fear that Iran wants to extend its Shiite influence — it is rooted in politics, not religion.
To some extent, the outrage has forged a sense of trans-sectarian unity, allowing militant Shiite figures like Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, to extend his influence in the Sunni Arab world, as he did during the 2006 war.
Demonstrations continued Tuesday in Cairo, where marchers have been carrying banners for days with slogans like “Down with Mubarak” and “Where is the Egyptian Army?” Angry disputes have broken out in the Egyptian Parliament, with members of the Muslim Brotherhood — the ideological parent of Hamas — accusing the government of colluding with Israel.
Protesters attacked the Egyptian Consulate in Aden, Yemen, on Tuesday, and 11 were arrested. There have been similar assaults on symbols of Egyptian authority in the region since Sunday.
In Tehran, a group of 30 to 40 students broke into the British Embassy’s residential compound, where they vandalized buildings and replaced the British flag with a Palestinian flag, according to a witness and an embassy official.
Egypt is trapped between Israel, with which it has a peace treaty, and Hamas, which has popular support among Egyptians. The government has struggled with its own Islamist opposition and does not want Hamas operatives to cross into its territory, but it faces popular anger if it appears to endorse violence against Palestinians.
The Israeli airstrikes that began Saturday have exacerbated the situation. Hamas is ruling Gaza and is politically isolated from the West Bank, putting the onus more than ever on Egypt, the only state besides Israel that borders Gaza.
“Egypt is very much cornered this time,” said Hassan Nafaa, a professor of political science at Cairo University. “There’s a perception that Egypt is leading the moderate Arab camp in this, and that the moderate camp has not been able to achieve anything.”
Egyptian officials see the hand of Iran, a patron of Hamas, in the current conflict. Iran had been pressing Egypt before the conflict, apparently eager to undermine Egypt’s role as a mediator between the Palestinian factions. Demonstrators gathered in front of the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran on Dec. 17 to protest Egypt’s position toward Hamas.
Recently, government-allied newspapers in Egypt have lashed out at Iran and its ally Hezbollah, whose leader, Hassan Nasrallah, demanded Sunday that Egypt open its border and allow weapons and supplies to flow to Hamas.
Mr. Nasrallah “has illusions that people in Egypt will take his orders, and that the government here submits to the kind of bribery he is used to in his country,” wrote Usama Saraya in Tuesday’s edition of Al Ahram, an Egyptian daily newspaper.
Television stations and newspapers allied with Iran and Syria continued to portray Egypt as a traitor. Some commentators had harsh words for other Arab states.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt “are even more excited about this war than they were during the 2006 war” between Israel and Hezbollah, said Ibrahim al-Amine, the chairman of the board of Al Akhbar, a newspaper aligned with Hezbollah.
“Israel would be satisfied with a compromise, but the Arab regimes want to finish Hamas completely,” Mr. Amine said.
They cannot openly say so, he added, because Hamas is a Sunni movement, unlike Hezbollah, which Saudi Arabia and Egypt — both of them Sunni-led countries — publicly criticized at the start of the summer 2006 war with Israel.
Hwaida Saad contributed reporting from Beirut, and Khalid al-Hammadi from Sana, Yemen.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/world ... nted=print
Moderate Arab States Feel Popular Anger
By ROBERT F. WORTH
BEIRUT, Lebanon — After four days of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, an outpouring of popular anger is putting pressure on American allies in the Arab world and appears to be worsening divisions in the region.
The sharpest rhetorical attacks have been aimed at Egypt, which is widely seen as having aided the Israeli campaign by closing its border with Gaza.
But as major street demonstrations continued Tuesday from North Africa to Yemen, some marchers and opinion-makers also lashed out at other moderate Arab governments for failing to take a stronger stand. Syria and Iran, meanwhile, have drawn praise for their militancy.
The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, gave a televised address to defend his decision not to open the border with Gaza except for humanitarian purposes. He derided “those who are seeking political gains at the expense of the Palestinian people.”
Although Jordan and Saudi Arabia — solid American allies — have been careful not to blame Hamas publicly, the violence has put them on the defensive, too.
“It’s becoming clear that if you are silent, the Arab street is going to consider you part of the enemy,” said Muhammad al-Masri, a researcher and political analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordan. “There is no way to be in the middle.”
The polarization appears to have ended a thaw that had taken place in the past year, Mr. Masri said. Syria had been reaching out to the West and holding indirect peace talks with Israel. Lebanon’s political factions had reached a peace deal. Syria and Saudi Arabia had made gestures toward resolving their feud.
Now, fault lines visible during the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah have reappeared. Syria has been pressing for an emergency Arab summit meeting, but Egypt and Saudi Arabia have resisted.
Although the conflict has sectarian overtones — many Sunni Arabs fear that Iran wants to extend its Shiite influence — it is rooted in politics, not religion.
To some extent, the outrage has forged a sense of trans-sectarian unity, allowing militant Shiite figures like Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, to extend his influence in the Sunni Arab world, as he did during the 2006 war.
Demonstrations continued Tuesday in Cairo, where marchers have been carrying banners for days with slogans like “Down with Mubarak” and “Where is the Egyptian Army?” Angry disputes have broken out in the Egyptian Parliament, with members of the Muslim Brotherhood — the ideological parent of Hamas — accusing the government of colluding with Israel.
Protesters attacked the Egyptian Consulate in Aden, Yemen, on Tuesday, and 11 were arrested. There have been similar assaults on symbols of Egyptian authority in the region since Sunday.
In Tehran, a group of 30 to 40 students broke into the British Embassy’s residential compound, where they vandalized buildings and replaced the British flag with a Palestinian flag, according to a witness and an embassy official.
Egypt is trapped between Israel, with which it has a peace treaty, and Hamas, which has popular support among Egyptians. The government has struggled with its own Islamist opposition and does not want Hamas operatives to cross into its territory, but it faces popular anger if it appears to endorse violence against Palestinians.
The Israeli airstrikes that began Saturday have exacerbated the situation. Hamas is ruling Gaza and is politically isolated from the West Bank, putting the onus more than ever on Egypt, the only state besides Israel that borders Gaza.
“Egypt is very much cornered this time,” said Hassan Nafaa, a professor of political science at Cairo University. “There’s a perception that Egypt is leading the moderate Arab camp in this, and that the moderate camp has not been able to achieve anything.”
Egyptian officials see the hand of Iran, a patron of Hamas, in the current conflict. Iran had been pressing Egypt before the conflict, apparently eager to undermine Egypt’s role as a mediator between the Palestinian factions. Demonstrators gathered in front of the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran on Dec. 17 to protest Egypt’s position toward Hamas.
Recently, government-allied newspapers in Egypt have lashed out at Iran and its ally Hezbollah, whose leader, Hassan Nasrallah, demanded Sunday that Egypt open its border and allow weapons and supplies to flow to Hamas.
Mr. Nasrallah “has illusions that people in Egypt will take his orders, and that the government here submits to the kind of bribery he is used to in his country,” wrote Usama Saraya in Tuesday’s edition of Al Ahram, an Egyptian daily newspaper.
Television stations and newspapers allied with Iran and Syria continued to portray Egypt as a traitor. Some commentators had harsh words for other Arab states.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt “are even more excited about this war than they were during the 2006 war” between Israel and Hezbollah, said Ibrahim al-Amine, the chairman of the board of Al Akhbar, a newspaper aligned with Hezbollah.
“Israel would be satisfied with a compromise, but the Arab regimes want to finish Hamas completely,” Mr. Amine said.
They cannot openly say so, he added, because Hamas is a Sunni movement, unlike Hezbollah, which Saudi Arabia and Egypt — both of them Sunni-led countries — publicly criticized at the start of the summer 2006 war with Israel.
Hwaida Saad contributed reporting from Beirut, and Khalid al-Hammadi from Sana, Yemen.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/world ... nted=print
January 1, 2009
Divisions Deep at Arab League Meeting
By STEVEN ERLANGER
CAIRO — Arab countries appeared deeply divided on Wednesday over how to respond to the latest escalation in fighting between Israel and Hamas, with sharply differing comments from foreign ministers at the opening of an emergency Arab League meeting here.
Moderate Arab states generally allied to the United States blamed Palestinian disunity for the crisis and more radical states, some of whom did not attend, urged collective action to defend the Palestinians against Israel.
In the most striking comments, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, criticized the Palestinians for their inability to remain united behind President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah — an implicit condemnation of Hamas, which took over Gaza entirely in 2007 in a brief but violent civil war with Fatah. Normally, during periods of Israeli-Palestinian fighting, Arab leaders only condemn Israel.
“This terrible massacre would not have happened if the Palestinian people were united behind one leadership, speaking in one voice,” Prince Saud said at the league meeting’s opening. “We are telling our Palestinian brothers that your Arab nation cannot extend a real helping hand if you don’t extend your own hands to each other with love,” he said.
The secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, also expressed frustration with Arab and Palestinian divisions, saying their weakness has “led to this disregard of the Arabs” internationally. “We are all in one boat, riddled with holes, and only our cohesion can save us,” he said.
Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, has made similar criticisms, and he has essentially told Arab nations that want Egypt to come to the defense of Hamas — and Iran — to mind their own business. Hamas is a branch of Egypt’s outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and Mr. Mubarak has to walk a fine line between supporting the Palestinians and not coming to the aid of Hamas, which gets significant aid from Tehran.
The state-controlled Egyptian media have blamed Hamas for refusing to renew a six-month cease-fire with Israel and being the main cause of the current violence, for which it also condemns Israel. Egypt has made regular efforts to pull the Palestinian factions into unity talks and to be an intermediary between Israel and Hamas.
Countries like Egypt and Jordan, which maintain close but complicated ties with the United States and have recognized Israel, have come under fierce criticism by the leaders of Syria, Libya and the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon for not doing enough to help the Gazans. There have been some street protests, including one today in Cairo, in an area where demonstrations are tolerated, but which produced some fighting between Islamist protestors and riot police.
Some protesters held up copies of the Koran and shouted: “On Gaza we will march, martyrs by the millions, we are all Hamas.” Others chanted: “Rule by the Koran.”
The Arab League is trying to put together an initiative to help end the fighting in Gaza and restore the cease-fire, and Egypt has asked the aid of Turkey, which has close ties to Israel.
The Arab League foreign ministers discussed the plan, which calls for an immediate, unconditional halt to the fighting, followed by a long-term truce between Hamas and Israel, and international monitors to guarantee the truce and the opening of border crossings into Gaza, which Israel has kept largely sealed since 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/world ... &th&emc=th
Divisions Deep at Arab League Meeting
By STEVEN ERLANGER
CAIRO — Arab countries appeared deeply divided on Wednesday over how to respond to the latest escalation in fighting between Israel and Hamas, with sharply differing comments from foreign ministers at the opening of an emergency Arab League meeting here.
Moderate Arab states generally allied to the United States blamed Palestinian disunity for the crisis and more radical states, some of whom did not attend, urged collective action to defend the Palestinians against Israel.
In the most striking comments, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, criticized the Palestinians for their inability to remain united behind President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah — an implicit condemnation of Hamas, which took over Gaza entirely in 2007 in a brief but violent civil war with Fatah. Normally, during periods of Israeli-Palestinian fighting, Arab leaders only condemn Israel.
“This terrible massacre would not have happened if the Palestinian people were united behind one leadership, speaking in one voice,” Prince Saud said at the league meeting’s opening. “We are telling our Palestinian brothers that your Arab nation cannot extend a real helping hand if you don’t extend your own hands to each other with love,” he said.
The secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, also expressed frustration with Arab and Palestinian divisions, saying their weakness has “led to this disregard of the Arabs” internationally. “We are all in one boat, riddled with holes, and only our cohesion can save us,” he said.
Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, has made similar criticisms, and he has essentially told Arab nations that want Egypt to come to the defense of Hamas — and Iran — to mind their own business. Hamas is a branch of Egypt’s outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and Mr. Mubarak has to walk a fine line between supporting the Palestinians and not coming to the aid of Hamas, which gets significant aid from Tehran.
The state-controlled Egyptian media have blamed Hamas for refusing to renew a six-month cease-fire with Israel and being the main cause of the current violence, for which it also condemns Israel. Egypt has made regular efforts to pull the Palestinian factions into unity talks and to be an intermediary between Israel and Hamas.
Countries like Egypt and Jordan, which maintain close but complicated ties with the United States and have recognized Israel, have come under fierce criticism by the leaders of Syria, Libya and the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon for not doing enough to help the Gazans. There have been some street protests, including one today in Cairo, in an area where demonstrations are tolerated, but which produced some fighting between Islamist protestors and riot police.
Some protesters held up copies of the Koran and shouted: “On Gaza we will march, martyrs by the millions, we are all Hamas.” Others chanted: “Rule by the Koran.”
The Arab League is trying to put together an initiative to help end the fighting in Gaza and restore the cease-fire, and Egypt has asked the aid of Turkey, which has close ties to Israel.
The Arab League foreign ministers discussed the plan, which calls for an immediate, unconditional halt to the fighting, followed by a long-term truce between Hamas and Israel, and international monitors to guarantee the truce and the opening of border crossings into Gaza, which Israel has kept largely sealed since 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/world ... &th&emc=th
There is a related video linked at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/03/world ... &th&emc=th
January 3, 2009
Generation Faithful
Preaching Moderate Islam and Becoming a TV Star
By ROBERT F. WORTH
JIDDA, Saudi Arabia — As Ahmad al-Shugairi took the stage, dressed in a flowing white gown and headdress, he clutched a microphone and told his audience that he had no religious training or titles: “I am not a sheik.”
But over the next two hours, he worked the crowd as masterfully as any preacher, drawing rounds of uproarious laughter and, as he recalled the Prophet Muhammad’s death, silent tears. He spoke against sectarianism. He made pleas for women to be treated as equals. He talked about his own life — his seven wild years in California, his divorce, his children — and gently satirized Arab mores.
When he finished, the packed concert hall erupted in a wild standing ovation. Members of his entourage soon bundled him through the thick crowd of admirers to a back door, where they rushed through the darkness to a waiting car.
“Elvis has left the building,” Mr. Shugairi joked, in English, as he relaxed into his seat.
Mr. Shugairi is a rising star in a new generation of “satellite sheiks” whose religion-themed television shows have helped fuel a religious revival across the Arab world. Over the past decade, the number of satellite channels devoted exclusively to religion has risen from 1 to more than 30, and religious programming on general interest stations, like the one that features Mr. Shugairi’s show, has soared. Mr. Shugairi and others like him have succeeded by appealing to a young audience that is hungry for religious identity but deeply alienated from both politics and the traditional religious establishment, especially in the fundamentalist forms now common in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
In part, that is a matter of style: a handsome, athletically built 35-year-old, Mr. Shugairi effortlessly mixes deep religious commitment with hip, playful humor. He earned an M.B.A. during his California years, and he sometimes refers to Islam as “an excellent product that needs better packaging.”
But his message of sincere religious moderation is tremendously powerful here. For young Arabs, he offers a way to reconcile a world painfully divided between East and West, pleasure and duty, the rigor of the mosque and the baffling freedoms of the Internet.
“He makes us attached to religion — sometimes with our modern life we get detached,” said Imma al-Khalidi, a 25-year-old Saudi who burst into tears when Mr. Shugairi, uneasy with his rock-star departure from the auditorium, returned to the hall to chat with a group of black-clad and veiled young women. There was an audible intake of breath as the women saw him emerge. A few bold ones walked forward, but most hung back, seemingly stunned.
“Before, we used to see only men behind a desk, like judges,” Ms. Khalidi said.
Mr. Shugairi is not the first of his kind. Amr Khaled, an Egyptian televangelist, began reaching large audiences eight years ago. But the field has expanded greatly, with each new figure creating Internet sites and Facebook groups where tens of thousands of fans trade epiphanies and links to YouTube clips of their favorite preachers.
Mr. Shugairi’s main TV program, “Khawater” (“Thoughts”), could not be more different from the dry lecturing style of so many Muslim clerics. In one episode on literacy, the camera follows Mr. Shugairi as he wanders through Jidda asking people where to find a public library (no one knows). In another, he pokes through a trash bin, pointing to mounds of rotting rice and hummus that could have been donated for the poor. He even sets up “Candid Camera”-style gags, confronting people who pocket a wallet from the pavement and asking them if the Prophet Muhammad would have done the same.
At times, his program resembles an American civics class disguised as religion, complete with lessons on environmental awareness and responsible driving.
Criticized From Both Sides
Inevitably, hard-line clerics dismiss Mr. Shugairi as a lightweight who toadies to the West. From the other side, some liberals lament that Mr. Shugairi and the other satellite sheiks are Islamizing the secular elite of the Arab world.
And while most of these broadcast preachers, including Mr. Shugairi, promote a moderate and inclusive strain of Islam, others do not. There are few controls in the world of satellite television, where virtually anyone can take to the air and preach as he likes on one of hundreds of channels.
Moreover, some observers fear that the growing prevalence of Islam on the airwaves and the Internet could make moderates like Mr. Shugairi steppingstones toward more extreme figures, who are never more than a mouse-click or a channel-surf away.
“There is no one with any real authority, they can say whatever they want to say, and the accessibility of these sheiks is 24/7,” said Hussein Amin, a professor at the American University in Cairo. “That’s why so many who were liberals are now conservatives, and those who were conservatives are now radicals.”
Mr. Shugairi and others like him, including the popular Egyptian television preacher Moez Masoud, counter that their moderate message is the best way to fight Islamic extremism. Forging that middle path, they say, is essential at a time when many young Arabs feel caught between an angry fundamentalism on the one hand and a rootless secularism on the other.
Bakr Azam is one of them. Like many of Mr. Shugairi’s fans, he received a dry, pitiless religious education that left him feeling resentful and hungry for something different.
“In high school, the way they taught us religion was very white and black,” said Mr. Azam, a 28-year-old Saudi who works as a recruiter for Toyota. “You always felt you were doing something wrong, and it drove a lot of people away.”
It drove Mr. Azam farther away than most. After moving to the United States for college in 1997, he more or less gave up on Islam entirely. He moved back here in 2001, a hip-hop fan with dyed red hair, a love for parties and no interest in religion.
But something was missing. In 2004, he happened to see one of Mr. Shugairi’s programs on TV, and he was mesmerized. Here was a man who had lived in the West and yet spoke of the Koran as a modern ethical guidebook, not a harsh set of medieval rules. He seemed to be saying you could enjoy yourself, retain your independence and at the same time be a good Muslim.
Right away, Mr. Azam opened his laptop and found Mr. Shugairi’s Web site. He joined a volunteer group in Jidda linked to the show. He found himself returning to the rituals he had grown up with, fasting and praying. He still counts himself a moderate, like his mentor. But — also like Mr. Shugairi — he became so devout that he separated from his wife, who did not wear a head scarf and retained the secular attitude he once shared.
“Ahmad made us look back at religion,” Mr. Azam said of Mr. Shugairi. “He helped us see that Islam is not about living in caves and being isolated from the world. Islam is international. It is modern. It is tolerant.”
As he spoke, Mr. Azam was sitting on a blue couch in the Andalus cafe, which was built by Mr. Shugairi as a gathering place for young people in Jidda. A few feet away, a televangelist could be seen talking about Islam on a large plasma TV screen. Nearby, young people sat gazing at their laptops, while Islamic music played quietly in the background. The design and furniture in the cafe are in the style of Andalusian Spain, widely seen as a high point in Islamic history, when scholarship and tolerance flourished.
Mr. Shugairi often spends time here chatting with friends and admirers, sipping tea and moving easily between Arabic and his California-accented English. He has become something of a celebrity in Saudi Arabia, but he seems uncomfortable with the role and does not have the arrogant manner of many educated Saudis. He makes a point of being friendly and respectful to everyone, including the Asian laborers who do most menial tasks here.
Mr. Shugairi got his start in television in 2002, when he began appearing on a program called “Yella Shabab” (“Hey, Young People”). Two years later, he started his own show, “Khawater,” which runs daily during the holy month of Ramadan.
Part of his inspiration, Mr. Shugairi said, came from the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which hit him especially hard as someone who spent formative years in the United States. “Many of us felt a need to educate youth to a more moderate understanding of religion,” he said, during an interview at the cafe.
Yet his approach to Islam, as with most of the other satellite TV figures who have emerged in the past few years, is fundamentally orthodox. He says that women should wear the hijab, or head scarf, and he talks of the Koran as a kind of constitution that should guide Muslim countries. His next program, “If He Were Among Us,” scheduled to be broadcast early this year, is focused squarely on adhering to the Prophet Muhammad’s life as an example.
To California and Back
Mr. Shugairi’s own life — and especially his struggle with the poles of decadence and extreme faith — is an essential feature of his appeal to many fans.
Born here in 1973 to a wealthy, cosmopolitan family, Mr. Shugairi went to college at age 17 in Long Beach, Calif. By his own account, he completely stopped praying. He chased women at clubs, and he even — for a year — drank. In 1995 he got married, and the pendulum swung toward a severe Islamism, as he angrily renounced the freedoms of his student life.
“Nothing violent, but intellectual violence,” Mr. Shugairi said, during an interview at the Andalus cafe.
He moved back to Saudi Arabia to manage his father’s importing business. His wife did not share his turn toward extremism, and the marriage soon ended in divorce.
It was then that he began studying with a cleric, Adnan al-Zahrani, who exposed him to the idea that Islam’s greatest strength comes from its diversity and its openness to new ways of thinking. For the first time, Mr. Shugairi found a way to balance the warring forces in his life, his American self and his Saudi self.
For much of his young audience, this synthesis is the key to his appeal. These young Muslims have inherited a world painfully divided between what they hear from the clerics and what they see on satellite television and the Internet. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, with its powerful and deeply conservative religious establishment.
“Ahmad helped me see that I can want to be with a girl, and it’s O.K. — I don’t need to feel bad,” said Muhammad Malaikah, a lean 22-year-old with a shy smile.
Now, he said, he was able to spend time alone with his girlfriend and still feel he was being true to himself and his culture. He goes to the movies with her. Sometimes they kiss, “but no sex.” He has persuaded her to start wearing the hijab.
“Ahmad showed us a middle way in everything,” he said, “in relationships, in working, in fasting, in prayer.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/03/world ... &th&emc=th
January 3, 2009
Generation Faithful
Preaching Moderate Islam and Becoming a TV Star
By ROBERT F. WORTH
JIDDA, Saudi Arabia — As Ahmad al-Shugairi took the stage, dressed in a flowing white gown and headdress, he clutched a microphone and told his audience that he had no religious training or titles: “I am not a sheik.”
But over the next two hours, he worked the crowd as masterfully as any preacher, drawing rounds of uproarious laughter and, as he recalled the Prophet Muhammad’s death, silent tears. He spoke against sectarianism. He made pleas for women to be treated as equals. He talked about his own life — his seven wild years in California, his divorce, his children — and gently satirized Arab mores.
When he finished, the packed concert hall erupted in a wild standing ovation. Members of his entourage soon bundled him through the thick crowd of admirers to a back door, where they rushed through the darkness to a waiting car.
“Elvis has left the building,” Mr. Shugairi joked, in English, as he relaxed into his seat.
Mr. Shugairi is a rising star in a new generation of “satellite sheiks” whose religion-themed television shows have helped fuel a religious revival across the Arab world. Over the past decade, the number of satellite channels devoted exclusively to religion has risen from 1 to more than 30, and religious programming on general interest stations, like the one that features Mr. Shugairi’s show, has soared. Mr. Shugairi and others like him have succeeded by appealing to a young audience that is hungry for religious identity but deeply alienated from both politics and the traditional religious establishment, especially in the fundamentalist forms now common in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
In part, that is a matter of style: a handsome, athletically built 35-year-old, Mr. Shugairi effortlessly mixes deep religious commitment with hip, playful humor. He earned an M.B.A. during his California years, and he sometimes refers to Islam as “an excellent product that needs better packaging.”
But his message of sincere religious moderation is tremendously powerful here. For young Arabs, he offers a way to reconcile a world painfully divided between East and West, pleasure and duty, the rigor of the mosque and the baffling freedoms of the Internet.
“He makes us attached to religion — sometimes with our modern life we get detached,” said Imma al-Khalidi, a 25-year-old Saudi who burst into tears when Mr. Shugairi, uneasy with his rock-star departure from the auditorium, returned to the hall to chat with a group of black-clad and veiled young women. There was an audible intake of breath as the women saw him emerge. A few bold ones walked forward, but most hung back, seemingly stunned.
“Before, we used to see only men behind a desk, like judges,” Ms. Khalidi said.
Mr. Shugairi is not the first of his kind. Amr Khaled, an Egyptian televangelist, began reaching large audiences eight years ago. But the field has expanded greatly, with each new figure creating Internet sites and Facebook groups where tens of thousands of fans trade epiphanies and links to YouTube clips of their favorite preachers.
Mr. Shugairi’s main TV program, “Khawater” (“Thoughts”), could not be more different from the dry lecturing style of so many Muslim clerics. In one episode on literacy, the camera follows Mr. Shugairi as he wanders through Jidda asking people where to find a public library (no one knows). In another, he pokes through a trash bin, pointing to mounds of rotting rice and hummus that could have been donated for the poor. He even sets up “Candid Camera”-style gags, confronting people who pocket a wallet from the pavement and asking them if the Prophet Muhammad would have done the same.
At times, his program resembles an American civics class disguised as religion, complete with lessons on environmental awareness and responsible driving.
Criticized From Both Sides
Inevitably, hard-line clerics dismiss Mr. Shugairi as a lightweight who toadies to the West. From the other side, some liberals lament that Mr. Shugairi and the other satellite sheiks are Islamizing the secular elite of the Arab world.
And while most of these broadcast preachers, including Mr. Shugairi, promote a moderate and inclusive strain of Islam, others do not. There are few controls in the world of satellite television, where virtually anyone can take to the air and preach as he likes on one of hundreds of channels.
Moreover, some observers fear that the growing prevalence of Islam on the airwaves and the Internet could make moderates like Mr. Shugairi steppingstones toward more extreme figures, who are never more than a mouse-click or a channel-surf away.
“There is no one with any real authority, they can say whatever they want to say, and the accessibility of these sheiks is 24/7,” said Hussein Amin, a professor at the American University in Cairo. “That’s why so many who were liberals are now conservatives, and those who were conservatives are now radicals.”
Mr. Shugairi and others like him, including the popular Egyptian television preacher Moez Masoud, counter that their moderate message is the best way to fight Islamic extremism. Forging that middle path, they say, is essential at a time when many young Arabs feel caught between an angry fundamentalism on the one hand and a rootless secularism on the other.
Bakr Azam is one of them. Like many of Mr. Shugairi’s fans, he received a dry, pitiless religious education that left him feeling resentful and hungry for something different.
“In high school, the way they taught us religion was very white and black,” said Mr. Azam, a 28-year-old Saudi who works as a recruiter for Toyota. “You always felt you were doing something wrong, and it drove a lot of people away.”
It drove Mr. Azam farther away than most. After moving to the United States for college in 1997, he more or less gave up on Islam entirely. He moved back here in 2001, a hip-hop fan with dyed red hair, a love for parties and no interest in religion.
But something was missing. In 2004, he happened to see one of Mr. Shugairi’s programs on TV, and he was mesmerized. Here was a man who had lived in the West and yet spoke of the Koran as a modern ethical guidebook, not a harsh set of medieval rules. He seemed to be saying you could enjoy yourself, retain your independence and at the same time be a good Muslim.
Right away, Mr. Azam opened his laptop and found Mr. Shugairi’s Web site. He joined a volunteer group in Jidda linked to the show. He found himself returning to the rituals he had grown up with, fasting and praying. He still counts himself a moderate, like his mentor. But — also like Mr. Shugairi — he became so devout that he separated from his wife, who did not wear a head scarf and retained the secular attitude he once shared.
“Ahmad made us look back at religion,” Mr. Azam said of Mr. Shugairi. “He helped us see that Islam is not about living in caves and being isolated from the world. Islam is international. It is modern. It is tolerant.”
As he spoke, Mr. Azam was sitting on a blue couch in the Andalus cafe, which was built by Mr. Shugairi as a gathering place for young people in Jidda. A few feet away, a televangelist could be seen talking about Islam on a large plasma TV screen. Nearby, young people sat gazing at their laptops, while Islamic music played quietly in the background. The design and furniture in the cafe are in the style of Andalusian Spain, widely seen as a high point in Islamic history, when scholarship and tolerance flourished.
Mr. Shugairi often spends time here chatting with friends and admirers, sipping tea and moving easily between Arabic and his California-accented English. He has become something of a celebrity in Saudi Arabia, but he seems uncomfortable with the role and does not have the arrogant manner of many educated Saudis. He makes a point of being friendly and respectful to everyone, including the Asian laborers who do most menial tasks here.
Mr. Shugairi got his start in television in 2002, when he began appearing on a program called “Yella Shabab” (“Hey, Young People”). Two years later, he started his own show, “Khawater,” which runs daily during the holy month of Ramadan.
Part of his inspiration, Mr. Shugairi said, came from the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which hit him especially hard as someone who spent formative years in the United States. “Many of us felt a need to educate youth to a more moderate understanding of religion,” he said, during an interview at the cafe.
Yet his approach to Islam, as with most of the other satellite TV figures who have emerged in the past few years, is fundamentally orthodox. He says that women should wear the hijab, or head scarf, and he talks of the Koran as a kind of constitution that should guide Muslim countries. His next program, “If He Were Among Us,” scheduled to be broadcast early this year, is focused squarely on adhering to the Prophet Muhammad’s life as an example.
To California and Back
Mr. Shugairi’s own life — and especially his struggle with the poles of decadence and extreme faith — is an essential feature of his appeal to many fans.
Born here in 1973 to a wealthy, cosmopolitan family, Mr. Shugairi went to college at age 17 in Long Beach, Calif. By his own account, he completely stopped praying. He chased women at clubs, and he even — for a year — drank. In 1995 he got married, and the pendulum swung toward a severe Islamism, as he angrily renounced the freedoms of his student life.
“Nothing violent, but intellectual violence,” Mr. Shugairi said, during an interview at the Andalus cafe.
He moved back to Saudi Arabia to manage his father’s importing business. His wife did not share his turn toward extremism, and the marriage soon ended in divorce.
It was then that he began studying with a cleric, Adnan al-Zahrani, who exposed him to the idea that Islam’s greatest strength comes from its diversity and its openness to new ways of thinking. For the first time, Mr. Shugairi found a way to balance the warring forces in his life, his American self and his Saudi self.
For much of his young audience, this synthesis is the key to his appeal. These young Muslims have inherited a world painfully divided between what they hear from the clerics and what they see on satellite television and the Internet. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, with its powerful and deeply conservative religious establishment.
“Ahmad helped me see that I can want to be with a girl, and it’s O.K. — I don’t need to feel bad,” said Muhammad Malaikah, a lean 22-year-old with a shy smile.
Now, he said, he was able to spend time alone with his girlfriend and still feel he was being true to himself and his culture. He goes to the movies with her. Sometimes they kiss, “but no sex.” He has persuaded her to start wearing the hijab.
“Ahmad showed us a middle way in everything,” he said, “in relationships, in working, in fasting, in prayer.”
January 7, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist
The Mideast’s Ground Zero
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The fighting, death and destruction in Gaza is painful to watch. But it’s all too familiar. It’s the latest version of the longest-running play in the modern Middle East, which, if I were to give it a title, would be called: “Who owns this hotel? Can the Jews have a room? And shouldn’t we blow up the bar and replace it with a mosque?”
That is, Gaza is a mini-version of three great struggles that have been playing out since 1948: 1) Who is going to be the regional superpower — Egypt? Saudi Arabia? Iran? 2) Should there be a Jewish state in the Middle East and, if so, on what Palestinian terms? And 3) Who is going to dominate Arab society — Islamists who are intolerant of other faiths and want to choke off modernity or modernists who want to embrace the future, with an Arab-Muslim face? Let’s look at each.
WHO OWNS THIS HOTEL? The struggle for hegemony over the modern Arab world is as old as Nasser’s Egypt. But what is new today is that non-Arab Iran is now making a bid for primacy — challenging Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran has deftly used military aid to both Hamas and Hezbollah to create a rocket-armed force on Israel’s northern and western borders. This enables Tehran to stop and start the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at will and to paint itself as the true protector of the Palestinians, as opposed to the weak Arab regimes.
“The Gaza that Israel left in 2005 was bordering Egypt. The Gaza that Israel just came back to is now bordering Iran,” said Mamoun Fandy, director of Middle East programs at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. “Iran has become the ultimate confrontation state. I am not sure we can talk just about ‘Arab-Israeli peace’ or the ‘Arab peace initiative’ anymore. We may be looking at an ‘Iranian initiative.’ ” In short, the whole notion of Arab-Israeli peacemaking likely will have to change.
CAN THE JEWS HAVE A ROOM HERE? Hamas rejects any recognition of Israel. By contrast, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, has recognized Israel — and vice versa. If you believe, as I do, that the only stable solution is a two-state one, with the Palestinians getting all of the West Bank, Gaza and Arab sectors of East Jerusalem, then you have to hope for the weakening of Hamas.
Why? Because nothing has damaged Palestinians more than the Hamas death-cult strategy of turning Palestinian youths into suicide bombers. Because nothing would set back a peace deal more than if Hamas’s call to replace Israel with an Islamic state became the Palestinian negotiating position. And because Hamas’s attacks on towns in southern Israel is destroying a two-state solution, even more than Israel’s disastrous and reckless West Bank settlements.
Israel has proved that it can and will uproot settlements, as it did in Gaza. Hamas’s rocket attacks pose an irreversible threat. They say to Israel: “From Gaza, we can hit southern Israel. If we get the West Bank, we can rocket, and thereby close, Israel’s international airport — anytime, any day, from now to eternity.” How many Israelis will risk relinquishing the West Bank, given this new threat?
SHOULDN’T WE BLOW UP THE BAR AND REPLACE IT WITH A MOSQUE? Hamas’s overthrow of the more secular Fatah organization in Gaza in 2007 is part of a regionwide civil war between Islamists and modernists. In the week that Israel has been slicing through Gaza, Islamist suicide bombers have killed almost 100 Iraqis — first, a group of tribal sheikhs in Yusufiya, who were working on reconciliation between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, and, second, mostly women and children gathered at a Shiite shrine. These unprovoked mass murders have not stirred a single protest in Europe or the Middle East.
Gaza today is basically ground zero for all three of these struggles, said Martin Indyk, the former Clinton administration’s Middle East adviser whose incisive new book, “Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Diplomacy in the Middle East,” was just published. “This tiny little piece of land, Gaza, has the potential to blow all of these issues wide open and present a huge problem for Barack Obama on Day 1.”
Obama’s great potential for America, noted Indyk, is also a great threat to Islamist radicals — because his narrative holds tremendous appeal for Arabs. For eight years Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have been surfing on a wave of anti-U.S. anger generated by George W. Bush. And that wave has greatly expanded their base.
No doubt, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran are hoping that they can use the Gaza conflict to turn Obama into Bush. They know Barack Hussein Obama must be (am)Bushed — to keep America and its Arab allies on the defensive. Obama has to keep his eye on the prize. His goal — America’s goal — has to be a settlement in Gaza that eliminates the threat of Hamas rockets and opens Gaza economically to the world, under credible international supervision. That’s what will serve U.S. interests, moderate the three great struggles and earn him respect.
Op-Ed Columnist
The Mideast’s Ground Zero
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The fighting, death and destruction in Gaza is painful to watch. But it’s all too familiar. It’s the latest version of the longest-running play in the modern Middle East, which, if I were to give it a title, would be called: “Who owns this hotel? Can the Jews have a room? And shouldn’t we blow up the bar and replace it with a mosque?”
That is, Gaza is a mini-version of three great struggles that have been playing out since 1948: 1) Who is going to be the regional superpower — Egypt? Saudi Arabia? Iran? 2) Should there be a Jewish state in the Middle East and, if so, on what Palestinian terms? And 3) Who is going to dominate Arab society — Islamists who are intolerant of other faiths and want to choke off modernity or modernists who want to embrace the future, with an Arab-Muslim face? Let’s look at each.
WHO OWNS THIS HOTEL? The struggle for hegemony over the modern Arab world is as old as Nasser’s Egypt. But what is new today is that non-Arab Iran is now making a bid for primacy — challenging Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran has deftly used military aid to both Hamas and Hezbollah to create a rocket-armed force on Israel’s northern and western borders. This enables Tehran to stop and start the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at will and to paint itself as the true protector of the Palestinians, as opposed to the weak Arab regimes.
“The Gaza that Israel left in 2005 was bordering Egypt. The Gaza that Israel just came back to is now bordering Iran,” said Mamoun Fandy, director of Middle East programs at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. “Iran has become the ultimate confrontation state. I am not sure we can talk just about ‘Arab-Israeli peace’ or the ‘Arab peace initiative’ anymore. We may be looking at an ‘Iranian initiative.’ ” In short, the whole notion of Arab-Israeli peacemaking likely will have to change.
CAN THE JEWS HAVE A ROOM HERE? Hamas rejects any recognition of Israel. By contrast, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, has recognized Israel — and vice versa. If you believe, as I do, that the only stable solution is a two-state one, with the Palestinians getting all of the West Bank, Gaza and Arab sectors of East Jerusalem, then you have to hope for the weakening of Hamas.
Why? Because nothing has damaged Palestinians more than the Hamas death-cult strategy of turning Palestinian youths into suicide bombers. Because nothing would set back a peace deal more than if Hamas’s call to replace Israel with an Islamic state became the Palestinian negotiating position. And because Hamas’s attacks on towns in southern Israel is destroying a two-state solution, even more than Israel’s disastrous and reckless West Bank settlements.
Israel has proved that it can and will uproot settlements, as it did in Gaza. Hamas’s rocket attacks pose an irreversible threat. They say to Israel: “From Gaza, we can hit southern Israel. If we get the West Bank, we can rocket, and thereby close, Israel’s international airport — anytime, any day, from now to eternity.” How many Israelis will risk relinquishing the West Bank, given this new threat?
SHOULDN’T WE BLOW UP THE BAR AND REPLACE IT WITH A MOSQUE? Hamas’s overthrow of the more secular Fatah organization in Gaza in 2007 is part of a regionwide civil war between Islamists and modernists. In the week that Israel has been slicing through Gaza, Islamist suicide bombers have killed almost 100 Iraqis — first, a group of tribal sheikhs in Yusufiya, who were working on reconciliation between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, and, second, mostly women and children gathered at a Shiite shrine. These unprovoked mass murders have not stirred a single protest in Europe or the Middle East.
Gaza today is basically ground zero for all three of these struggles, said Martin Indyk, the former Clinton administration’s Middle East adviser whose incisive new book, “Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Diplomacy in the Middle East,” was just published. “This tiny little piece of land, Gaza, has the potential to blow all of these issues wide open and present a huge problem for Barack Obama on Day 1.”
Obama’s great potential for America, noted Indyk, is also a great threat to Islamist radicals — because his narrative holds tremendous appeal for Arabs. For eight years Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have been surfing on a wave of anti-U.S. anger generated by George W. Bush. And that wave has greatly expanded their base.
No doubt, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran are hoping that they can use the Gaza conflict to turn Obama into Bush. They know Barack Hussein Obama must be (am)Bushed — to keep America and its Arab allies on the defensive. Obama has to keep his eye on the prize. His goal — America’s goal — has to be a settlement in Gaza that eliminates the threat of Hamas rockets and opens Gaza economically to the world, under credible international supervision. That’s what will serve U.S. interests, moderate the three great struggles and earn him respect.
January 8, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist
The Gaza Boomerang
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
At a time when Israel is bombing Gaza to try to smash Hamas, it’s worth remembering that Israel itself helped nurture Hamas.
When Hamas was founded in 1987, Israel was mostly concerned with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement and figured that a religious Palestinian organization would help undermine Fatah. Israel calculated that all those Muslim fundamentalists would spend their time praying in the mosques, so it cracked down on Fatah and allowed Hamas to rise as a counterforce.
What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other, and the excessive Israeli ground assault in Gaza is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.
If this pattern continues, we may eventually see Hamas-style Palestinians facing off against hard-line Israelis, with each side making the others’ lives wretched — and political moderates in the Middle East politically eviscerated.
I visited Gaza last summer and found many Palestinians ambivalent in a way that Americans and Israelis often don’t appreciate. Many Gazans scorn Fatah as corrupt and incompetent, and they dislike Hamas’s overzealousness and repression. But when they are suffering and humiliated, they find it emotionally satisfying to see Hamas fighting back.
Granted, Israel was profoundly provoked in this case. Israel sought an extension of its cease-fire with Hamas, and Egypt offered to mediate one — but Hamas refused. When it is shelled by its neighbor, Israel has to do something.
But Israel’s right to do something doesn’t mean it has the right to do anything. Since the shelling from Gaza started in 2001, 20 Israeli civilians have been killed by rockets or mortars, according to a tabulation by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that has killed more than 660 people (it’s difficult to know how many are militants and how many are civilians).
So what could Israel have reasonably done? Bombing the tunnels through which Gazans smuggle weapons would have been a proportionate response, if Israel had stopped there, and the same is true of airstrikes on certain Hamas targets. An even better approach would have been to ease the siege in Gaza, perhaps creating an environment in which Hamas would have extended the cease-fire. It was certainly worth trying — and almost anything would be better than lashing out in a way that would create more boomerangs.
“This policy is not strengthening Israel,” notes Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.
“My colleague in Gaza works for an Israeli organization. She’s learning Hebrew, and she’s just the kind of person we can build a future with. And her 6-year-old nephew, every time a bomb drops from the air, is at first scared and then says — hopefully — maybe the Qassam Brigades will now fire rockets at the Israelis.”
Israel’s strategy has been to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward Hamas. That’s why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza utilities — and why today, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents lack running water, Ms. Bashi said.
“The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza,” she said.
We all know that the most plausible solution to the Middle East mess is a two-state solution along the lines that former President Bill Clinton has proposed. It’s difficult to tell how we get there from here, but a crucial step is to strengthen President Mahmoud Abbas and his Palestinian Authority.
Instead, initial reports are that the assault on Gaza is focusing Arab anger on Mr. Abbas and moderate neighbors like Jordan, undermining the peacemakers.
My courageous Times colleague in Gaza, Taghreed el-Khodary, quoted a 37-year-old father weeping over the corpse of his 11-year-old daughter: “From now on, I am Hamas. I choose resistance.”
Barack Obama has said relatively little about Gaza. At first, given the provocations by Hamas, that was understandable. But as the ground invasion costs more lives, he needs to join European leaders in calling for a new cease-fire on all sides — and after he assumes the presidency, he must provide real leadership that the world craves.
Aaron David Miller, a longtime Middle East peace negotiator for the United States, suggests in his excellent new book, “The Much Too Promised Land,” that presidents should offer Israel “love, but tough love.”
So, Mr. Obama, find your voice. Fall in tough love with Israel.
•
I invite you to visit my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter.
****
January 8, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
What You Don’t Know About Gaza
By RASHID KHALIDI
NEARLY everything you’ve been led to believe about Gaza is wrong. Below are a few essential points that seem to be missing from the conversation, much of which has taken place in the press, about Israel’s attack on the Gaza Strip.
THE GAZANS Most of the people living in Gaza are not there by choice. The majority of the 1.5 million people crammed into the roughly 140 square miles of the Gaza Strip belong to families that came from towns and villages outside Gaza like Ashkelon and Beersheba. They were driven to Gaza by the Israeli Army in 1948.
THE OCCUPATION The Gazans have lived under Israeli occupation since the Six-Day War in 1967. Israel is still widely considered to be an occupying power, even though it removed its troops and settlers from the strip in 2005. Israel still controls access to the area, imports and exports, and the movement of people in and out. Israel has control over Gaza’s air space and sea coast, and its forces enter the area at will. As the occupying power, Israel has the responsibility under the Fourth Geneva Convention to see to the welfare of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip.
THE BLOCKADE Israel’s blockade of the strip, with the support of the United States and the European Union, has grown increasingly stringent since Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. Fuel, electricity, imports, exports and the movement of people in and out of the Strip have been slowly choked off, leading to life-threatening problems of sanitation, health, water supply and transportation.
The blockade has subjected many to unemployment, penury and malnutrition. This amounts to the collective punishment — with the tacit support of the United States — of a civilian population for exercising its democratic rights.
THE CEASE-FIRE Lifting the blockade, along with a cessation of rocket fire, was one of the key terms of the June cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. This accord led to a reduction in rockets fired from Gaza from hundreds in May and June to a total of less than 20 in the subsequent four months (according to Israeli government figures). The cease-fire broke down when Israeli forces launched major air and ground attacks in early November; six Hamas operatives were reported killed.
WAR CRIMES The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious. But the numbers speak for themselves: Nearly 700 Palestinians, most of them civilians, have been killed since the conflict broke out at the end of last year. In contrast, there have been around a dozen Israelis killed, many of them soldiers. Negotiation is a much more effective way to deal with rockets and other forms of violence. This might have been able to happen had Israel fulfilled the terms of the June cease-fire and lifted its blockade of the Gaza Strip.
This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about “restoring Israel’s deterrence,” as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: “The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.”
Rashid Khalidi, a professor of Arab studies at Columbia, is the author of the forthcoming “Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East."
****
January 8, 2009
Fighting to Preserve a Myth
By GIDEON LICHFIELD
Tel Aviv
SUPPOSE Israel manages to prevent its campaign in Gaza from turning into a repeat of its disastrous war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. Suppose the army does not get bogged down fighting in the narrow streets of Gaza’s refugee camps and international outrage at the spiraling death toll does not force it to pull out with rockets still falling on Israeli towns. Suppose no soldiers are taken hostage and Hamas suffers enough damage to force it to accept a cease-fire on Israel’s terms. Then what?
Israeli leaders say often that the result will be to “re-establish deterrence” against Hamas, and by extension against Hezbollah and others. This harks back to the glory days when Israel defeated three Arab armies in 1967 and fought off surprise attacks from Egypt and Syria in 1973. The trouble is that “deterrence” does not exist.
The effect of deterring conventional military attacks, as Israel did back then, was that aggression found other channels. For more than three decades the main threat to Israel has been not from conventional armies but from guerrilla movements like Hamas and Hezbollah. And these groups cannot be deterred.
During the 2006 war, the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said that merely surviving an Israeli onslaught would equal victory for his movement. The same is true of Hamas — even more so, in fact, since it is the only real power in Gaza, whereas Hezbollah is in finely balanced competition with other Lebanese parties. (Indeed, though some Israelis say that Hezbollah’s current silence is proof that deterrence works, the real reason it has not intervened on behalf of Hamas is probably that it does not want to upset the political balance just ahead of the Lebanese elections a few months away.) Deterrence has to be equal to the enemy’s fear of defeat; when the only defeat is annihilation, there is no deterrence unless Israel is prepared to reduce all of Gaza to rubble.
Even if Israel now manages to impose a cease-fire on its terms, the calm will be short-lived unless it is willing to reoccupy much of the Gaza Strip indefinitely. Moreover, as long as Israel plays the role of aggressor in Palestinian eyes, Hamas’s support remains high. And each attack has weakened the relative moderates within Hamas and strengthened its most extremist leaders.
Israel needs instead to abandon its military concept of deterrence in favor of a more pragmatic political one. What could deter Hamas is the fear that by using violence it will lose support among its people.
How to create this? It is worth remembering that Israel launched its operation after the breakdown of a cease-fire that had held, reasonably well, for several months. Each side accused the other of breaching it, both with some justification. Instead of trying to re-establish the cease-fire, Israel’s leaders, driven by the need to bolster their ratings ahead of an election in February, decided to try to strike a decisive blow against Hamas.
What Israel should do now is work for a cease-fire on terms that allow both sides to save some face. It should then do something it has done far too little of in the past: improve Gazans’ living conditions significantly. The aim should be to construct a long-lived state of calm in which Hamas has more to lose by breaching the cease-fire than by sticking to it.
In the longer term Israel will have to accept that Hamas is no fringe movement that can be rooted out and destroyed, but a central part of Palestinian society. This will be the hard part, not least because of the opposition from Hamas’s secularist Palestinian rivals, Fatah.
But even though Hamas’s stated goal is Israel’s destruction, it has said many times that it would accept a truce extending decades. Some former Israeli security chiefs argue that such an accommodation — a peace treaty in all but name — would eventually oblige Hamas to accept Israel’s existence, or else lose its own base of support. It is a gamble, certainly. But the alternative is more innocent lives lost, more extremism and ultimately more trouble for Israel.
Gideon Lichfield, a correspondent for The Economist, was the magazine’s Jerusalem bureau chief from 2005 to 2008.
Op-Ed Columnist
The Gaza Boomerang
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
At a time when Israel is bombing Gaza to try to smash Hamas, it’s worth remembering that Israel itself helped nurture Hamas.
When Hamas was founded in 1987, Israel was mostly concerned with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement and figured that a religious Palestinian organization would help undermine Fatah. Israel calculated that all those Muslim fundamentalists would spend their time praying in the mosques, so it cracked down on Fatah and allowed Hamas to rise as a counterforce.
What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other, and the excessive Israeli ground assault in Gaza is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.
If this pattern continues, we may eventually see Hamas-style Palestinians facing off against hard-line Israelis, with each side making the others’ lives wretched — and political moderates in the Middle East politically eviscerated.
I visited Gaza last summer and found many Palestinians ambivalent in a way that Americans and Israelis often don’t appreciate. Many Gazans scorn Fatah as corrupt and incompetent, and they dislike Hamas’s overzealousness and repression. But when they are suffering and humiliated, they find it emotionally satisfying to see Hamas fighting back.
Granted, Israel was profoundly provoked in this case. Israel sought an extension of its cease-fire with Hamas, and Egypt offered to mediate one — but Hamas refused. When it is shelled by its neighbor, Israel has to do something.
But Israel’s right to do something doesn’t mean it has the right to do anything. Since the shelling from Gaza started in 2001, 20 Israeli civilians have been killed by rockets or mortars, according to a tabulation by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that has killed more than 660 people (it’s difficult to know how many are militants and how many are civilians).
So what could Israel have reasonably done? Bombing the tunnels through which Gazans smuggle weapons would have been a proportionate response, if Israel had stopped there, and the same is true of airstrikes on certain Hamas targets. An even better approach would have been to ease the siege in Gaza, perhaps creating an environment in which Hamas would have extended the cease-fire. It was certainly worth trying — and almost anything would be better than lashing out in a way that would create more boomerangs.
“This policy is not strengthening Israel,” notes Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.
“My colleague in Gaza works for an Israeli organization. She’s learning Hebrew, and she’s just the kind of person we can build a future with. And her 6-year-old nephew, every time a bomb drops from the air, is at first scared and then says — hopefully — maybe the Qassam Brigades will now fire rockets at the Israelis.”
Israel’s strategy has been to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward Hamas. That’s why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza utilities — and why today, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents lack running water, Ms. Bashi said.
“The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza,” she said.
We all know that the most plausible solution to the Middle East mess is a two-state solution along the lines that former President Bill Clinton has proposed. It’s difficult to tell how we get there from here, but a crucial step is to strengthen President Mahmoud Abbas and his Palestinian Authority.
Instead, initial reports are that the assault on Gaza is focusing Arab anger on Mr. Abbas and moderate neighbors like Jordan, undermining the peacemakers.
My courageous Times colleague in Gaza, Taghreed el-Khodary, quoted a 37-year-old father weeping over the corpse of his 11-year-old daughter: “From now on, I am Hamas. I choose resistance.”
Barack Obama has said relatively little about Gaza. At first, given the provocations by Hamas, that was understandable. But as the ground invasion costs more lives, he needs to join European leaders in calling for a new cease-fire on all sides — and after he assumes the presidency, he must provide real leadership that the world craves.
Aaron David Miller, a longtime Middle East peace negotiator for the United States, suggests in his excellent new book, “The Much Too Promised Land,” that presidents should offer Israel “love, but tough love.”
So, Mr. Obama, find your voice. Fall in tough love with Israel.
•
I invite you to visit my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter.
****
January 8, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
What You Don’t Know About Gaza
By RASHID KHALIDI
NEARLY everything you’ve been led to believe about Gaza is wrong. Below are a few essential points that seem to be missing from the conversation, much of which has taken place in the press, about Israel’s attack on the Gaza Strip.
THE GAZANS Most of the people living in Gaza are not there by choice. The majority of the 1.5 million people crammed into the roughly 140 square miles of the Gaza Strip belong to families that came from towns and villages outside Gaza like Ashkelon and Beersheba. They were driven to Gaza by the Israeli Army in 1948.
THE OCCUPATION The Gazans have lived under Israeli occupation since the Six-Day War in 1967. Israel is still widely considered to be an occupying power, even though it removed its troops and settlers from the strip in 2005. Israel still controls access to the area, imports and exports, and the movement of people in and out. Israel has control over Gaza’s air space and sea coast, and its forces enter the area at will. As the occupying power, Israel has the responsibility under the Fourth Geneva Convention to see to the welfare of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip.
THE BLOCKADE Israel’s blockade of the strip, with the support of the United States and the European Union, has grown increasingly stringent since Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. Fuel, electricity, imports, exports and the movement of people in and out of the Strip have been slowly choked off, leading to life-threatening problems of sanitation, health, water supply and transportation.
The blockade has subjected many to unemployment, penury and malnutrition. This amounts to the collective punishment — with the tacit support of the United States — of a civilian population for exercising its democratic rights.
THE CEASE-FIRE Lifting the blockade, along with a cessation of rocket fire, was one of the key terms of the June cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. This accord led to a reduction in rockets fired from Gaza from hundreds in May and June to a total of less than 20 in the subsequent four months (according to Israeli government figures). The cease-fire broke down when Israeli forces launched major air and ground attacks in early November; six Hamas operatives were reported killed.
WAR CRIMES The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious. But the numbers speak for themselves: Nearly 700 Palestinians, most of them civilians, have been killed since the conflict broke out at the end of last year. In contrast, there have been around a dozen Israelis killed, many of them soldiers. Negotiation is a much more effective way to deal with rockets and other forms of violence. This might have been able to happen had Israel fulfilled the terms of the June cease-fire and lifted its blockade of the Gaza Strip.
This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about “restoring Israel’s deterrence,” as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: “The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.”
Rashid Khalidi, a professor of Arab studies at Columbia, is the author of the forthcoming “Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East."
****
January 8, 2009
Fighting to Preserve a Myth
By GIDEON LICHFIELD
Tel Aviv
SUPPOSE Israel manages to prevent its campaign in Gaza from turning into a repeat of its disastrous war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. Suppose the army does not get bogged down fighting in the narrow streets of Gaza’s refugee camps and international outrage at the spiraling death toll does not force it to pull out with rockets still falling on Israeli towns. Suppose no soldiers are taken hostage and Hamas suffers enough damage to force it to accept a cease-fire on Israel’s terms. Then what?
Israeli leaders say often that the result will be to “re-establish deterrence” against Hamas, and by extension against Hezbollah and others. This harks back to the glory days when Israel defeated three Arab armies in 1967 and fought off surprise attacks from Egypt and Syria in 1973. The trouble is that “deterrence” does not exist.
The effect of deterring conventional military attacks, as Israel did back then, was that aggression found other channels. For more than three decades the main threat to Israel has been not from conventional armies but from guerrilla movements like Hamas and Hezbollah. And these groups cannot be deterred.
During the 2006 war, the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said that merely surviving an Israeli onslaught would equal victory for his movement. The same is true of Hamas — even more so, in fact, since it is the only real power in Gaza, whereas Hezbollah is in finely balanced competition with other Lebanese parties. (Indeed, though some Israelis say that Hezbollah’s current silence is proof that deterrence works, the real reason it has not intervened on behalf of Hamas is probably that it does not want to upset the political balance just ahead of the Lebanese elections a few months away.) Deterrence has to be equal to the enemy’s fear of defeat; when the only defeat is annihilation, there is no deterrence unless Israel is prepared to reduce all of Gaza to rubble.
Even if Israel now manages to impose a cease-fire on its terms, the calm will be short-lived unless it is willing to reoccupy much of the Gaza Strip indefinitely. Moreover, as long as Israel plays the role of aggressor in Palestinian eyes, Hamas’s support remains high. And each attack has weakened the relative moderates within Hamas and strengthened its most extremist leaders.
Israel needs instead to abandon its military concept of deterrence in favor of a more pragmatic political one. What could deter Hamas is the fear that by using violence it will lose support among its people.
How to create this? It is worth remembering that Israel launched its operation after the breakdown of a cease-fire that had held, reasonably well, for several months. Each side accused the other of breaching it, both with some justification. Instead of trying to re-establish the cease-fire, Israel’s leaders, driven by the need to bolster their ratings ahead of an election in February, decided to try to strike a decisive blow against Hamas.
What Israel should do now is work for a cease-fire on terms that allow both sides to save some face. It should then do something it has done far too little of in the past: improve Gazans’ living conditions significantly. The aim should be to construct a long-lived state of calm in which Hamas has more to lose by breaching the cease-fire than by sticking to it.
In the longer term Israel will have to accept that Hamas is no fringe movement that can be rooted out and destroyed, but a central part of Palestinian society. This will be the hard part, not least because of the opposition from Hamas’s secularist Palestinian rivals, Fatah.
But even though Hamas’s stated goal is Israel’s destruction, it has said many times that it would accept a truce extending decades. Some former Israeli security chiefs argue that such an accommodation — a peace treaty in all but name — would eventually oblige Hamas to accept Israel’s existence, or else lose its own base of support. It is a gamble, certainly. But the alternative is more innocent lives lost, more extremism and ultimately more trouble for Israel.
Gideon Lichfield, a correspondent for The Economist, was the magazine’s Jerusalem bureau chief from 2005 to 2008.
January 10, 2009
Egyptians Seethe Over Gaza, and Their Leaders Feel Heat
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — Inside Al Azhar Mosque, a 1,000-year-old center of religious learning, the preacher was railing on Friday against Jews. Outside were rows of riot police officers backed by water cannons and dozens of plainclothes officers, there to prevent worshipers from charging into the street to protest against the war in Gaza.
“Muslim brothers,” said the government-appointed preacher, Sheik Eid Abdel Hamid Youssef, “God has inflicted the Muslim nation with a people whom God has become angry at and whom he cursed so he made monkeys and pigs out of them. They killed prophets and messengers and sowed corruption on Earth. They are the most evil on Earth.”
As the war in Gaza burned through its 14th day, Arab governments have felt their legitimacy challenged with an uncommon virulence. With each passing day, and each Palestinian death, the popularity of Hamas and other radical movements has ratcheted higher on the Arab street, while the standing of Arab leaders has suffered.
Nowhere in the Arab world is the gap between the street and the government so wide as here in Egypt, which has a peace treaty with Israel and has refused to allow free passage of goods and people through its border with Gaza, a decision that has been attacked by Islamic and Arab leaders and proved deeply troubling to many Egyptians. And so the government of President Hosni Mubarak appeared to lean back on its standard formula for preserving authority at Friday Prayer, relying on its security forces to keep calm on the street and government religious institutions like Al Azhar to try to appease public sentiment, in this case by lashing out at the Jews in response to Gaza.
“The pressure is mounting on Egypt,” said Abdel Raouf el-Reedy, a former Egyptian ambassador to the United States. “How come you keep the Israeli ambassador here? How come you keep the Egyptian ambassador in Israel? How come you still export gas to Israel in spite of a court order to stop? The system is on the defensive. Public opinion is more clearly on the side of Hamas.”
The mood on the streets of Cairo feels somber, dark, dejected. There is a heavy security presence. Armed riot police officers are massed outside of professional organizations, like the Doctor’s Syndicate, that are often run by members aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, the officially outlawed but tolerated Islamic movement. Massive troop carriers clog small side streets.
Over three days of interviews here, people seemed deflated about the public criticism their country had received, let down by the failure of their own government to help the Palestinians and sickened by the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians, not only combatants but many women and children as well. Over and over, Egyptians said they felt the only ones they could trust were the Islamists — not their government.
“The Muslim Brotherhood’s work gives them credibility,” said Heba Omar, 27, who collected about $4,000 from her neighbors to donate to a charity controlled by brotherhood members. “They do what they can do at times of crisis.”
On Thursday, three young men looked over the railing at the choppy gray waters of the Nile, schoolbooks tucked beneath their arms, jackets zipped up to their chins against the winter chill. “Of course we are sad,” Muhammad Atef, said in a low, defeated voice. “There is nothing we can do. There is nothing in our hands.”
Mr. Atef and his schoolmates, Hazem Khaled and Ramy Morsy, all 19 years old and studying to be electricians, were walking along the Nile Corniche, just opposite the imposing office tower that houses Egypt’s Foreign Ministry.
The diplomats handling the crisis were out of town, in New York City at the United Nations. But the young men said they were looking elsewhere for a chance to help the Palestinians. “The Islamists are very close to us,” Mr. Atef said.
“They are people we can trust,” Mr. Khaled said.
“We trust Islamist organizations,” Mr. Morsy said.
Talk like this has helped press Egypt to change its approach to Gaza, if not its actual policies. When the war first began, Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit lashed out at Hamas, blaming it for inciting the violence by refusing to heed Israel’s warnings to stop its rocket fire.
Egypt took a similar position in 2006, blaming Hezbollah for provoking Israel and setting off its bombing campaign against Lebanon by grabbing two Israeli soldiers in 2006. But then, as now, the government quickly changed its posture in the face of public outrage. “Mubarak lost credibility, not just in the Arab world but in Egypt, too,” said Fahmy Howeidy, an Egyptian writer with Islamist sympathies whose work used to appear in the main government-controlled daily newspaper, Al Ahram.
Egypt quickly tried to recover its standing by promoting a cease-fire initiative. That failed, and again the pressure has been growing. Political and diplomatic experts here say that officials are hoping to prop up Fatah, the secular Palestinian faction that was routed by Hamas and now is in charge of the West Bank. But they fear that as the fighting goes on, their reluctance to come to the aid of Hamas will accomplish exactly the opposite. Fatah may be undermined and Hamas empowered.
“I don’t think that Fatah will be able to go back into Gaza,” said Mr. Reedy. “This is the irony of Israel’s military strength. They will not eliminate Hamas. Hamas will live in the minds of the people.”
For average people, the concerns of the state pale in comparison to the desire to help stop the bloodshed. At Friday Prayer, which serves as a nexus between religion and politics for Muslims, leading Islamic scholars in the Middle East called for Muslims throughout the world to come together under the flag of Islam to help. And preachers heeded their call, very often taking aim at Israel, the Jewish people, the United States and the Egyptian president.
“The truth about Jews is that they killed prophets and messengers and broke pacts and promises between them and other nations,” said Ilyas Ait Siarabi during his sermon in a neighborhood mosque in Algiers. “And they seek to spill blood and kill the souls of innocent old men, women and weak children.”
At the state-controlled Al Azhar in Cairo, Sheik Yousef ended his talk by calling for unity. “Muslim brothers, division among Muslims today is what weakens them and made the enemy get at them,” he said, his voice booming from loudspeakers mounted outside the mosque. “What we have to do, Muslim brothers, is come together and strengthen our external and internal fronts.”
Before the service had started, a woman had stood in front of the women’s section — men and women pray in separate areas of the mosque — and asked everyone to stay behind when it was over. She said they wanted the women to create a wall to protect the men, who planned to protest, from being taken or beaten by the police. When the service was over, a woman jumped to her feet and shouted, “Open the border, open the border.”
A police officer shouted for everyone to leave, and the congregants made their way onto the street crowded with security men and riot police officers. There never was a demonstration.
Mona el-Naggar contributed reporting.
Egyptians Seethe Over Gaza, and Their Leaders Feel Heat
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — Inside Al Azhar Mosque, a 1,000-year-old center of religious learning, the preacher was railing on Friday against Jews. Outside were rows of riot police officers backed by water cannons and dozens of plainclothes officers, there to prevent worshipers from charging into the street to protest against the war in Gaza.
“Muslim brothers,” said the government-appointed preacher, Sheik Eid Abdel Hamid Youssef, “God has inflicted the Muslim nation with a people whom God has become angry at and whom he cursed so he made monkeys and pigs out of them. They killed prophets and messengers and sowed corruption on Earth. They are the most evil on Earth.”
As the war in Gaza burned through its 14th day, Arab governments have felt their legitimacy challenged with an uncommon virulence. With each passing day, and each Palestinian death, the popularity of Hamas and other radical movements has ratcheted higher on the Arab street, while the standing of Arab leaders has suffered.
Nowhere in the Arab world is the gap between the street and the government so wide as here in Egypt, which has a peace treaty with Israel and has refused to allow free passage of goods and people through its border with Gaza, a decision that has been attacked by Islamic and Arab leaders and proved deeply troubling to many Egyptians. And so the government of President Hosni Mubarak appeared to lean back on its standard formula for preserving authority at Friday Prayer, relying on its security forces to keep calm on the street and government religious institutions like Al Azhar to try to appease public sentiment, in this case by lashing out at the Jews in response to Gaza.
“The pressure is mounting on Egypt,” said Abdel Raouf el-Reedy, a former Egyptian ambassador to the United States. “How come you keep the Israeli ambassador here? How come you keep the Egyptian ambassador in Israel? How come you still export gas to Israel in spite of a court order to stop? The system is on the defensive. Public opinion is more clearly on the side of Hamas.”
The mood on the streets of Cairo feels somber, dark, dejected. There is a heavy security presence. Armed riot police officers are massed outside of professional organizations, like the Doctor’s Syndicate, that are often run by members aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, the officially outlawed but tolerated Islamic movement. Massive troop carriers clog small side streets.
Over three days of interviews here, people seemed deflated about the public criticism their country had received, let down by the failure of their own government to help the Palestinians and sickened by the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians, not only combatants but many women and children as well. Over and over, Egyptians said they felt the only ones they could trust were the Islamists — not their government.
“The Muslim Brotherhood’s work gives them credibility,” said Heba Omar, 27, who collected about $4,000 from her neighbors to donate to a charity controlled by brotherhood members. “They do what they can do at times of crisis.”
On Thursday, three young men looked over the railing at the choppy gray waters of the Nile, schoolbooks tucked beneath their arms, jackets zipped up to their chins against the winter chill. “Of course we are sad,” Muhammad Atef, said in a low, defeated voice. “There is nothing we can do. There is nothing in our hands.”
Mr. Atef and his schoolmates, Hazem Khaled and Ramy Morsy, all 19 years old and studying to be electricians, were walking along the Nile Corniche, just opposite the imposing office tower that houses Egypt’s Foreign Ministry.
The diplomats handling the crisis were out of town, in New York City at the United Nations. But the young men said they were looking elsewhere for a chance to help the Palestinians. “The Islamists are very close to us,” Mr. Atef said.
“They are people we can trust,” Mr. Khaled said.
“We trust Islamist organizations,” Mr. Morsy said.
Talk like this has helped press Egypt to change its approach to Gaza, if not its actual policies. When the war first began, Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit lashed out at Hamas, blaming it for inciting the violence by refusing to heed Israel’s warnings to stop its rocket fire.
Egypt took a similar position in 2006, blaming Hezbollah for provoking Israel and setting off its bombing campaign against Lebanon by grabbing two Israeli soldiers in 2006. But then, as now, the government quickly changed its posture in the face of public outrage. “Mubarak lost credibility, not just in the Arab world but in Egypt, too,” said Fahmy Howeidy, an Egyptian writer with Islamist sympathies whose work used to appear in the main government-controlled daily newspaper, Al Ahram.
Egypt quickly tried to recover its standing by promoting a cease-fire initiative. That failed, and again the pressure has been growing. Political and diplomatic experts here say that officials are hoping to prop up Fatah, the secular Palestinian faction that was routed by Hamas and now is in charge of the West Bank. But they fear that as the fighting goes on, their reluctance to come to the aid of Hamas will accomplish exactly the opposite. Fatah may be undermined and Hamas empowered.
“I don’t think that Fatah will be able to go back into Gaza,” said Mr. Reedy. “This is the irony of Israel’s military strength. They will not eliminate Hamas. Hamas will live in the minds of the people.”
For average people, the concerns of the state pale in comparison to the desire to help stop the bloodshed. At Friday Prayer, which serves as a nexus between religion and politics for Muslims, leading Islamic scholars in the Middle East called for Muslims throughout the world to come together under the flag of Islam to help. And preachers heeded their call, very often taking aim at Israel, the Jewish people, the United States and the Egyptian president.
“The truth about Jews is that they killed prophets and messengers and broke pacts and promises between them and other nations,” said Ilyas Ait Siarabi during his sermon in a neighborhood mosque in Algiers. “And they seek to spill blood and kill the souls of innocent old men, women and weak children.”
At the state-controlled Al Azhar in Cairo, Sheik Yousef ended his talk by calling for unity. “Muslim brothers, division among Muslims today is what weakens them and made the enemy get at them,” he said, his voice booming from loudspeakers mounted outside the mosque. “What we have to do, Muslim brothers, is come together and strengthen our external and internal fronts.”
Before the service had started, a woman had stood in front of the women’s section — men and women pray in separate areas of the mosque — and asked everyone to stay behind when it was over. She said they wanted the women to create a wall to protect the men, who planned to protest, from being taken or beaten by the police. When the service was over, a woman jumped to her feet and shouted, “Open the border, open the border.”
A police officer shouted for everyone to leave, and the congregants made their way onto the street crowded with security men and riot police officers. There never was a demonstration.
Mona el-Naggar contributed reporting.
There are photos at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world ... &th&emc=th
January 13, 2009
Gulf Oil States Seeking a Lead in Clean Energy
By ELISABETH ROSENTHAL
ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — With one of the highest per capita carbon footprints in the world, these oil-rich emirates would seem an unlikely place for a green revolution.
Gasoline sells for 45 cents a gallon. There is little public transportation and no recycling. Residents drive between air-conditioned apartments and air-conditioned malls, which are lighted 24/7.
Still, the region’s leaders know energy and money, having built their wealth on oil. They understand that oil is a finite resource, vulnerable to competition from new energy sources.
So even as President-elect Barack Obama talks about promoting green jobs as America’s route out of recession, gulf states, including the emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are making a concerted push to become the Silicon Valley of alternative energy.
They are aggressively pouring billions of dollars made in the oil fields into new green technologies. They are establishing billion-dollar clean-technology investment funds. And they are putting millions of dollars behind research projects at universities from California to Boston to London, and setting up green research parks at home.
“Abu Dhabi is an oil-exporting country, and we want to become an energy-exporting country, and to do that we need to excel at the newer forms of energy,” said Khaled Awad, a director of Masdar, a futuristic zero-carbon city and a research park that has an affiliation with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, that is rising from the desert on the outskirts of Abu Dhabi.
These are long-term investments in an alternative energy future that neither falling oil prices nor the global downturn seems likely to reverse. Even as the local real estate market is foundering, leaders in politics, business and research from across the globe will flock to this distant kingdom for three days starting Monday for the second World Future Energy Summit, which just one year after its inception here has become something of a Davos gathering on renewable energy.
This year’s guest list includes a former British prime minister, Tony Blair, and the European Union energy commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, as well as the oil and gas ministers of Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. In attendance will also be executives representing hundreds of companies, large and small, from BP and Credit Suisse to dozens of start-up companies from Europe and the United States.
“Truth is that locally money is tight as everywhere, and the property market is certainly taking a correction downwards,” said Richard Hease, whose Dubai-based company, Turret Middle East, organized the conference. “But on the renewable energy front, it is business as usual.”
This new investment aims to maintain the gulf’s dominant position as a global energy supplier, gaining patents from the new technologies and promoting green manufacturing. But if the United States and the European Union have set energy independence from the gulf states as a goal of new renewable energy efforts, they may find they are arriving late at the party.
“The leadership in these breakthrough technologies is a title the U.S. can lose easily,” said Peter Barker-Homek, chief executive of Taqa, Abu Dhabi’s national energy company. “Here we have low taxes, a young population, accessibility to the world, abundant natural resources and willingness to invest in the seed capital.”
The vision of a renewable future in the gulf is rooted not so much in a fuzzy green sentiment — though that is starting to take hold — as in analysis of the region’s economic future and the high-end lifestyles of its citizens.
“You see what the gulf states have achieved in terms of modern infrastructure and beautiful architecture, but this has come at a very high environmental price,” said Mr. Awad of Masdar, standing in a field of 40 types of solar panels that the project’s engineers are testing, and using to power offices.
“We know we can’t continue with this carbon footprint,” he said. “We have to change. This is why Abu Dhabi must develop new models — for the planet, of course, but also so as not to jeopardize Abu Dhabi.”
The world is now consuming 80 million barrels of oil a day, and that could continue to rise steeply over the coming decades if population and consumption trends continue. That could mean having to add six Saudi Arabias worth of oil output just to keep up, according to Mr. Barker-Homek, at a time when scientists are warning that carbon levels need to be cut significantly to avoid potentially disastrous global warming.
To hedge their positions, then, an increasingly sophisticated generation of largely Western-educated leaders in the Middle East are seizing on green business opportunities, by seeding research in faraway nations.
The crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the wealthiest of the seven emirates that make up the United Arab Emirates, announced last January that he would invest $15 billion in renewable energy. That is the same amount that President-elect Obama has proposed investing — in the entire United States — “to catalyze private sector efforts to build a clean energy future.”
Masdar, the model city that will generate no carbon emissions, is tied to the crown prince’s ambitions. Designed by Norman Foster, the British architect, it will include a satellite campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as well as a research park with laboratories affiliated with Imperial College London and other institutions.
In Saudi Arabia, the new state-owned King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, or Kaust, gave a Stanford scientist $25 million last year to start a research center on how to make the cost of solar power competitive with that of coal. Kaust, now in its first grant cycle, also gave $8 million to a Berkeley researcher developing green concrete.
And it has other agreements as well, with Caltech, Cambridge, Cornell, Imperial, La Sapienza, Oxford and Utrecht, to name just a few.
In November, the Qatari government signed an agreement with Britain’s visiting prime minister, Gordon Brown, to invest £150 million, or more than $220 million, in a British low-carbon technology fund, dwarfing the fund’s investments from home.
For the rest of the world, the enormous cash infusion may provide the important boost experts say is needed to get dozens of emerging technologies — like carbon capture, microsolar and low-carbon aluminum — over the development hump to make them cost-effective.
“The impact has been enormous,” said Michael McGehee, the associate professor at Stanford who received the $25 million Saudi grant. “It has greatly accelerated the development process.”
Director of the largest solar cell research group in the world, Professor McGehee had tried and failed to get money from the United States government or American industries to commercialize cheaper solar cells. Research money is tight, he noted.
With the Saudi money he has hired 16 new researchers and expects the new energy cells to dominate the market by 2015. “People are astonished to see how big this grant is and where it came from,” he said, noting that his past grants from the United States government were one-fiftieth that amount.
Experts say the vast investments from the gulf states have already restarted stalled environmental technologies.
Nancy Tuor, vice chairwoman of CH2M Hill, the Canadian construction firm that is building Masdar city, said that the sheer size of the investment had had a “forcing effect,” pushing polluting industries to experiment with cleaner solutions.
For example, initial plans for Masdar excluded both aluminum and conventional concrete because the production of those materials generates high levels of carbon emissions, which warm the planet. Aluminum manufacturers protested and came back with a product that reduced emissions by 90 percent compared with regular aluminum; it is now included in the project.
Proponents say Masdar goes beyond creating new materials and is in fact exploring a new model for urban life. Masdar will use one quarter of the energy of a conventional city its size (about 50,000 people) — an amount that it will produce itself.
“When people think about sustainability, they think about devices,” said Gerard Evenden, a partner at Foster and Partners, the British architectural firm that is designing the site. “But here you’re taking it to a city scale, which has much more of an impact — connecting the devices to the structure to the transportation to the people.”
The city will have no cars; people will move around using driverless electric vehicles that move on a subterranean level. The air-conditioning will be solar powered.
With no industrial history, the gulf states say they have the advantage of starting from scratch in developing green manufacturing; countries like the United States are forced to retool ailing industries, like car manufacturing.
Also, although the gulf states have previously showed little interest in green energy like wind or solar, they have another advantage, Mr. Awad noted as he stood in the shimmering desert. “The sun shines 365 days a year,” he said.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world ... &th&emc=th
January 13, 2009
Gulf Oil States Seeking a Lead in Clean Energy
By ELISABETH ROSENTHAL
ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — With one of the highest per capita carbon footprints in the world, these oil-rich emirates would seem an unlikely place for a green revolution.
Gasoline sells for 45 cents a gallon. There is little public transportation and no recycling. Residents drive between air-conditioned apartments and air-conditioned malls, which are lighted 24/7.
Still, the region’s leaders know energy and money, having built their wealth on oil. They understand that oil is a finite resource, vulnerable to competition from new energy sources.
So even as President-elect Barack Obama talks about promoting green jobs as America’s route out of recession, gulf states, including the emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are making a concerted push to become the Silicon Valley of alternative energy.
They are aggressively pouring billions of dollars made in the oil fields into new green technologies. They are establishing billion-dollar clean-technology investment funds. And they are putting millions of dollars behind research projects at universities from California to Boston to London, and setting up green research parks at home.
“Abu Dhabi is an oil-exporting country, and we want to become an energy-exporting country, and to do that we need to excel at the newer forms of energy,” said Khaled Awad, a director of Masdar, a futuristic zero-carbon city and a research park that has an affiliation with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, that is rising from the desert on the outskirts of Abu Dhabi.
These are long-term investments in an alternative energy future that neither falling oil prices nor the global downturn seems likely to reverse. Even as the local real estate market is foundering, leaders in politics, business and research from across the globe will flock to this distant kingdom for three days starting Monday for the second World Future Energy Summit, which just one year after its inception here has become something of a Davos gathering on renewable energy.
This year’s guest list includes a former British prime minister, Tony Blair, and the European Union energy commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, as well as the oil and gas ministers of Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. In attendance will also be executives representing hundreds of companies, large and small, from BP and Credit Suisse to dozens of start-up companies from Europe and the United States.
“Truth is that locally money is tight as everywhere, and the property market is certainly taking a correction downwards,” said Richard Hease, whose Dubai-based company, Turret Middle East, organized the conference. “But on the renewable energy front, it is business as usual.”
This new investment aims to maintain the gulf’s dominant position as a global energy supplier, gaining patents from the new technologies and promoting green manufacturing. But if the United States and the European Union have set energy independence from the gulf states as a goal of new renewable energy efforts, they may find they are arriving late at the party.
“The leadership in these breakthrough technologies is a title the U.S. can lose easily,” said Peter Barker-Homek, chief executive of Taqa, Abu Dhabi’s national energy company. “Here we have low taxes, a young population, accessibility to the world, abundant natural resources and willingness to invest in the seed capital.”
The vision of a renewable future in the gulf is rooted not so much in a fuzzy green sentiment — though that is starting to take hold — as in analysis of the region’s economic future and the high-end lifestyles of its citizens.
“You see what the gulf states have achieved in terms of modern infrastructure and beautiful architecture, but this has come at a very high environmental price,” said Mr. Awad of Masdar, standing in a field of 40 types of solar panels that the project’s engineers are testing, and using to power offices.
“We know we can’t continue with this carbon footprint,” he said. “We have to change. This is why Abu Dhabi must develop new models — for the planet, of course, but also so as not to jeopardize Abu Dhabi.”
The world is now consuming 80 million barrels of oil a day, and that could continue to rise steeply over the coming decades if population and consumption trends continue. That could mean having to add six Saudi Arabias worth of oil output just to keep up, according to Mr. Barker-Homek, at a time when scientists are warning that carbon levels need to be cut significantly to avoid potentially disastrous global warming.
To hedge their positions, then, an increasingly sophisticated generation of largely Western-educated leaders in the Middle East are seizing on green business opportunities, by seeding research in faraway nations.
The crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the wealthiest of the seven emirates that make up the United Arab Emirates, announced last January that he would invest $15 billion in renewable energy. That is the same amount that President-elect Obama has proposed investing — in the entire United States — “to catalyze private sector efforts to build a clean energy future.”
Masdar, the model city that will generate no carbon emissions, is tied to the crown prince’s ambitions. Designed by Norman Foster, the British architect, it will include a satellite campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as well as a research park with laboratories affiliated with Imperial College London and other institutions.
In Saudi Arabia, the new state-owned King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, or Kaust, gave a Stanford scientist $25 million last year to start a research center on how to make the cost of solar power competitive with that of coal. Kaust, now in its first grant cycle, also gave $8 million to a Berkeley researcher developing green concrete.
And it has other agreements as well, with Caltech, Cambridge, Cornell, Imperial, La Sapienza, Oxford and Utrecht, to name just a few.
In November, the Qatari government signed an agreement with Britain’s visiting prime minister, Gordon Brown, to invest £150 million, or more than $220 million, in a British low-carbon technology fund, dwarfing the fund’s investments from home.
For the rest of the world, the enormous cash infusion may provide the important boost experts say is needed to get dozens of emerging technologies — like carbon capture, microsolar and low-carbon aluminum — over the development hump to make them cost-effective.
“The impact has been enormous,” said Michael McGehee, the associate professor at Stanford who received the $25 million Saudi grant. “It has greatly accelerated the development process.”
Director of the largest solar cell research group in the world, Professor McGehee had tried and failed to get money from the United States government or American industries to commercialize cheaper solar cells. Research money is tight, he noted.
With the Saudi money he has hired 16 new researchers and expects the new energy cells to dominate the market by 2015. “People are astonished to see how big this grant is and where it came from,” he said, noting that his past grants from the United States government were one-fiftieth that amount.
Experts say the vast investments from the gulf states have already restarted stalled environmental technologies.
Nancy Tuor, vice chairwoman of CH2M Hill, the Canadian construction firm that is building Masdar city, said that the sheer size of the investment had had a “forcing effect,” pushing polluting industries to experiment with cleaner solutions.
For example, initial plans for Masdar excluded both aluminum and conventional concrete because the production of those materials generates high levels of carbon emissions, which warm the planet. Aluminum manufacturers protested and came back with a product that reduced emissions by 90 percent compared with regular aluminum; it is now included in the project.
Proponents say Masdar goes beyond creating new materials and is in fact exploring a new model for urban life. Masdar will use one quarter of the energy of a conventional city its size (about 50,000 people) — an amount that it will produce itself.
“When people think about sustainability, they think about devices,” said Gerard Evenden, a partner at Foster and Partners, the British architectural firm that is designing the site. “But here you’re taking it to a city scale, which has much more of an impact — connecting the devices to the structure to the transportation to the people.”
The city will have no cars; people will move around using driverless electric vehicles that move on a subterranean level. The air-conditioning will be solar powered.
With no industrial history, the gulf states say they have the advantage of starting from scratch in developing green manufacturing; countries like the United States are forced to retool ailing industries, like car manufacturing.
Also, although the gulf states have previously showed little interest in green energy like wind or solar, they have another advantage, Mr. Awad noted as he stood in the shimmering desert. “The sun shines 365 days a year,” he said.
January 25, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist
This Is Not a Test
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Stop me if you’ve heard this one before. “Guy walks into a bar ...” No, not that one — this one: “This is the most critical year ever for Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. It is five minutes to midnight. If we don’t get diplomacy back on track soon, it will be the end of the two-state solution.”
I’ve heard that line almost every year for the last 20, and I’ve never bought it. Well, today, I’m buying it.
We’re getting perilously close to closing the window on a two-state solution, because the two chief window-closers — Hamas in Gaza and the fanatical Jewish settlers in the West Bank — have been in the driver’s seats. Hamas is busy making a two-state solution inconceivable, while the settlers have steadily worked to make it impossible.
If Hamas continues to obtain and use longer- and longer-range rockets, there is no way any Israeli government can or will tolerate independent Palestinian control of the West Bank, because a rocket from there can easily close the Tel Aviv airport and shut down Israel’s economy.
And if the Jewish settlers continue with their “natural growth” to devour the West Bank, it will also be effectively off the table. No Israeli government has mustered the will to take down even the “illegal,” unauthorized settlements, despite promises to the U.S. to do so, so it’s getting hard to see how the “legal” settlements will ever be removed. What is needed from Israel’s Feb. 10 elections is a centrist, national unity government that can resist the blackmail of the settlers, and the rightist parties that protect them, to still implement a two-state solution.
Because without a stable two-state solution, what you will have is an Israel hiding behind a high wall, defending itself from a Hamas-run failed state in Gaza, a Hezbollah-run failed state in south Lebanon and a Fatah-run failed state in Ramallah. Have a nice day.
So if you believe in the necessity of a Palestinian state or you love Israel, you’d better start paying attention. This is not a test. We’re at a hinge of history.
What makes it so challenging for the new Obama team is that Mideast diplomacy has been transformed as a result of the regional disintegration since Oslo — in three key ways.
First, in the old days, Henry Kissinger could fly to three capitals, meet three kings, presidents or prime ministers and strike a deal that could hold. No more. Today a peacemaker has to be both a nation-builder and a negotiator.
The Palestinians are so fragmented politically and geographically that half of U.S. diplomacy is going to be about how to make peace between Palestinians, and build their institutions, so there is a coherent, legitimate decision-making body there — before we can make peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
Second, Hamas now has a veto over any Palestinian peace deal. It’s true that Hamas just provoked a reckless war that has devastated the people of Gaza. But Hamas is not going away. It is well armed and, despite its suicidal behavior of late, deeply rooted.
The Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank will not make any compromise deal with Israel as long as it fears that Hamas, from outside the tent, would denounce it as traitorous. Therefore, Job 2 for the U.S., Israel and the Arab states is to find a way to bring Hamas into a Palestinian national unity government.
As the Middle East expert Stephen P. Cohen says, “It is not enough for Israel that the world recognize that Hamas criminally mismanaged its responsibility to its people. Israel’s longer-term interest is to be sure that it has a Palestinian partner for negotiations, which will have sufficient legitimacy among its own people to be able to sign agreements and fulfill them. Without Hamas as part of a Palestinian decision, any Israeli-Palestinian peace will be meaningless.”
But bringing Hamas into a Palestinian unity government, without undermining the West Bank moderates now leading the Palestinian Authority, will be tricky. We’ll need Saudi Arabia and Egypt to buy, cajole and pressure Hamas into keeping the cease-fire, supporting peace talks and to give up rockets — while Iran and Syria will be tugging Hamas the other way.
And that leads to the third new factor — Iran as a key player in Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. The Clinton team tried to woo Syria while isolating Iran. President Bush tried to isolate both Iran and Syria. The Obama team, as Martin Indyk argues in “Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East,” “needs to try both to bring in Syria, which would weaken Hamas and Hezbollah, while also engaging Iran.”
So, just to recap: It’s five to midnight and before the clock strikes 12 all we need to do is rebuild Fatah, merge it with Hamas, elect an Israeli government that can freeze settlements, court Syria and engage Iran — while preventing it from going nuclear — just so we can get the parties to start talking. Whoever lines up all the pieces of this diplomatic Rubik’s Cube deserves two Nobel Prizes.
****
January 25, 2009
Op-Ed Contributors
How Words Could End a War
By SCOTT ATRAN and JEREMY GINGES
AS diplomats stitch together a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, the most depressing feature of the conflict is the sense that future fighting is inevitable. Rational calculation suggests that neither side can win these wars. The thousands of lives and billions of dollars sacrificed in fighting demonstrate the advantages of peace and coexistence; yet still both sides opt to fight.
This small territory is the world’s great symbolic knot. “Palestine is the mother of all problems” is a common refrain among people we have interviewed across the Muslim world: from Middle Eastern leaders to fighters in the remote island jungles of Indonesia; from Islamist senators in Pakistan to volunteers for martyrdom on the move from Morocco to Iraq.
Some analysts see this as a testament to the essentially religious nature of the conflict. But research we recently undertook suggests a way to go beyond that. For there is a moral logic to seemingly intractable religious and cultural disputes. These conflicts cannot be reduced to secular calculations of interest but must be dealt with on their own terms, a logic very different from the marketplace or realpolitik.
Across the world, people believe that devotion to sacred or core values that incorporate moral beliefs — like the welfare of family and country, or commitment to religion and honor — are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Our studies, carried out with the support of the National Science Foundation and the Defense Department, suggest that people will reject material compensation for dropping their commitment to sacred values and will defend those values regardless of the costs.
In our research, we surveyed nearly 4,000 Palestinians and Israelis from 2004 to 2008, questioning citizens across the political spectrum including refugees, supporters of Hamas and Israeli settlers in the West Bank. We asked them to react to hypothetical but realistic compromises in which their side would be required to give away something it valued in return for a lasting peace.
All those surveyed responded to the same set of deals. First they would be given a straight-up offer in which each side would make difficult concessions in exchange for peace; next they were given a scenario in which their side was granted an additional material incentive; and last came a proposal in which the other side agreed to a symbolic sacrifice of one of its sacred values.
For example, a typical set of trade-offs offered to a Palestinian might begin with this premise: Suppose the United Nations organized a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians under which Palestinians would be required to give up their right to return to their homes in Israel and there would be two states, a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Second, we would sweeten the pot: in return, Western nations would give the Palestinian state $10 billion a year for 100 years. Then the symbolic concession: For its part, Israel would officially apologize for the displacement of civilians in the 1948 war
Indeed, across the political spectrum, almost everyone we surveyed rejected the initial solutions we offered — ideas that are accepted as common sense among most Westerners, like simply trading land for peace or accepting shared sovereignty over Jerusalem. Why the opposition to trade-offs for peace?
Many of the respondents insisted that the values involved were sacred to them. For example, nearly half the Israeli settlers we surveyed said they would not consider trading any land in the West Bank — territory they believe was granted them by God — in exchange for peace. More than half the Palestinians considered full sovereignty over Jerusalem in the same light, and more than four-fifths felt that the “right of return” was a sacred value, too.
As for sweetening the pot, in general the greater the monetary incentive involved in the deal, the greater the disgust from respondents. Israelis and Palestinians alike often reacted as though we had asked them to sell their children. This strongly implies that using the standard approaches of “business-like negotiations” favored by Western diplomats will only backfire.
Many Westerners seem to ignore these clearly expressed “irrational” preferences, because in a sensible world they ought not to exist. Diplomats hope that peace and concrete progress on material and quality-of-life matters (electricity, water, agriculture, the economy and so on) will eventually make people forget the more heartfelt issues. But this is only a recipe for another Hundred Years’ War — progress on everyday material matters will simply heighten attention on value-laden issues of “who we are and want to be.”
Fortunately, our work also offers hints of another, more optimistic course.
Absolutists who violently rejected offers of money or peace for sacred land were considerably more inclined to accept deals that involved their enemies making symbolic but difficult gestures. For example, Palestinian hard-liners were more willing to consider recognizing the right of Israel to exist if the Israelis simply offered an official apology for Palestinian suffering in the 1948 war. Similarly, Israeli respondents said they could live with a partition of Jerusalem and borders very close to those that existed before the 1967 war if Hamas and the other major Palestinian groups explicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist.
Remarkably, our survey results were mirrored by our discussions with political leaders from both sides. For example, Mousa Abu Marzook (the deputy chairman of Hamas) said no when we proposed a trade-off for peace without granting a right of return. He became angry when we added in the idea of substantial American aid for rebuilding: “No, we do not sell ourselves for any amount.”
But when we mentioned a potential Israeli apology for 1948, he brightened: “Yes, an apology is important, as a beginning. It’s not enough because our houses and land were taken away from us and something has to be done about that.” His response suggested that progress on sacred values might open the way for negotiations on material issues, rather than the reverse.
We got a similar reaction from Benjamin Netanyahu, the hard-line former Israeli prime minister. We asked him whether he would seriously consider accepting a two-state solution following the 1967 borders if all major Palestinian factions, including Hamas, were to recognize the right of the Jewish people to an independent state in the region. He answered, “O.K., but the Palestinians would have to show that they sincerely mean it, change their textbooks and anti-Semitic characterizations.”
Making these sorts of wholly intangible “symbolic” concessions, like an apology or recognition of a right to exist, simply doesn’t compute on any utilitarian calculus. And yet the science says they may be the best way to start cutting the knot.
Scott Atran, an anthropologist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, John Jay College and the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, is the author of the forthcoming “Talking to the Enemy.” Jeremy Ginges is a professor of psychology at the New School for Social Research.
Op-Ed Columnist
This Is Not a Test
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Stop me if you’ve heard this one before. “Guy walks into a bar ...” No, not that one — this one: “This is the most critical year ever for Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. It is five minutes to midnight. If we don’t get diplomacy back on track soon, it will be the end of the two-state solution.”
I’ve heard that line almost every year for the last 20, and I’ve never bought it. Well, today, I’m buying it.
We’re getting perilously close to closing the window on a two-state solution, because the two chief window-closers — Hamas in Gaza and the fanatical Jewish settlers in the West Bank — have been in the driver’s seats. Hamas is busy making a two-state solution inconceivable, while the settlers have steadily worked to make it impossible.
If Hamas continues to obtain and use longer- and longer-range rockets, there is no way any Israeli government can or will tolerate independent Palestinian control of the West Bank, because a rocket from there can easily close the Tel Aviv airport and shut down Israel’s economy.
And if the Jewish settlers continue with their “natural growth” to devour the West Bank, it will also be effectively off the table. No Israeli government has mustered the will to take down even the “illegal,” unauthorized settlements, despite promises to the U.S. to do so, so it’s getting hard to see how the “legal” settlements will ever be removed. What is needed from Israel’s Feb. 10 elections is a centrist, national unity government that can resist the blackmail of the settlers, and the rightist parties that protect them, to still implement a two-state solution.
Because without a stable two-state solution, what you will have is an Israel hiding behind a high wall, defending itself from a Hamas-run failed state in Gaza, a Hezbollah-run failed state in south Lebanon and a Fatah-run failed state in Ramallah. Have a nice day.
So if you believe in the necessity of a Palestinian state or you love Israel, you’d better start paying attention. This is not a test. We’re at a hinge of history.
What makes it so challenging for the new Obama team is that Mideast diplomacy has been transformed as a result of the regional disintegration since Oslo — in three key ways.
First, in the old days, Henry Kissinger could fly to three capitals, meet three kings, presidents or prime ministers and strike a deal that could hold. No more. Today a peacemaker has to be both a nation-builder and a negotiator.
The Palestinians are so fragmented politically and geographically that half of U.S. diplomacy is going to be about how to make peace between Palestinians, and build their institutions, so there is a coherent, legitimate decision-making body there — before we can make peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
Second, Hamas now has a veto over any Palestinian peace deal. It’s true that Hamas just provoked a reckless war that has devastated the people of Gaza. But Hamas is not going away. It is well armed and, despite its suicidal behavior of late, deeply rooted.
The Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank will not make any compromise deal with Israel as long as it fears that Hamas, from outside the tent, would denounce it as traitorous. Therefore, Job 2 for the U.S., Israel and the Arab states is to find a way to bring Hamas into a Palestinian national unity government.
As the Middle East expert Stephen P. Cohen says, “It is not enough for Israel that the world recognize that Hamas criminally mismanaged its responsibility to its people. Israel’s longer-term interest is to be sure that it has a Palestinian partner for negotiations, which will have sufficient legitimacy among its own people to be able to sign agreements and fulfill them. Without Hamas as part of a Palestinian decision, any Israeli-Palestinian peace will be meaningless.”
But bringing Hamas into a Palestinian unity government, without undermining the West Bank moderates now leading the Palestinian Authority, will be tricky. We’ll need Saudi Arabia and Egypt to buy, cajole and pressure Hamas into keeping the cease-fire, supporting peace talks and to give up rockets — while Iran and Syria will be tugging Hamas the other way.
And that leads to the third new factor — Iran as a key player in Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. The Clinton team tried to woo Syria while isolating Iran. President Bush tried to isolate both Iran and Syria. The Obama team, as Martin Indyk argues in “Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East,” “needs to try both to bring in Syria, which would weaken Hamas and Hezbollah, while also engaging Iran.”
So, just to recap: It’s five to midnight and before the clock strikes 12 all we need to do is rebuild Fatah, merge it with Hamas, elect an Israeli government that can freeze settlements, court Syria and engage Iran — while preventing it from going nuclear — just so we can get the parties to start talking. Whoever lines up all the pieces of this diplomatic Rubik’s Cube deserves two Nobel Prizes.
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January 25, 2009
Op-Ed Contributors
How Words Could End a War
By SCOTT ATRAN and JEREMY GINGES
AS diplomats stitch together a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, the most depressing feature of the conflict is the sense that future fighting is inevitable. Rational calculation suggests that neither side can win these wars. The thousands of lives and billions of dollars sacrificed in fighting demonstrate the advantages of peace and coexistence; yet still both sides opt to fight.
This small territory is the world’s great symbolic knot. “Palestine is the mother of all problems” is a common refrain among people we have interviewed across the Muslim world: from Middle Eastern leaders to fighters in the remote island jungles of Indonesia; from Islamist senators in Pakistan to volunteers for martyrdom on the move from Morocco to Iraq.
Some analysts see this as a testament to the essentially religious nature of the conflict. But research we recently undertook suggests a way to go beyond that. For there is a moral logic to seemingly intractable religious and cultural disputes. These conflicts cannot be reduced to secular calculations of interest but must be dealt with on their own terms, a logic very different from the marketplace or realpolitik.
Across the world, people believe that devotion to sacred or core values that incorporate moral beliefs — like the welfare of family and country, or commitment to religion and honor — are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Our studies, carried out with the support of the National Science Foundation and the Defense Department, suggest that people will reject material compensation for dropping their commitment to sacred values and will defend those values regardless of the costs.
In our research, we surveyed nearly 4,000 Palestinians and Israelis from 2004 to 2008, questioning citizens across the political spectrum including refugees, supporters of Hamas and Israeli settlers in the West Bank. We asked them to react to hypothetical but realistic compromises in which their side would be required to give away something it valued in return for a lasting peace.
All those surveyed responded to the same set of deals. First they would be given a straight-up offer in which each side would make difficult concessions in exchange for peace; next they were given a scenario in which their side was granted an additional material incentive; and last came a proposal in which the other side agreed to a symbolic sacrifice of one of its sacred values.
For example, a typical set of trade-offs offered to a Palestinian might begin with this premise: Suppose the United Nations organized a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians under which Palestinians would be required to give up their right to return to their homes in Israel and there would be two states, a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Second, we would sweeten the pot: in return, Western nations would give the Palestinian state $10 billion a year for 100 years. Then the symbolic concession: For its part, Israel would officially apologize for the displacement of civilians in the 1948 war
Indeed, across the political spectrum, almost everyone we surveyed rejected the initial solutions we offered — ideas that are accepted as common sense among most Westerners, like simply trading land for peace or accepting shared sovereignty over Jerusalem. Why the opposition to trade-offs for peace?
Many of the respondents insisted that the values involved were sacred to them. For example, nearly half the Israeli settlers we surveyed said they would not consider trading any land in the West Bank — territory they believe was granted them by God — in exchange for peace. More than half the Palestinians considered full sovereignty over Jerusalem in the same light, and more than four-fifths felt that the “right of return” was a sacred value, too.
As for sweetening the pot, in general the greater the monetary incentive involved in the deal, the greater the disgust from respondents. Israelis and Palestinians alike often reacted as though we had asked them to sell their children. This strongly implies that using the standard approaches of “business-like negotiations” favored by Western diplomats will only backfire.
Many Westerners seem to ignore these clearly expressed “irrational” preferences, because in a sensible world they ought not to exist. Diplomats hope that peace and concrete progress on material and quality-of-life matters (electricity, water, agriculture, the economy and so on) will eventually make people forget the more heartfelt issues. But this is only a recipe for another Hundred Years’ War — progress on everyday material matters will simply heighten attention on value-laden issues of “who we are and want to be.”
Fortunately, our work also offers hints of another, more optimistic course.
Absolutists who violently rejected offers of money or peace for sacred land were considerably more inclined to accept deals that involved their enemies making symbolic but difficult gestures. For example, Palestinian hard-liners were more willing to consider recognizing the right of Israel to exist if the Israelis simply offered an official apology for Palestinian suffering in the 1948 war. Similarly, Israeli respondents said they could live with a partition of Jerusalem and borders very close to those that existed before the 1967 war if Hamas and the other major Palestinian groups explicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist.
Remarkably, our survey results were mirrored by our discussions with political leaders from both sides. For example, Mousa Abu Marzook (the deputy chairman of Hamas) said no when we proposed a trade-off for peace without granting a right of return. He became angry when we added in the idea of substantial American aid for rebuilding: “No, we do not sell ourselves for any amount.”
But when we mentioned a potential Israeli apology for 1948, he brightened: “Yes, an apology is important, as a beginning. It’s not enough because our houses and land were taken away from us and something has to be done about that.” His response suggested that progress on sacred values might open the way for negotiations on material issues, rather than the reverse.
We got a similar reaction from Benjamin Netanyahu, the hard-line former Israeli prime minister. We asked him whether he would seriously consider accepting a two-state solution following the 1967 borders if all major Palestinian factions, including Hamas, were to recognize the right of the Jewish people to an independent state in the region. He answered, “O.K., but the Palestinians would have to show that they sincerely mean it, change their textbooks and anti-Semitic characterizations.”
Making these sorts of wholly intangible “symbolic” concessions, like an apology or recognition of a right to exist, simply doesn’t compute on any utilitarian calculus. And yet the science says they may be the best way to start cutting the knot.
Scott Atran, an anthropologist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, John Jay College and the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, is the author of the forthcoming “Talking to the Enemy.” Jeremy Ginges is a professor of psychology at the New School for Social Research.